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I.  Definition ·of subject - Classification and ultimate aim of infrastructures 
- Need to revise their traditional concept for protection of nature and 
life medium 
a)  The collective equipment  - or infrastructures - are usually 
distinguished from equipment described as directly productive -
or superstructures - formed with a  view to market production of 
goods or services.  In these economies of the market,  the former 
are considered to be within the jurisdiction of public authorities  and 
the latter to fall in the realm of ente.1·prise. 
These classifications are hardly satisfactory.  In fact,  certain 
infrastructures are within the jurisdiction of enterprise,  their 
ser:vfces being sometimes free and sometimes sold at a  commercial 
price or non-commercial price.  A case in point is,  for example, 
poweW  as are,  the railways,  telecommunications,  hospitals and 
even universities and motorways.  On the other hand, enterprises 
often make investments which are not directly productive,  in order 
to ensure or improve their working conditions.  This is the case for 
instance when they finance roads,  vocational schools or cultural 
·or sports installations.  Under these conditions,  this is rather more 
a  function of their ultimate aim - public interest in its broadest 
sense - which we suggest for defining and classifying infrastructures, 
whatevermay be their mode of formation,  management or financing. -2-
ln this context,  it is possible to propose a primary distinction 
between : 
a)  Infrastructures with economic aims,  which condition the acti-
vity of enterprises and the material welfare of men: for example, 
transpo:r_-t,  power,  telecommunications. 
b)  Infrastructures with socio-cultural aims,  which condition the 
physical ,  intellectual and moral welfare of men: for example, 
health,  education,  culture and leisure activities. 
c)  Infrastructures with administrative aims,  which condition the 
effective management of the community and its protection by 
public powers and services: for example,  administration,  police 
and defence. 
Undoubtedly,  certain of these infrastructures do not have one sole 
function whose nature isolates them from all others.  However,  such 
a  classification would allow better identification of their principle 
objectives and,  hence,  better specification according to their goal, 
various categories of collective equipment,  costs and recurrent 
expenditure incurred in their use. 
•• 
b)  On the other hand,  the very concept·  of infrastructures produces 
a  complementary proposition.  The management of land,  collective 
equipment and development should henceforward be conceived 1in 
accordance with nature• and with a  view to protection of the life 
medium.  An increasing number of voices of increasing authority 
are now proposing this. -3-
Philippe Saint Marc in particular (1)  has  given a  warning 
that it has  become  urgent  and vital to react against  a 
tendency to self-cancellation of the  growth of industrial 
nations,  which is all the  more  marked  as  those activities 
which are  favourable  to the natural environment represent 
no  more  than a  small part  of production activities, whilst 
'neutral'  or  'injurious'  activities form  the  major part. 
Added  to industrial pollution  (noise,  air and water pollu-
tion,  refuse)  those  of space  (human  overcrowding reduction 
of green areas,  distance  from nature)  tend,  according to 
him,  to  give rise to  a  retrogression of the life medium 
which is greater than the  progression of the  standard of 
living measured in terms  of national accountancy.  As  it 
produces  a  general psychophysical  impoverishment  of man, 
the  progress  of this pollution threatens  to reduce  his 
general welfare at a  greater rate  than it can be  increased 
by progress in the  standard of living. 
Although it is difficult to  estimate  the  full extent  Qf 
this threat,  its existence  cannot  be  challenged.  This 
brings into question again the still too  1productivist 1 
and short  term traditional approach  and  concept  of collec-
tive  equipment without  sufficient regard to  the  protection 
of nature  and  the  life medium  (2). 
On  another plane,  this threat suggests  that  the  approach 
towards  the  problems  of infrastructure  should be  broadenedo 
(1)  'La Socialisation de  la Nature'  - Ed.  STOCK  - Paris  1971 
(2)  Cf.  also  on this subject  L.  Gerardin  'Les  Futurs Possi-
bles'  (Hachette  1971),  p.  65:  'It is going  to be  necessa· 
ry for  economists  to  change  their methods  and  to accept 
that what  Bertrand de Jouvenel  has  called the  'amenities 
of life',  the  quality of life,  must  be  taken into 
account.  S_ums  spent  on  the  restoration of something 
which has  been destroyed by different  means will have 
to be  counted as Negative,  and  not Positive,  as  is the 
case  today  through  a  totally incomprehensible  aberra-
tion.  If we  do  not  take  care it (the  growth)  will  go 
beyond  the  limits and  become,  how ridiculous this is, 
a  real reduction in the  interconnected standard of 
living with an apparent. economic  growth. -4-
In fact,  many of them cannot be compl~tely or correctly solved, 
save by international co-operation and solidarity reached on the 
level of national and world groups.  In this l"espect the extension 
of the role of the organs of the European Community appears in 
particular to be increasingly necessary. 
The present and the past - Total data available - Comments on these -
Irrational utilisation of resot~rces - Sectioning,  disparity and dispersial 
of efforts - Consequence of lack of harmonisation and co-ordination of 
policies 
a)  It is impossible to classify statistically the infrastructures within 
the Community according to objectives ( 1).  But this does not prevent 
the location of the problem of their financing and the search for 
solutions.  In fact,  even if the means of this financing are variable 
and complex,  in its total sense this problem is more simple..  It 
concerns the financing of the totality of the infrastructures and 
directly productive equipments,  without producing harmful im-
balances.  One knows that such imbalances can originate,  for 
example,  from a  reliance on taxes,  savings or credits,  internal 
or external,  which is excessively marked or is resented as being 
too restrictive and which gives rise to an uncompensated monetary 
creation.  Since the means of financing the totality of investments 
are  limited,  the  allocation of  these  means  without  causing 
disorder poses  problems  of priority and  choice  : 
1)  In what measure should these means be allocated both to infras-
tructures and to directly productive equipment ? 
As has been pointed out,  some are set in motion by private and well 
ordered enterprises,  hence,  in directly productive equipment. Others 
financed by public or mixed enterprise,  appear in national accounts 
under the heading 'enterprises  1•  Furthermore,  infrastructures of the 
same kind,  depending on the country,  are sometimes in the charge ofthe 
State  ~nd sometimes ofpublic or mixed enterprises. Enterprise 
investments 
Construction 
of dwellings 
·Public 
investments 
Total: 
-5-
2)  What infrastructures take priority in being established or in 
improvement ? 
3}  What proportion of the resources should be allocated to invest-
ments in the public and the private sectors ? 
In this context,  the evaluation and prospects of investment expen-
diture must first be dealt with on a macro-econom1c basis.  Des-
pite their inadequacy available data of this nature can throw useful 
light on the subject. 
b)  Macro-economic data concerning gross fixed capital formation in 
the Commu~ty 
Total public investment lies between 14 and 15% of the gross fixed 
capital formation during recent years; 
T. 1 - Gross Fixed Capital Formation in the Community 
in milliards of units of account  o/o  of the total  at current prices 
1967  1968  1969  1970  1967  1968  1969  1970 
47.7  51.8  60.8  73. 7  58.5  58. 2  59.6  60. 7 
21. 8  23.8  26. 7  30. 6  26. 8  26.7  26.2  25. 2 
12.0  13. 5  14.5  17. 1  14.7  15. 1  14. 2  14. 1 
81. 5  89. 1  102. 0  121.4  100.0  100. 0  100. 0  100. 0 
Source : Banque Europ~enne d'Inves·tissement,  Rappcnt  Annuel 
(Annual Report) 1970,  page 36. -6-
On th~ other hand,  it would seem that the gross fixed capital formation 
of public administrations has been relatively stable in relation to the 
whole and in relation to the Gross National Product (GNP),  at current 
prices,  in member countries during the period 1961/70 ( 1). 
T. 2  - The gross fixed capital formation in public administrations in 
relation to the internal GFCF (I) and in relation to the GNP at 
current prices (II) 
I  II 
Country  1~fff&e  Variance  f98i_/*Je  Variance 
Germany  16-.  0  1. 01  4. 1  0.35 
Belgium  13~2  2.0  2.8  0.45 
France  13. 2  o. 57  3. 2  o.  31 
Italy  12.4  o. 95  2.6  o.  21 
Netherlands  19. 1  0. 72  4.8  0.25 
Source : Calculated on bases given by the  OECD. 
These overall figures require comment.  In fact,  the investments must 
not be regarded solely from a  quantitative point of view or even from 
the point of view of their origin whether public or private.  More than 
ten years ago,  a  report prepared by the OECD  (2)  concerning investments 
of the member countries during the decade 1950/59  noted  the absence 
of any precise relation : 
- between the rate of investment  and the rate of growth; 
- between the share of public investments in the GNP and the rates of 
investment and growth; 
- between the investments and disposable income of enterprises expres-
sed as a percentage of the national revenue. 
( 1)  The variance is higher for Belgium due to a  greater effort in infrastructure 
during the last three years. 
(2)  International report on factors of policy nature affecting investments  Bruce 
Williams. -7-
The establishment of these facts confirms,  although it has not yet 
been proved,  the importance of the search for the optimum,  that 
is to say the quality of the economic dimensions and efficiency and 
of elimination of euplications,  cost escalation and wastage in the 
sphere of investment.  This importance is even greater since the 
investments commit and determine the future.  As has been stressed 
by P.  Mass~, 
1 to invest is,  in a  way,  to freeze• ( 1)  Since the greater part of in-
vestments becomes more and more costly,  the commitment implied 
becomes increasingly binding. 
Furthermore,  as has been recalled,  certain investments compromise 
the life medium,  that is to say the ultimate aim of all development 
policy:  human progress.  Some authoritative voices consider these 
investments to be on the increase.  Besides,  it is evident that,  as 
investment  policy - be they of infrastructure or directly productive 
equipments - becomes aore rational and draws nearer to the optimum, 
it can in large measure economise on methods of financing.  For 
example,  the cost of a  preventive policy of protection of nature and 
limitation or even suppression of damaging factors could be very much 
less than that of rehabilitation of a  damaged environment.  The pollution 
which is caused by many industries could often be reduced through 
relatively inexpensive investments. 
Finally,  the formation of a  European Community involves the search 
for a  balanced development not only of countries but also of regions, 
that is special support for the conversion of backward or weakened 
zones. 
( 1}  1Les Choix des Investissements1  (P.  Mass~) Ed.  Dunod,  Paris 
(2)  Cf.  particularly on this subject,  in addition to authors already quoted: 
1Le Jugement dernier1  (Gordon Rattray Taylor),  Ed.  Calmann-Levy and 
'R~flexions au bord du gouffre  1  (G.  Picht} Ed. Laffont. -8-
c)  In this respect,  what is the position today ?  Achievements are 
disappointing in relation to what is possible or desirable.  Returning 
to the previous Table II,  we note firstly that the level of gross fixed 
capital formation in public administrations in relation to the GFCF 
and to the GNP differs quite noticeably from one country to another. 
This level was relatively lowest in Italy and decreased in that country 
towards the end of the period.  It was ~her in the Netherlands and 
Germany.  Thus,  disparities in infrastructure influence competitive 
conditions and the implantation of enterprises.  The regions whose 
economic,  social and socio-cultural equipment is most highly dev-
eloped are generally presenting more attraction to enterprises and 
to workers,  having regard to the  1 external economies' thus created. 
Enterprises are attracted by the facilities afforded by a  good infras-
tructure.  Workers by the availability of adequate dwellings,  schools, 
hospitals,  transport facilities and sports and amusement facilities. 
However,  excessively dense economic or urban concentrations give 
rise on the other hand,  to external costs which are sometimes so 
high that they counter-balance these external economies.  This is 
notably why the public powers (the Central State or regional or local 
bodies) scatter their land with moderately well-equipped industrial 
zones at the price of high expenditure.  The creation of such zones, 
and granting of subsidies and various facilities to enterprises who 
establish themselves there,  become the privileged instruments of 
regional policy  Often,  direct subsidies granted in the form of capital 
premiums or interest payments are made up by a  range of subsidies 
or indirect advantages which are difficult to evaluate and hence to 
compare. -9-
Insufficiently co-ordinated,  these instruments are often used in a 
competitive fashion to attract investors.  There is no doubt that such 
an escalation of demand between countries,  regions and even communities 
increases the price paid by the community as a  whole for a  specific 
volume of investments. 
In addition,  with regard to the time required to eq~ip an infrastruc-
ture,  many industrial zones have been prepared in expectation of 
potential investors.  Often,  these zones have become 1Fehlinvestitionen1, 
few if any industries being established there.  It is obvious that this 
multiplication of initiatives,  commendable in  themselves,  but dis-
parate and ~nco-ordinated, is costly and inefficient.  It is all the more 
so since the creation of these zones is only oecasionally dependant upon 
satisfactory criteria of economic rationalisation.  For example,  new 
industry occupying a  sizeable area,  but few workers,  is not always 
implanted in less densely populated regions.  On the other hand,  indus-
tries which are pollutive and of high capital intensity are set up in 
densely populated regions where there is an abuf:ldant work force. 
However,  such implantations are frequently encouraged by direct and 
indirect subsidies which alleviate the production costs of enterprises 
and also give them a  competitive advantage in relation to other companies 
in the sector.  In the final analysis,  the new investments encouraged by 
public powers could at times go so far as to create such a lack of  su:f:fi-
cient co-ordination,  and excess production capacity as to bring about a 
price slump.  In this case,  community expenditure,  far from increasing 
economic productivity,  would lead to wastage and creae industrial dif-
ficulties liable to have social impacts. - 10-
d)  Forecasts for  197 5 
The disparity of efforts made by the member States of the Community 
on this subject appears also in the forecast for  197 5.  The percentages 
of public investment,  in relation to the GNP are lowest in Italy and 
France.  Italy maintains the same level (2. 6o/o  of the GNP) as the 
average rate for the period 1961/70.  The same is true for Germany 
but at a  notably higher level (  4. 2 %)  The other countries of the EEC 
forecast an increase of public investment in the order of 0. 5o/o  for 
France (from 3. 2 to 3. 7o/o),  of 0. 8o/o  for the Netherlands (from 4. 8 to 5. 6o/o) 
of 1. 4o/o  for Belgium (from 2. 8 to 4. 2%).  According to these facts,  if 
things remain as they are,  Italy and France could remain behind in 
relation to the other countries of the EEC.  However,  an increase in 
infrastructure requirements is forecast,  both in the teaching and social 
sectors and in the economic field (ports,  navigation channels,  road-
ways,  pipe-lines,  airports,  industrial zones,  applied scientific research) 
and in the sphere of environment (ecological and anti-pollution programmes: 
.  The Environment 
We have suggested that the problem of the environment should be brought into 
the conception of collective equipment programmes as a  matter of priority. - 11-
The  world popu1ation  is increasing at such a  rate ( 1) that increasingly 
sizoJWpressure is being exerted on nature and on the life medium. {2)  The 
earth.  is not without limits and its natural resources are not inexhaustable. 
Left solely to the market forces or managed by public powers more con-
cerned with production or siz1mght  of power than improvement of the quality 
of life,  the industrial or post-industrial society would tend to waste resources 
which are irreplacable and to exploit others with lack of consideration.  It 
has been pointed out that scientific research and the economic applications 
which have been unleashed in obtaining short term objectives do not taJce 
sufficient account of long1erm  objectives.  Thus the physicist Rabi (Nobel 
Prize) has stressed that science is becoming 1balkanised' under the influence 
of specialisation.  He observes that the giant research machine is broken up 
into hyperspecialised cells which become incapable of apprehending and fore-
seeing how their discoveries will integrate with others and what will be their 
primary and secondary consequences.  A similar situation  occum with the 
many economic initiatives both of public and private origin. 
( 1)Many 'futurists' or 1prospectivists1 reckon  that .the world population could 
be between 5. 5 and 7 milliards by the year 2  ..  000;  that is double the present 
population.  Certain people  claim that  some  20%  o£  this latter £igure are 
suffering from malnutrit.1on and that some 60o/o  are  suffering from nutri-
tional deficiency.  It is thus unlikely that the demographic explosion which we 
are experiencing can be checked rapidly,  even at the price of a  gigantic 
effort in developing countries. 
(2) Some biologists consider the earth to be alreaqy over-populated,  taking 
into account the resources which are available to us and the life style which 
we have the right  to demand.  (Cf.  in particular P.R.  and A.H.  Ehrlich, 
'Population resources  et environnement1 in •Dialogue•.,  1971.,  no. 3). - 12-
Already, to take an example, we are  engaged  in extrac  tiug rare  minerals 
from the depths of the oceans,  often without sufficient study of the possible 
repercussions of such an extraction on the marine flora and fauna. ( 1)  In 
certain regions,  the utilisation,  and even the destruction of nature becomes 
such that forests,  heathlands,  scrub and other natural habitats disappear 
sometimes for ever ( 2 ).  If they are abused,  fishing and hunting compromise 
the survival of numerous species.  The disappearance of the species and 
their habitat cuts our genetic and biological capital,  whilst producing inu-
merable imbalances,  often as harmful as they are unsuspected.  ( 3) 
Man needs horizons.  By reason of hyperconcentrations,  the space available 
to him for his habitation,  work and transport is becoming smaller in many 
regions.  In parallel with this human overcrowding,  activities and dwellings 
emigrate to new areas of land,  to the detriment of green spaces,  sites and 
countryside.  This inconsiderate or anarchical swallowing up of nature·  and 
of space poses enormous problems for the protection or reconstitution of the 
environment and life medium,  the management of land,of communications and 
transport. 
In addition,  industrial waste,  pollutive products and the damage to the bio-
sphere  tend to produce other shortages,  notably in pure water,  pure air and 
biologically healthy nutriments.  Resources or natural elements which  were 
once obtained for nothing now take on a  commercial value,  due to their in-
creasing scarcity.  New investments become necessary in order to purify 
the air and the water.  This damage or depletion of natural resources must 
lead,  we feel,  to a  fundamental revision of economic and political concepts 
which have ,  in large areas of opinion,  now acquired a  generally accepted 
status. 
( 1)  Cf.  in particular 'S. 0. S.  Environnement1  - Le Courrier de L 1Unesco 
(2) Phenomenons of 1desertisation' or 'laterisation1 • 
(3)  Cf.  in particular 1Un premier programme pour 11environnement 20001  -
Review of land management (number out of sequence p. 14) - 13-
It is thus that the quantitative growth of goods and services,  calculated 
by national accounting systems  ,is still often considered a  measure of 
progress.  However,  production or consumption per inhabitant are not 
good indicators of welfare,  since they do not take account of the qualitative 
aspects and,  especially,  those of environment and life medium.  Bertrand 
de Jouvenel ( 1)  has shown that the relation can even be the reverse.  For 
example,  surely the journey - above all else a permanent factor - between 
the place of dwelling and that of work gives more hardship than satisfaction ? 
National accounting nevertheless places this transport within the total 
volume of consumption,  where it is considered to be an indication of progress 
whilst it in fact reflects a  regression in welfare. 
This  accounting does  not  take  into account  the  external 
effects of production and consumption of goods and services.  Such external 
effects  (or externals) appear when the activity of an economic agent affects 
others without being integrated in the economic calculations.  So,  if these 
effects can produce advantages (external economies) they may also give 
rise to disadvantages (or  1external diseconomies  This is the case with 
all kinds of despoilment which the development of industrial nations tends 
to foster,  unless a  remedy is found.  The traditionalism of present accounting 
methods and economic ealculation is not without incidence - far from it - on 
development policies and the positions of the parties and groups from which 
they originate.  On the contra:ty, it breaks them down and this slows down the 
search for optimum utilisation of resources. 
( 1)  B.  de Jouvenel : Arcadie,  Essais pour le mieux vivre futurable.  Sedeis 
- Paris 1968. - 14-
The problem has not escaped the attention of certain economists. 
Even in 1920 it was brought up by Pigou.  More recently,  many 
1futurists  1 .and increasing numbers of institutes or research groups 
are worried by this.  Nevertheless,  to date,  apart from a  few ap-
plications,  these worries have hardly led to any true environmental 
policy,  encompassing or orienting investment decisions in both the 
infrastructure and directly productive spheres. 
Without going so far as to raise cries of alarm,one must obs.erve 
the increasing threat of disadvantages caused by the absence of any 
such policy.  The economy today is often developed at the expense 
of nature and of the medium and quality of life.  The search for a 
balance between the standard and quality of life must therefore be-
come the focal concern of all economic,  industrial and social policies, 
and on international,  regional and local levels.  The necessity of inter-
national solidarity and co-operation in these areas,  mentioned in the 
introduction,  will be more easily appreciable if  we recall briefly 
certain problems posed by the pollution of water and air and  by the 
utilisation of earth and space. 
IV.  Pollution 
Public opinion in industrial nations is becoming aware of despoliations 
and pollution because their effects are becoming increasingly apparent. 
( 1)  1Economics of Welfare 1  London  1920 
(2)  See Gordon Rattray Taylor (idem) tLe Jugement dernier peut 
arri  ver de  main'. - 15-
a)  The water is suffering increasingly harmful adulteration. 
The oceans are the final resting place of industrial,  urban 
and agricultural waste.  It has been estimated ( 1)  that between 
three and :five million tons of hydrocarbides are thrown into 
the seas each year by petroleum vessels.  To these must be 
added waste from other vessels (cleansing of tanks and bunkers) 
natural discharges,  oil lost in accidents (shipwrecks,  damage, 
underwater drilling,  leakage or breaks in pipes) and that col-
lected by rain water in the atmosphere and thrown back into 
the oceans (products from industrial chimney stacks which 
have not been burnt up and from road vehicles) (2) and (3). 
In internal navigation,  hydrocarbide waste is usually discharged 
into the water  courses.  Pollution occurring from domestic 
sewers and from waste waters of industry is also apparent. 
Lakes and rivers of all sizes become hardly more than enormous 
open sewers.  Many industries use vast quantities of water and 
subsequently release the discarded part,  often in a polluted state 
or at a  high temperature.  Agriculture has taken a place among 
the agents of pollution  specifically through the wide  use  o:f 
pesticides,  herbicides and fertilisers.  Some of these and many 
other 
( 1)  Cf.  J. A.  Ternisien 'Pr~cis g~n~ral des nuisances', 
Environnement et Nuisances ,  Paris 1971,  p.  94 et seq. 
(2)  Cf.  on this subject the study of •Ocean American Shipping Services• 
(quoted by •Enterprise',  no.  856 - 9 February 1972 (p. 55) 
(  3}  According to the Belgian review  'L  •Homme et la Nature' (no. 1 - 1971), 
English oceanic laboratories have establishetl that the North Sea is 
now being seriously polluted in increasingly large areas. - 16-
products flow into the waters.  ( 1)  The use of detergent~_ 
which leads to the appearance of scum on water courses 
downstream of large urban centres or factories,  is now 
spreading throughtou the industrialsed world.  Thermal 
pollution through waters used for cooling in power stations 
becomes a matter for concern.  The degree of heat given 
out is such that the limits of temperature compatible with 
acquatic life may be quickly reached when it is a  matter of 
very high units.  In mentioning the matter of adulteration of 
water,  we make no claim to judge the size or seriousness of the 
problem.  We would only note that a  valuable natural heritage 
is being damaged in this way.  In addition,  we often draw 
thoughtlessly on our reserves of deep water,  which will have 
already given rise to a  worrying dehydration.  Our pure water 
requirements are increasing and will increase rapidly.  Our 
consumption of water tends to increase under the influence of 
population expansion and the evolution of our life style,  the 
degree of urbanisation and industrialisation. 
( 1) According to G.  R.  Taylor (idem p.  102-103 and 104) 
We pass our time pouring thousands of products whose biological 
effects are for the most part unknown into the oceans and  rivers which 
flow into them.  This includes petroliferous products,  chemical wastes, 
heavy metals,  dry cleaning products,  radio-active waste,  chemical 
war gas and vesicants,  detergents,  pesticides and inumerable other 
groups of substances.  In fact,  almost everyth:ing  that we throw away 
in liquid form reaches the sea,  with a  few rare exceptions which de-
compose rapidly,  whilst much that we throw into the air also finishes 
up by falling into the sea.  The number of the various substances which 
we now introduce into the sea is estimated to be half a  million and in 
the great majority of cases we have not the least idea of their effect, 
since no one has ever tried to find out.  'A much greater peril than 
that which might be produced by radio active waste.  We have already 
reached the point where detectable quantities of radio-activity are to be 
found in a  cask of sea water taken from anyone spot on the globe.  E. D. 
Goldberg announced in 1968 at the meeting of the A. A. A. S.  (American 
Association for the Advancement of Sciences) :  'Radio-active substances 
are found in all the oceans and in all organisms of the  marine  bio-sphere 
Many other authors have made similar observations: 
cfr.  in particular L.  Gerardin  (op.cit.)  p.  62  et seq. - 17-
In many countries.,  of which Belgium is one.,  a  tendancy 
towards a  scarcity of fresh water is already becoming 
apparent.  In future.,  water could become  a  relatively expen-
sive consumable asset and production factor.  ( 1)  This is 
why the policies necessary for protection of water resources 
must be defined and applied in order to combat its pollution 
and to ensure optimum utilisation. 
Regional or national initiatives cannot suffice in this sphere. 
As pure water is unequally apportioned this would lead to 
wastage in areas of abundance to the detriment of areas which 
are lacking.  On the other hand.,  since pollution recognises no 
frontiers..  it is absolutely vital that policies should be drawn 
up and action taken firstly at a  community level and then on 
world scale.  This is just as important for sea water as for 
fresh water. 
b)  It has been estimated that the concentration of carbon dioxide 
in the atmosphere.,  which was in the region of 290 parts per 
million a  century ago  ..  could increase to 375-400 parts by the 
year 2000 (2).  Combustion processes give off fine particles of 
sulphur dioxide.,  nitrogen oxides  ..  and carbon oxides (3).  To 
these are added a mass of dusts..  sulphur compounds such as 
sulphur anhydrides  ..  nitrogen acid.,  organic compounds and 
fiuorines given off by certain industries or the burning of waste. 
---------------------------------------------------
( 1)  Some reckon that water requirements will have doubled within twenty 
years and that unless enormous investments are made water factories 
(desalination ofsea water) will not be sufficient to overcome forecast 
deficiencies. 
(2)  C.  Starr 'Energy and Power'  ..  Scientific American  ..  September 1971 p. 43 
(3)  Coal.,  'fluel' and petrol being  ..  by their composition of natural gas.,  the 
most pollutive.,  certain American towns such as Los Angeles,  Chicago 
and New York.,  have set up communal control centres  ..  in order to force 
certain coal and crude oil users to change over to natural gas.,  when 
the rate of atmospheric pollution becomes too high.  In other countries 
such as Great Britain certain •smokeless zones' have already been 
decreed (by the 1Clean Air' Act of 1956).  Such measures kaTe  brough.t 
excellent results but  taey still remain disparate  and partial. - 18-
The ever-increasing expansion of road vehicle~  trafic, 
contributes to the pollution of air,  with carbon oxides,  organic 
compounds,  nitrogen oxides and smoke and even further with 
harmful additive waste.  In their field,  sonic airQplanes,  which 
are increasing in number,  aggravate phonic and air pollution. 
Careful attention must also be paid to fall-out,  not only of radio-
active particles but also of lead,  cadmium,  zinc ,mercury and, 
tomorrow,  of other metals which are coming increasingly into 
general use. 
These despoliations are estimated to have reached such an alar-
ming point that the former Secretary General at the U.N.,  U 
Thant,  has la'tmched. an appeal for us to face up to what he has 
called 1a  collective suicide which although slower is as relentless 
as a  war•.  In fact,  international action would be necessary as much 
to measure the situation and its dangers scientifically as to 
guard against them. 
c)  Land is poisoned especially by excessive use of certain ferti-
lisers and synthetic pesticides and by the fall-out of wastes 
from the air.  In addition,  it is feared that the food-cycle may 
be threatened by noxious substances,  such as mercury,  lead, 
cadmium,  DDT and other chemical compounds. 
On the other hand,  the increase of articles sold in 1disposable' 
and  1non-returnable1 packaging gives rise to a proliferation of 
refuse and wastes,  many of which are not destroyed or are even 
decomposable.  ( 2)  Since products of the earth are often tran-
sported far afield,  and man1s  movements are becoming more 
generalised,  crossing frontiers,  its protection is not only of 
interest to national governments.  It should also be assured at 
an international level. 
( 1)  Cf.  notably on this subject :  G. R.  Taylor (idem) ChaP.ter  1Expirez, 
n'inspirez pas !  (Breathe  out,  do  not  breathe  in l}. 
(2)  On this subject it has been ce1;lculated that the proliferation of refuse 
increases at the geometric rate of more than lOo/o per year. v. 
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The Utilisation of Spac~ 
Demographic and industrial evolution reduce the free space 
within the Community,,  particularly in densely populated regions 
where activities and infrastructures are in general most highly 
concentrated.  The accumulation of factories,  buildings, lterrils  1 
roadways,  pipelines and cables either old or modern,  is the out-
come of an evolution which has occurred,  sometimes gradually 
and at times in spurts,  but generally without any unified concepts. 
Certain zones which were once active become or remain des-
poiled although new industries may have partially supplanted 
those which have fallen into disuse in the area.  In fact,  public 
intervention in the utilisation of space and land management is 
relatively recent and,  as a  rule,  still disparate,  compartmented 
and insufficient.  Since the last world war,  serious preoccupation 
concerning the regional balance of development and the worries 
caused by work in proximity to the more densely populated areas, 
have led to an unorganised swarm of infrastructures and eco-
nomic activities.  In certain regions numerous communities already 
possess or have in preparation zones of attraction for industry. 
The dispersal of such initietives is very costly because it pro-
duces a  consequential multiplication of investment expenditure. 
( 1)  In addition,  such dispersal means the utilisation of more 
space than necessary for the conversion or optimum utilisation 
of surfaces already built on and it denaturalises the countryside. 
ln certain very industrial regions,  forested  or agricul-
tural zones thus gradually  take on the alJ)eararre  of' .lalge  ag-
glomerations still scattered with pockets of green space.  In 
others,  the natural sites are intersected by roadways 
( 1)  Cf.  specially on this subject A.  Marchal - 1Syst~mes et Structures  Econo-
miques' p.  670 - Iv edition.  P. U. F.  1959 ... •regional development policy  .• 
and this is the first point - if it wishes to be effective,  must not be limited 
to peppering the expanse of a  region with subsidies scattered at  the  whim o'£ 
requirements or influences.  Such a policy would only end in swallowing up 
enormous sums at no profit.  In the second place,  the poles of growth must 
be planted with the e:qcouragement of the public powers. - 20-
railways,  canals,  factories or houses,  often without any 
regard to the ecological consequences of these investments 
and without any attempt to unify designs in architecture. 
Apart from the aesthetic disadvantages of this evolution, 
socio-psychologists stress that space which is broken up 
no longer has the same restful properties for man as wide 
open expanses,  protected from noise and din as far as the eye 
can see.  Paradoxically,  this desire for calm spaces leads to 
their destruction,  in relation to the increase of the standard of 
living,  development of leisure activities and urban population 
density.  In fact,  more and more town dwellers set up residence 
in belts round the edge or else establish secondary residences 
at a  distance.  The methods of consumption of nature and the 
destruction of natural areas are thus accentuated.  The dis-
orderly invasion of space also aggravates the traffic problems 
between industrial zones,  between home and work,  between 
home and places of relaxation and leisure activities.  Traffic 
congestion and accidents  are on the increase,  especially 
during rush hours and at weekends.  On the other hand,  the 
transportation of goods becomes more costly,  mainly by reason 
of stopping time,  accidents and increasing insurance costs.  In 
many sectors (for example,  those where many points of sale 
have been installedL  the improvement of productivity at the 
manufacturing stage is completely negated by higher distribution 
costs,  to such an extent that prices are forced to rise. 
Without doubt,  public powers do endeavour to deal with these 
problems,  especially by the construction of motorways which 
avoid towns,  multilevel crossroads,  bridges and tunnels. 
Often,  however,  these partial remedies have only a  temporary 
effect and only succeed in the end in transferring the difficulties 
or producing others. - 21-
For example,  hypermarkets and shopping centres are installed 
within reach of towns and motorways.  This produces new uti-
lisation of space which destroys the sites and also new causes 
of congestion or traffic jams on the motcrways.  The rapid 
saturation of many infrastructures is an indication of this. 
In 1:hc:a conditions,  it is no longer reasonable to hope that 
partial,  marginal and unco-ordinated solutions will be adequate 
to solve correctly the problems posed in the utilisation of space. 
Without wishing to specify and propose  programmes here,  (1) 
we would suggest that henceforth  infrastructures and 
development should be conceived within the framework of a 
policy of space which takes into account economic,  social, 
aesthetic and human aspects.  In this respect,  one of the fi-rst 
major preoccupations must be that of limiting the consumption 
of empty spaces and natural sites caused by disordered implan-
tations.  For example,  instead of installi  g industrial zones in 
many neighbouring communities,  would it not be preferable to 
go for centralised zonings ?  Judiciously implanted,  such central 
zones could become the development pole for a  whole, region. 
By the elimination of duplications,  and overprovisioning,  the 
cost of investment required would not be as high as that caused by 
fragmented and isolated initiatives.  Furthermore,  the implan-
tation of such zones could be more rational,  more economical 
and more social with proper management,  especially of internal 
traffic,  access roads and facilities which are necessary in order 
to make them· viable. 
( 1)  Some authors,  organisms or groups have formulated some:  cf.  especially 
Ph.  Saint Marc (idem) p. 215 et seq;  E.  Goldsmith &  R.  Allen,  editors 
of the manifesto 'A Pledge for Survival' published by the British review 
'The Ecologist• (distributed with approval of eminent members of the 
•Royal Society•);  concerning pollution:  'Seven methods of anti-pollution 
Policy' - Pr.  J.  Pen,  Economic quarterly review of the 1Amsterdam-
Raterdam Bank',  March 1971;  J.  Ternisien (idem) : works of 0. M.S., 
of the Economic Commission for Europe of the U.N. ,  of the Council of 
Europe,  of the Communities Commission,  of the  uECD. VI. 
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Thinking along these lines,  certain zones could be specialised 
in order to accommodate particular industries.  When these 
are pollutive it would be less costly to cure the influences by 
one sole action,  even by communal installations. 
In this area,  as in others already mentioned,  the international 
approach would appear to become increasingly necessary.  ( 1) 
Undoubtedly this should ideally be reconciled with the powerful 
regionalist aspirations which are evident in Western Europe. 
But this does not alter the fact that a  regrouping is necessary of 
the functions of land management,  protection of the natural medium 
and the quality of life on a  higher political level.  On the other 
hand,  political selections cannot be improvised 1  a  thorough 
technical study must always be made first,  in order to clarify, 
quantify and measure the options and their multiple implications. 
The competent technical institution must ensure that the scientific 
proposals are of unquestionable repu'b!  and must conduct its 
work thoroughly.  (2) 
Financing of infrastructures 
a)  A major objective: the limitation of costs by control of 
optimum expenditure. 
This financing poses the problem not only of allocation of 
public re!sources and of the level of total public expenditure 
in relation to the G.  N. P.  but also of optimum utilisation of 
public funds. 
( 1)  An international conference on the human environment will meet in 
Stockholmliin June  19.7~.,.tat. the instiEtation.of the Ut .N.n..- Member  courftr1es  ave neen 1nv1  ed to present tne1r repor s  t.uere. 
(2)  Cf.  especially on this subject H.  Simonet : 'La Gauche et la Soci~t~ 
industrielle  ',  Ed.  Mara  bout,  Paris et Verviers (p.  106 et seq. ) Year 
1957 
1967 
-23-
The proportion of public expenditure in the G. N. P. 
has grown recently in all the countries of the Community: 
Germany  France  Italy  Netherlands  Belgium  Lux  em-
bourg 
38. 3  38.7  30. 2  39.4  28.7  30. 5 
42.9  41.3  36.2  48.0  39. 3  37. 6 
Source :  E. E. C.  - L 1  ~volution des finances publiques dans 
les Etats membres de la Cpmmunaut~ 
Europ~enne de 1957 b.  1967 - ( 1970 no. 8) 
With particular regard to the development of public res-
ponsibilities,  this tendency will probably be maintained, 
in certain countries at least.  In Belgium,  for example,  it 
is forecast that the proportion of public expenditure in re-
lation to the GNP will go from 40. 6o/o  in 1968 to 47. 4% in 
1985.  This escalation of budgets leads us to pay particular 
attention to the organisation,  efficiency and,  in an ever-
changing vor  ld,  the adaptability of the administration. 
Badly allocated,  or employed,  public expenditure would 
have an increasingly heavier social cost and become increas-
ingly unbearable. 
In democracy,  these aspects must have a  growing political 
impact.  Disregarding all ideologies,  citizens,  their elec-
ted repres~ntatives, organisations representing the directly 
productive and work sectors,  will surely be inclined to 
require public powers to  make optimum use of accrued fin-
ancial resources which are obtained from them.  It would 
seem that one may presume this.  Besides,  it has been 
pointed out that the means of covering infrastructure expen-
diture without producing chaos were limited and that it was 
necessary to supply simultaneous finance for directly pro-
ductive equipments required for development. - 24-
In these conditions~ the search for optimum use  of 
resources allocated to infrastructures must become a 
major objective~ not only in intent but also in reality. 
In order to make progress towards this  objective~  re-
conciling it at the same time with the protection of nature 
and the life medium~ revisions and innovations are neces-
sary under several headings. 
1)  Firstly~ long term social objectives~  development 
policies and programmes should be redefined  and 
clarified ( 1},  also the means of carrying them out. 
2) 
To this end,  the future and the options  (possible~  fore-
seeable and preferable) should be prepared and studied 
by the administrations or offices responsible for 
drawing up these programmes with the scientific pro-
posals required~  especially those of 'futurity' centres. 
Such work has been undertaken in certain countries. 
Such centres already exist.  It would be desirable to 
assemble and co-ordinate this work and activity in the 
iritial stages through community organs. 
On the other hand,  the costs and advantages,  direct and 
indirect,  of the options or the proposals should be more 
thoroughly looked into,  which is often not the case .  (2). 
Alvin Toffler has written that 'cut off from the future, 
the citizen becomes a  political eunuch'.  He proposes 
'the democratisation of methods by going to the people'. 
In order to associate this with the necessary choices with 
regard to the future,  he suggests that 'assemblies for 
the future of societyr should be created. 
( 1)  Especially,  by the revision,  suggested previously~  of traditional 
national accounting methods and economic calculation systems,  by 
establishing means of measuring public welfare with appropriate indi-
cators. 
(2)  Without such thoroughness,  the financial costs often result much heavier 
than those foreseen in the original outline plan,  whichthus compromises 
the possibilities of future action. - 25-
These assemblies would be representative bodies,  not only 
geographic but also social:  industry,  the working world, 
the arts,  women,  ethnic and religious groups,  students. 
( 1)  Their work would be prepared by teams of techni-
cians with a  view to presenting all possible alternatives 
and to orienting the choices,  in relation specifically to 
costs.  Although such a proposal may appear,  at first 
glance,  unrealistic,  in so far as the present functioning 
.of democratic regimes is concerned,  procedures or 
organs,  either consultative in certain of these milieux, 
or for joint action on development policy,  do exist in 
the countries of the Community.  as well as <?n  the higher 
Community level.  Nevertheless,  their competences 
differ and their work is often confined to short and 
medium term projects or programmes.  It would be possible 
and desirable to introduce a  new dimension :  that of 
future prospects or futurity,,  into the functions of these 
consultative or joint action organs ;  to harmonise their 
statutes.,  making them as representative as possible of 
the regions and the constituent elements of the social 
body and also to improve the scientific basis of their 
work. 
3)  The scientific.,  technological and industrial revolutions 
have forced humanity to assume responsibility for its 
future.,  because henceforward it  is in a position to 
fashion it and because these revolutions pose just as 
much of a threat as they afford any benefits. 
( 1)  In this spirit.,  these assemblies,  whose participants would be con-
stantly reviewed and renewed.,  would serve the social body both as 
a jury for the great political choices and as ad'lisers for the future. 
(2)  As L.  G~rardin wrote ('Les Futurs Possibles') - Hachette 1971., 
p.  162  :  10f course,  the study of futurity is not planning.  But the 
two together form a whole : the first flowing naturally into the second. - 26-
But humanity's vision,  behaviour,  methods and ins-
titutions have hardly been adapted to this situation, 
although it is true to say that it is a  new one in its 
history. 
Europe,like the world,  is still divided into more or less 
autonomous parcels,  with preoccupations and policies 
often singular,  isolated and scattered,  even contradic-
tory  or antagonistic. 
With the exception of a  few cases of community action 
and co-ordination,  the problems of infrastructure continue 
to  be  broachEI!'i on levels and in contexts which are too 
exclusively nationalist or even regionalist or local. 
We have established that,  as a  result,  there are inad-
equacies,  extra charges and wastages,  mainly due to 
duplication,  escalation of values and inadequate di-
mensions. 
The equipment policy practised in Europe is one illus-
tration of this among ethers.  The majority of ports 
are equipped for container traffic,  which brings an 
under-utilisation of installations.  Some of them 
compete to attract vessels of greater and greater 
tonnage,  so that previous costly investments lose their 
utility before their normal redemption. 
Numerous cases of this nature could be quoted,  for 
example,  in the sphere of pipe-lines and in countries 
where regional or local compensation of infrastructures 
expenditure is practised,  without integrating it into the 
total long term plan scientifically prepared and co-
ordinated with projects of neighbouring nations. 
4) Such a  lack of provision for the future,  accentuated 
by the limitation of financial means,  leads to the ins-
tallation of infrastructures of inadequate dimensions 
or of a  too traditional concept.  Consequently,  they 
are often rapidly overtaken by technical,  economic, 
social,  cultural or sociological evolution.  This is 
the case for example with river,  road,  rail and air 
links,  or furthermore for universities,  vocational 
schools and hospitals. -27-
False cost economies~ which in reality result in 
losses~ add thus to the wastage, caused by dispersion 
of initiatives and a lack of joint action and co-ordination. ( 1) 
5)  Careful withdrawal of investments at the correct time 
would provide economies with additional returns.  In-
frastructures which have become us.eless should be 
abolished~ reconverted or sold.  This is particularly 
the case for airfields or disused military ground~ 
industrial zones which are li_ttle or badly used arrl 
decayed~ unoccupied or unadaptable buildings.  In 
so far as such investment withdrawals allow the re-
cuperation of resources and the reduction of function 
expenses~ new equipment could be put in its place 
without extra charges. 
6)  The staggering of public investments is also of con-
sequence from the point of view of our present con-
siderations.  By their multiplicative effect,  these 
investments stimulate expansion.  They produce em-
ployment~ revenue for nations and returns for public 
powers.  This is why investment policy is used as an 
instrument of contingency regulation.  However..  it is 
important to be extra careful in handling it of itA reper-
cussion on costs,  which is often not the case.  Indeed, 
these may be made heavier by the fractioning or delay 
in execution of the programmes. 
(1) It is interesting to  recaR,~this  :respectt  the  principle of max-
imisation of social earn1ngs (cf.  R. H.  Haveman~ 'The Economics of 
the Public Sector'~  New York-London-Toronto,  p.  61).  According to 
this principle,  the public sector should increase taxes and public expen-
diture as long as the marginal social utility exceeds the marginal social 
disutility due to the transfer by tax,  of a monetary unit from the private 
to the public sector.  On the other hand,  the allocation of public expen-
diture to the various categories of expenditure and programmes should, 
according to a  reasoning of this nature~ result in an equalisation of mar-
ginal utility of the monetary unit spent on each programme. ( 1) 
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7)  In order to restrict the cost of infrastructures and 
to integrate the conception into a  development policy 
based on the protection of the environment~ life 
medium and the quality of life~  it would be necessary 
to redefine the ultimate  objective~  missions and often 
the organisation of enterprises~ administrations and 
public services.  This nee essity is increasingly 
realised and stressed.  ( 1)  The missions of enter-
prise no longer lead solely to the objective of profi-
tability but extend to cover elements such as participa-
tion in decisions and results~  work  satisfaction~  scale 
of remunerations~  information~ responsibilities to-
wards the community of implantation or the surrounding 
environment.  Business men are induced to construct 
and direct an innovating organisation.  (2)  As for 
public administrations and services~ the search for 
efficiency~  creativity and the quality of benefits~  tends 
to be more and more generally aserted in relation to 
the escalation of fiscal and parafiscal charges.  On 
the other hand~  state employees no longer consider 
security of employment or public service as sufficiently 
satisfactory incentives. 
One of the possible ways of reform would be to accen-
tuate the decentralisation of certain functions of public 
interest~  specifically in the sphere of studies~  and 
realisation and management of infrastructures.  Spe-
cialised organs are more supple and adaptable.  Their 
intervention could be more speedy and less costly. 
Cf.  specially B.  Cazes~  1Explorer l'Avenir' - 'Informations et 
Documents  1  ~  (p. 31)  - December 1971 :  H.  Janne~  1Le Temps du 
Changement' - Marabout~  1971 (p.  239 et seq)  :  10ne must have 
the courage . • .  to imagine collective institutions of a  new type, 
conceived with two goals in mind : on the one hand,  to accept loyally 
t:t?.at part founded on criticisms of the public services,  regarding their 
excessive costs per unit,  their deficits and their relative inefficiency~ 
their rigidity,  their lack of control and the criticable treatment of 
users ;  on the other hand,  to prepare tre ground thus for the appli-
cation of  a  more  direct and  more  part1cipant  democracy. 
Cf.  particularly on  the  subject  :  Peter Drucker, 
'..,La  .Gra,_nd~  Mutation'  p.  69  et seq.  -Ed.  d'Organisation; 
Iar1.s  1.9/0. ( 1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
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Their financing could be facilitated by the person-
nalisation of their mission.  It could be more easily 
foreseen that they should receive payment from the 
users for their services.  A more general use of 
new instruments and methods would also appear re-
commendable : for example,  1The Planning,  Program-
ming,  Budgeting System  1  (P. P. B.S.) ( 1) or •Ration-
alisation of Budgetary Choices  1  (Rationalisation des 
Choix Budgetaires R. C. B.) (2) ,  the •cost Benefit 
Analyses•,  the use of econometric models {3),  the 
Delphi method (4) and the so-called •scenario'. 
Besides,  systematic and objective information of 
opinion in particular through television,  radio and 
press,  would appear to be increasingly useful. 
8)  The application,  albeit progressive,  of the various 
measures cited here,  would allow the limitation of 
public expenditure both in investment and functioning. 
It would also contribute,  we feel,  to improvement of 
the image of public powers,  administrations and ser-
vices.  These are the objectives of primary importance. 
The requirements and means of financing 
a)  Expenditure on infrastructure will grow in the European 
nations 
In public budgets,  the expenditure on infrastructure 
exerts and will exert an increasingly strong pressure 
in regard to the multiplication and growing cost of 
equipments in particular. 
Born in the United States and now used in Europe 
First applied in France 
As,  for example,  ihose used bl the economists of the American Treasuxy, 
comprising variations and fruits of their experience.  . 
Used by the Rand Corporation,  which consists of gathering adv1ce from 
experts and thence forming conclusions. -30-
and to the rise in exploitation costs.  ( 1}  This 
pressure is closely allied to the speed of evolution 
of technical progress,  industrial development,  per-
sonal income and style of life.  The economic viability 
of many equipments tends to become increasingly 
shorter,  whilst their users become more and more 
demanding.  Besides,  the cost of many collective 
equipments is accentuated by inflationist tendencies 
since.,  in the scheme of things,  constructions and 
buildings are,  in the final analysis,  work and land. 
This is notably why we have insisted on the necessity 
of searching for an optimum infrastructure policy in order 
to limit expenditure.  But,  even supposing that it is 
possible to move fairly rapidly towards this goal.,  it 
remains that the volume of equipments to be financed 
will increase substantially in the years to come.  The 
only additional charges for an indispensable policy of 
protection of the environment and of nature will tend 
to increase public budgets considerably.  This evolution 
will pose problems,  all the more thorny,  since the 
expense of transfer of public power to the direct bene-
fit of individuals and enterprises has increased by 
much more than the disbursements of collective interest, 
which is indirectly to their benefit.  Thus.,  the favour-
able effect of these disbursements is less easily dis-
cerned;  they are therefore less popular.  On the other 
hand.,  it is easier for Governments and Parliaments 
to obtain allocation of public funds to national.,  regional 
or local ends than to longer term projects of inter-
national interest,  even if the latter are more necessary. 
b)  Expenditure on infrastructure in the countries of the 
Community could -be higher than forecast 
We have shown that new capital expenditure and functions 
will be  unavoidable if we are to protect the environn1 en  t 
and to manage lands and spaces. 
( 1)  In relation particularly to the increase of remunerations and the 
reduction of working time. -31-
Sweden proposes for example to' allocate 8 to 10% 
of her gross national product to this between now 
and 1980.  The United States put this figure between 
5 and 6%.  (1) 
As for member countries of the EEC,  they do not 
forecast,  in general,  an increase of more than 2 
to 3o/o.  (2)  However,  the requirements of the Com-
munity are no less than those of the other countries 
cited.  From this we can deduce that the problem here 
is not yet appreciated in total clarity and there are 
~ven those who hesitate to present it in its full extent 
and seriousness due to other preoecupatiom.  One may 
well doubt that this position may be maintained. 
c)  The problems of financing probably cannot in future 
be resolved through the usual channels 
Since supplementary expenses appear thus as unavoi-
dable,  one must ask how we are to finance them.  Overall, 
they should be covered by the taxation policy,  by savings 
or by credit,  internal or external.  (3) 
1)  Credit can only be considered as an occasional or 
mar  gina! contribution 
We would point out straight away that recourse to short 
term debts can only,  in our opinion,  be considered as 
an occasional or mar  gina! contribution towards the 
financing of investments and •a fortiori  1 current public 
expenditure.  To allow the contrary,  in economically 
and technically developed countries would be to accept 
the imposition of inflation by continuous monetary in-
jections on top of the various forms of cost inflation 
already hardly bearable without chaos. 
( 1)  Cf.  particularly :  1La Tribune d1Allemagne' (no. 16) December 1971 
p.  8. 
(2)  According to the services of the Commission. 
( 3}  In so far as the price of services rendered is not payed by the users, 
as can be forecast in certain cases. - 32-
There remains fiscal policy and savings. 
2)  Foundations and application of taxation policy 
should be reviewed 
The frontiers of fiscal policy are not indefinitely ex-
pandable.  In so far as personal tax is concerned,  the 
taxpayers revolt,  the fiscal basis is gradually eroded, 
capital is exported,  ( 1)  and the cost -of  controls in-
creases when certain limits are exceeded.  Those 
receiving receipts from earnings and who consider  the 
net proceeds from these try to pass on at the very 
least a  part of the additional taxes to their employers, 
if they a:re not to lose their initiative or become less 
productive.  (2)  Excessive taxation thus accentuates 
cost inflation or reduces the productivity of the system. 
In so far as tax on companies and enterprises is con-
cerned,  once certain thresholds have been passed,  this 
threatens the faculties of adaptation,  innovation and 
growth.  Indeed,  if public interventions and subsidies 
are not generalised,  these faculties depend in the final 
analysis on the net cash flow,  after deduction of taxes. 
As for so called indirect taxes,  levied whenever possible 
on the transfer of goods or services,  these are borne 
in the end,  for the most part,  by the consumers. 
Although these must be differentiated for social reasons, 
their ]ncrease thus causes a  rise in the cost of living. 
In these conditions,  it is doubtful whether the increase 
of fiscal charges alone can resolve the problems of 
financing the infrastructures which now face us. 
( 1)  Notably by mPans of the numerous 'tax havens' which exist in the world. 
(2)  L.  G~rardin (idem p.  'JJ?  et seq) on this subject mentions the failure 
of the 'Swedish model',  which he considers is becoming increasingly 
pronounced.  He wonders if the true cause of this failure is not a 
vi-olent reaction of the white collar workers :  1The Swedish Confederation 
of Intellectual workers' has recently demanded an immediate increase 
of 23%  to compensate for inflation - To compensate also for the new 
increases in taxation (Sweden is the country with the highest  indirect 
taxation in the world). ' -33-
This does not mean to say that improvements and, 
above all,  innovations must not be studied.  Indeed, 
many tax devices have been conceived on the basis 
of situations which az:e out of date today or soon to 
become so and,  much more rarely in the futurist 
context.  So,  the reviewing of certain tax concepts 
and their application could improve the yield,  accep-
tance and advantageous effects of taxes.  In particular, 
the measures against frauds and tax evasions would be 
reinforced by concerted international attitudes and action. 
In the absence of these, the most vigilant nations risk 
being penalised when capital is removed or centres of 
profit or initiative transferred.  ( 1)  On the other hand, 
methods of establishment,  collection and control of 
taxes should be brought into line with the objectives 
of the development policy and amended with a  view to 
reducing,  notably by simplifications,  the levy costs.  -(2) 
For example,  the fiscal policy could contribute to the 
policy of protection of the life medium and improvement 
of life quality.  Concerning pollution,  one principle is 
tending to become increasingly stressed: 'the polluter 
must become the payer'·  The application of this prin-
ciple could take on multiple means.  Private individuals., 
public services and enterprises would be forced or in-
duced,  mainly by fiscal means,  to avoid destruction, 
damage and pollution,  or at the very least,  bring them 
to tolerable proportions.  ( 3) 
( 1)  It is well known that multinational enterprises and those who have 
foreign subsidiaries,  can,  by various means which are often legal. 
make part of their profits appear in the place where the tax regime 
is the most favourable.  The same can apply for ~e  many enterprises 
which deal with foreign countries. 
(2)  This is an enormous task.Butitia becoming vital that it is undertaken. 
F.  Bloch-Lain~ has drawn up some suggestions in this respect which 
are especially worthy of interest(  in 1Pour une r~forme de 11 Enterprise , 
p.  127  - Ed.  du Seuil. ) 
(3)  Ph.  St.  Marc (idem·p. 274 et seq) proposes a tax on damages and on 
the utilisation  ·of green spaces,  als? an •urban biological tax' (with 
a  view to slowing down excess urbanisation).  He expresses the opinion · 
that,  in order to stop polluters from polluting,  the pollution dues should be 
at least equal to the cost of purifying. - 34-
Nevertheless,  unless they are harmonised at inter-
national level,  measures of this order would create 
distortions in competitive conditions and would affect 
commercial exchanges as much as strong lia.isons 
between enterprises in the countries where they are 
adopted.  Indeed,  such dispositions would bring addi-
tional charges and investments which are not directly 
profitable and would cause an increase in costs.  ( 1) 
Countries which instigate avant garde measures in 
isolation,  in the general interest,  would thus run the 
risk of weakening,  by this very move,  the competitive 
position of their enterprises,  that is to say that they 
would jeopardise the level of employment and of life 
of their population. 
3)  Preparations must be made for the transitions 
towards a  new society 
On a  more general scale,  the passage of a  productivi.st 
society still too attached to the quantatne aspects,  to a 
humanist society,  with more qualitative goals,  will 
produce such upheavals that the transitions must be 
studied and prepared. Conversions will be necessary 
both in infrastructure and directly productive investments. 
Often,  these conversions will have to be made simultan-
eously.  The financial structure is already too weak in 
many EuroPean enterprises and their net profitability 
has become too marginal or vulnerable for them to be 
in a  position to obtain enough additional capital of their 
own by self-finance or by the traditional mechanisms of the 
finance market.  Unless they are able to make use of new 
facilities,  these enterprises will hardly be able to finance 
the conversions they desire. 
( 1)  Without it always being possible or desirable to reflect these 
increases in cost. On the other hand,  it will be necessary tE>  prepare the 
ordered development of branches of industry and ser-
vices whose competition will be necessary for the 
protection of the environment ,  elimination of refuse, 
reduction of pollution,  purification of water or its 
production.  Apart from direct public aid,  which could 
become unavoidable in certain cases,  in this sphere 
too one must endeavour to find the optimum,  both to 
limit collective costs and with a  view to efficiency. 
To this end,  one could imagine,  firstly,  the institution 
of a  1 European industrial fund  1  to prepare the policy 
to follow and orientate by sti.oul.ii <r by financial con-
tributions,  the decisions of enterprises into a  direction 
which coincides with the priority objectives of this 
policy.  ( 1)  Again,  one could study the creation,  on an 
EEC level.,  of an organ responsible for the preparation 
of a  policy of infrastructure and environment and the 
inspiration,  harmonis.ation and co-ordination of national 
and regional actions in these spheres. 
In order to facilitate and accelerate the conversions of 
industry and services it would also be necessary to 
extend the role and amplify the means of investment or 
development of public interest by companies or institutes,ani 
such  bodies  already  exist m several European countries. 
These companies or institutes could be particularly use-
ful to support enterprise's commercial risks - their 
intervention entails 1nultiplicative effects and their 
policy could easily be aligned with that of public powers. 
The need,  which we have stressed,  for the creation of 
such an investment company or institute on a  European 
level,  to stimulate or revive the necessary conversions 
seems equally increasingly obvious, for the same reasons. (2 
( 1)  Various steps have been taken in this connection on a  national or re-
gional scale but of a  scattered nature.  The creation of a community organ 
would allow the reinforcement,  harmonisation and co-ordination of these measures. 
(2)  Cf.  notably 1Le Financement de la Politique lndustrielle en Europe', 
report at the Conference at the European Centre for Public Enterprise 
(CEEP),  Rome,  May 1971 (L1Echo de la Bourse- 3 June 1971) and  1Propo-
~Jltion de creer une  soci~t~ europeenne d 1investissernent• (Revue de la ·Banque Bruxelles 
4 April,  1968 - no. 4)  M.  Petrilli,  President of the IRI specifically expressed a  similar 
SUI!I!estion. - 36-
4)  It wodl.d be wise to foresee a  lack of savings funds 
with regard to investment requirements,  and,  hence, 
to endeavour to find new means. of financing 
Is it wise to forecast that sufficient savings could be 
mobilised by traditional methods,  in order to  complete 
the financing of infrastructure and equipment requirements? 
We do not think so. 
We know that savings can come from public administrations, 
enterprises or households. 
So,  one can hardly foresee the formation of large savings 
by public administrations.  Indeed,  their establishment 
is held back or prevented by numerous factors such as 
the extension of their present tasks and their requirements, 
pressures 1n view of social transfers or public aid,  and 
the frontiers of fiscal expansion. 
On the other hand,  the net savings faculties of enter-
prises are a  function of their profitability margins. 
Now,  if these margins remain high in certain branches, 
on the other hand,  they become slight and fluctuating in 
many others.  Besides,  they could be further restricted 
in many cases by a  'Scissor effect' which is the result of 
an increase of production costs in parallel (1) with a 
ceiling on sales prices.  (2}  It is doubtful whether this 
restriction can always be compensated by innovations, 
productivity improvem.ents or by external or scaled 
economies.  Besides,  many European enterprises have 
financed their investments by taking loars on an extreme 
scale rather than increasing their own funds.  ( 3} 
( 1)  Under the effect of a  tendency to increases of wages and social bene-
fits (in parallel with a  reduction in the working hours),  taxes,  primary 
materials and power,  forecast expenditure for the protection of the 
natural environment and for improving the conditions and value of work. 
(2)  By virtue notably of the accentuation of international competition and 
the obligations of the price policy. 
( 3}  By virtue notably of fiscal advantages which result from loan financing 
and the difficulty of obtaining risk capital. -37-
These factors eXplain how the State and enter-
prises already toda_y have recourse in large measure 
tto external financing to ensure their investments. 
Nothing now would seem to indicate that it will be other-
wise tomorrow. 
Regarding savings of households,  these have reached 
a  relatively high level in Europe.  It remains possible 
that this could expand in relation to the increase of per-
sonal incomes and the broadening of their distribution. 
However,  their formation could also be held back by 
several factors such as monetary erosion,  extension 
of leisure activities,  multiplication of available goods 
and services,  desire for improved welfare,  facilities 
offered by personal credit and financing by the deferred 
payments system. 
Under these conditions,  it is definitely advisable to carry 
out a  policy of encouragement and stimulation of savings, 
mainly by tax advantages. (1)  But it is doubtful whether 
this would be sufficient tc mobilise the complementary 
capital necessarv for setting up infrastructure and directly 
productive investments. 
Hence,  in this spher-e too,  new solutions must be looked 
for.  Amongst these,  the study of a legal system of 
savings could be made.  Of what,  for example,  would 
such a  system consist?  ( 1) As a  complement to  direct 
taxes,  levies would be made on certain incomes and put 
to productive savings accounts of low interest.  Capital 
thus formed would be put principally to the financing of 
institutions of public interest and priority investment 
projects.  The accounts could be converted ·in determined 
proportions and conditions,  into shares or debentures 
(convertible or non-convertible) in enterprises or insti-
tutions of community interest.  Other forms of mobili-
sation of these accounts could also be envisaged. 
( 1)  This policy has had favourable results , for example in Germany 
(2)  Cf.  pre'\bu sly quoted report at the Congress of the CEEP (May 1971 VII. 
Without  doubt,  such  a  suggestion which  would  recall prece-
dents  of forced  savings would  provoke  objections.  If we 
believe,  however,  that it must  be  put  forward,  it is because 
a  realistic diagnosis  of the  prospects  for  savin~s and 
investment would  appear  to  lead to  a  choice  between certain 
opinions:  inflation,  excessive rise in taxation,  blockage 
of  development  and  of necessary conversions  or  the  search 
for  new  solutions,  one  of which would  be  legal savings. 
Amongst  these  options,  that  of legal savings  would  appear 
to  be  perhaps  the  least constraintive.  (1) 
Final  Consider~!!~ 
In stressing so  forcefully  the  problems  of  conceptions, 
policy  and  financing,  posed  by  the  infrastructures  and  pro-
tection of  the  ~nvironment in the  Community,  we  have  laid 
no  claim to  originality.  Perhaps  we  may  have  been  able  to 
contribute in  some  way,  however,  to  a  partial illumination, 
usin~ the  facts  and  information which  we  have  been able  to 
glean. 
Neither  have  we  attempted  to  predict  the  future,  or  even 
suggest  that  we  would  tend  to  such  a  prediction.  Sharing 
the  belief  tl1at  one  must  endeavour  to  forecast  the  future 
in a  realistic fashion,  we  have  only wished  to  show  certain 
grounds  for  organising  ourselves  in such  a  fashion  as  to 
arrive  there,  whilst constantly keeping  in mind  the  theories 
and  future  plans  in the  light of  evolutions  observed  and  the 
resultant  new  tendencies.  Is it not  important,  in fact,  to 
create  conditions  conducive  to  a  totally conscious  and  pre-
pared  path  towards  a  humanist  society,  reconciling  growth 
objectives with  those  of protection of the  environment, 
prote~tion of life  medium  and  improvement  of  the  quality 
of life  ? 
(1)  In the  course  of  a  conversation in Paris,  a  similar 
proposal,  although  of  a  much  stricter  natur~, was  formu-
lated by  one  of  the  directors  o~ a  large  American  bank. 
This  proposal  was  the  following  Any  increase  in wages, 
salaries,  dividends  or  other  income  heyond  a  certain 
percentage  would  automatically be  put  into  a  savin~s 
fund.  This  fund  would  pay  interest to  those  whose  in~s 
had  been withheld.  Such  a  system  w~uld reduce  the  incen-
tive  to  look  for  and  to  pay  excessive  salary increases 
and would  procure  a  new  source  of capital for  the  finan-
cing  of public  investments  in such  spneres  as  housing, 
transport  and  the  control of pollution  • 
(Proposition by w.  Butler,  Vice-President  of Chase 
Manhattan Bank,  cited by  the  President  H.  Patterson, 
during  the  international financial  forum  organised by 
this Bank  in Paris,  11th March,  1971.) -39-
Would we not prefer to invent the future than to 
suffer it?  The  time is no longer  J  always supposing 
that it has ever existedJ  when it is acceptable to 
'approach the future backwards  as expressed by 
Paul Val~ry.  The times of nationalistJ  private and 
scattered solutions to the problems of development and 
infrastructure have also run their full course.  Regional 
aspirations must be reconciled with international joint 
actionJ  co-operation and solidarity which 3.re becoming 
more necessary than ever.  With regard to public ex-
penditureJ  both in investment and functionsJ  its expansion 
makes it necessary for us to endeavour to find solutions 
which will produce the optimum results.  In order to 
reach this pointJ  there must be strong but democratic 
StatesJ  served by competent administrationsJ  and by 
a  network of efficient public institutions.  Louis Armand 
stressedJ  and rightly that 'men are worn down to no pur-
pose in weak structures.  Their efficiency isJ  on the 
other handJ  increased tenfold by strong structures' ( 1). 
This need for strengthening of States does not in the 
least contradict that of the delegation of missions and 
of powers required of international organs.  On the 
contraryJ  the capacity of each would thus be reinforced. 
By forcing ourselves to make specific suggestionsJ  we 
have only wished to show that new channels can and must 
be found within the framework of a  democratic regimeJ 
which remainsJ  in our opinionJ  valuableJ  and above all 
capable of perfectionJ  despite the clumsiness and defects 
which are being increasingly criticised.  The forms of 
democracy are multipleJ  flexible and can be improved. 
On the other handJ  we cannot see any alternative to this 
improvement save decadence or some disguised  Corm 
of dictatorship. 
( 1)  'Simples Propos• {p. 180) - FayartJ  1968 - 40-
At the end of his work on 'Les Futurs Possibles' 
(The Possible Futures) L.  <Mrardin rem.inds us of 
the reply of Ralph Nadler to the reporter Henry 
Brandon who said to him - 1Many young people no 
longer believe in reforms.  They want to destroy 
the system in order to create a  new one. 1  His reply 
was:  11 myself maintain that the democratic system 
is a  good framework to work in.  Democracy does not 
mean 'Status quo•,  but people must understand how the 
machine functions,  the damage which it causes them and 
the need to get it into working order. 1  He then proposed 
that we should •question ourselves,  and look constmc-
tively at the creative re-build:ing of the future'.  This 
is what we have attempted here and what we too propose. 
The formation and enlargening of the European economic 
community has given us the opportunity to fashion,  jointly 
and democratically,  our future.  Let us not allow such a 
precious chance to slip through our fingers and bear 
in mind,  as also recalled by Paul  Val~ry, that ' civili-
sations are mortal. 1  In grasping this opportunity,  let 
us be capable of reaping the full value of our common 
interest,  and extending our horizons beyond parochialism, 
private interests or situations and generally accepted 
clich~ ideologies or ideas. 
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======================== CONFERENCE  ON  INDUSTRY  AND  THE  CO¥~UNITY 
********** 
Report  by  BALDASSARE  ARMATO 
"Financing infrastructures for  a  harmonious 
Development  of  the  Community" PROPOSITION 
To  our  way  of thinking,  the  problem  of financing infrastructures 
if it has  objective limits in a  poor  community,  has  only  a  political 
meaning in rich communities  such as  those  of Western  Europe.  In West 
European  zoneswhere there  are  huge  movements  of speculative capital which 
does  not  find or  does  not  wish  to  find  productive  uses,where  there is a 
constant movement  of capital  towards  other countries,  the  problem  of 
financing  the  building of structures and  plants to  improve  the  standard 
of living is eminently a  political one.  It is at political level,  in the 
most  relevant meaning of  the  term,  that resources are  parceled out  for 
various uses  on  the basis of the relation of strength established amongst 
the different strata of the  Community.  In  this report  we,  therefore, 
propose  to  deal  with  the  main  topics of  conflict of interests which 
have  been stimulated in Western  Europe,  a  conflict in recent  times  which 
has  been  based  on  the  imbalance  created  through obsolescence of national 
authorities and of that minimum  of economic  democracy  which  succeeded in 
taking shape  (democratic  programmes,  parliamentary control,  syndical 
action,  etc.)  between  the  Community  and  the  productive  world,  between 
social objectives and industrial development. -2-
Chapter  1  - THE  PROBLEM.  OF  INFRASTRUCTURES  AND  THE  GENERAL 
POLITICAL  CONTEST  IN  THE  EEC. 
I-1.  Th~ problem  of definition 
The  concept  of social infrastructure  in any  of  the  definitions 
by  sociologists and  economists,  is neutral  on  the  question  of conflict of 
interests.  They  do  not  help us,  therefore,  to  identify  the  field of 
action nor  the  results of this opposition  which  we  think  has  been  outlined 
in European  society. 
For  this reason,  more  is required  than  only  an  abstract and 
inclusive  concept  and  a  clear distinction is needed  of infrastructures 
on  the  basis of  objectives pursued,  even if this distinction  can  have 
but  a  rather  vague  outline.  However,  it will  be  said  that  even  a  distinctio 
based  on  the  social or  economic  objectives  sought  needs  examination at  the 
level of  the  interests pursued.  One  can  distinguish: 
infrastructures with  an  economic  purpose,  necessary  to  the  activities 
of enterprises  (energy,  transport,  etc.); 
infrastructures of  a  social-cultural character,  which  serve  the 
physical,  intellectu~l and  moral  well-being of the  population  (health, 
homes,  education,  culture,  organization of  free  time); 
infrastructures with  an  administration purpose,  (state apparatus, 
defence,  administration of law);  there  are still some  margins  of 
ambiguity  under  this heading. 
Infrastructures of  a  social-cultural character  could  function  as 
an  answer  to  socially distorted needs.  A school,  for  instance,  could  be 
directed exclusively  towards  increasing productivity.  The  building of 
houses  for  emigrants  can -3-
serve  to  perpetuate  the  imbalance  between  regions of high productivity 
and  the  less developed  ones  with serious inconvenience  to all those 
involved  (in departure  and arrival zones)  with this phenomenon. 
On  the  other hand,  infrastructures with an  economic aim  of 
stimulating a  balanced development  between various regions  would  answer 
efficiently the  needs of European society.  In spite of these margins  of 
• 
ambiguity,  it seems  to us  that in order  to  characterize certain trends 
this distinction could be  accepted. 
I-2.  Some  considerations  on  the  trend of the  European  integration process 
In  documents  of the  Community  organs,  mention is frequently made 
of the  "Creation of an original civilization" as  t"he  fundamental  objective 
of the  process of  economic  integration.  In truth,  optimistic as  the 
interpreters may  be,  it is difficult  to  find  in the  Treaty  such  generous 
intentions.  From  its reading,  the  illusion emerges  rather of creating 
in the  Eur9pe  of  the  twentieth century an area of economic  liberalism 
where  to  the  automatism  of market  forces  would  befall  the  task of achieving 
the  aims  of civilized progress.  The  Treaty  does  not  provide  for,  nor 
does it ascribe  to  anyone,  the  authority  to  direct  European  development. 
The  economic  and  social  changes  which it has  produced  have  by  now  revealed 
how  intolerable  the situation is.  With  such background,  we  are  not 
surprised if, in recent years,  more  concern has  been  shown  to  the  problem 
of securing a  maximum  rate of expansion  so  as  to  recover  productive  gaps, 
rather  than  to  the necessity of giving an  impulse  to objectives of social 
programme  and  to  economic  democratisation. -4-
Apart  from  some  dreamer  who  continued  to  propose  the  idea of an 
orignal  development,  it was  all too  evident  that  the  objective  to  be  reached 
was  competitiveness with other  developed  areas in the  capitalistic world, 
turning away  anything that  could  harm  this competitiveness. 
In  the  Memorandum  on  industrial policy,  for  instance,  can  be 
seen  how  the  financing  of public  expenditure  through  an  increase  of 
public  debt  is to  be  avoided  in  so  far  that it weakens  the  means  of 
industrial  financing  by  lessening  the  availability in  the  capital market. 
The  statement  of  the  Memorandum  means,  therefore,  containing 
public  expenditure  so  as  to  free  resources  for  industrial  development. 
This is confirmed  by  the  role  that  in  such  a  contest is allocated  to 
public  enterprises and  to  the  policy of public  contracts,  two  factors 
which  should  ensure  further  support  to  industrial expansion,  with  a  loss 
of public  expenditure. 
In  the  EEC  the  dualism  industry-community  has  been  solved in 
practice  by  making  the  first objectives prevail  over  the  second,  and  also 
by  taking advantage  of  the  timorous  vacuity in  democratic  control  at European 
level.  Paradoxically,  in  so  doing,  the  same  kind  of  development  in  the 
advanced  areas  of  the  Western  world,  whose  competition  should  have  been 
fought,  have  been  proposed again.  However,  the  preference  given  to 
spontaneous  economic  evolution  produces  in  the  limits of  the  relations of 
strength between  productive  powers  an  imbalance  in favour  of enterprises 
in  contrast  to  social needs. 
This  produces  in fact  a  concentration of political  power  in 
the  productive  structures and  the  burden  of  a  constant  passive  adaptation 
by  labour  to  the  spontaneous  evolution of -5-
economic  structures.  In essence,  workers are called upon·to  make  sacrifices 
in front  of reduced  economic  activity,  to  face  structural crisis,  trade  and 
sectoral restructurisation and  to  react  by mass  emi~ation to  the 
attitude of securing the  maximum  profits realisable  by  territorial concen-
tration of investments.  The  preferential character of access  to 
accumulation  by  economic  forces  coupled  to  an  uncontrolled  phenomenon 
of concentrated territorial development  are  the  cause  and,simultaneously, 
the effect of an  inability,  definable  as  a  system,  to  face  at least 
parallel social infrastructure development. 
Public  expenditure  which  is capable of meeting objectively the 
needs  of productive  quantitative  development  but is unsuccessful  in 
directing the  qualitative  choices limits itself in reality to  the 
performance  of a  collateral  function  unable  to  supply  even  adequate  answers 
to  those  same  needs  for  a  territorial planning now  indispensible  for  the 
pursuit of present  tendencies. 
1-3.  The  political problem 
In  the  course  of  time  the  tolerance of an  advanced  industrial 
society  faced  with this situation tends  to  diminish whether in factories) 
places of  work  or in the  community,  even if this does  not  occur 
uniformly in  the  various  countries.  The  trend of this  curYe  is 
undoubtedly  determined  by  various historical,  ideological and 
institutional factors.  For  instanc~,  in European  countries  where 
organisations of workers actions were  born and  have  grown,  workers are 
far  more  sensitive to  this problem  of -6-
economic  democratisation.  Yet,  institution and political 'organisa~ions 
do  not  seem  capable  of expressing these  requirements  in a  practical way. 
The  domination  which  economic  groups exert  on  areas of 
communication  of  the masses  enables  them  to  extol  an  ideology  whose  aim  is 
"the extolling of economic  liberalism and  individual  success  to  the 
detriment  of collective aspects of social life,  to  the  conditioning 
of individuals"  (1)  in their choices  and  their kind  of  comportment  "in 
order  to  preserve  power  in the  hands  of  a  few  minority  groups".  This 
is probably  the  most  efficient force  which  allows  the  extraordinary 
capacity of adaptation of capitalism.  It is in  this way  that are labelled, 
like  symbols  of success,the  products  destined  to  individual  use:  motorcars, 
domestic  electric implements,  etc.  This  ideology  has  two  deep  rooted  aims~ 
one  economic,  the  continued  demand  for  private  consumption  which  permits 
an  intensification in demand  for  such  goods,  strengthening current 
tendencies;  the  other political,  the  proposal  that  the  present  mode  of 
development  is the  only possible  and  fair  one.  The  phenomenon  has  thus  an 
important  influence either  on  finding  oneself missing out  in our  society 
or  on  the  possibility of its change. 
In  the  end  there is a  missing perspective  and  structural 
adaptation  to  this new  reality of modes  of political constitutions which 
should rule  the  destiny of Western  Europe.  On  the  one  hand,  the  democratic 
institutions  founded  on  a  national status are  now  old irons unable  to 
control,  except  to  a  small  extent,  an  economic  development  now  of 
continental perspective at least. 
(1)  CFDI  - "Pour  un  socialisme  democratique"  - P.40. -7-
On  the  other hand,  even  the  ~ew prospects  which  do  exist at 
European  and at national levels for  guiding  economic  evolution are 
frustrated  by  the  inconsistent  and unsuccessful revival of institutions. 
All  this leads European citizens to  the  firm  belief that  there  are  no 
alternatives, at lease at short  term,  to  the present situation. 
In spite of these negative  elements,  from  1968  to  this day, 
a  real objection  to  this situation has  developed;  started in factories, 
it gained  ground  in the  community  and is supported  by  the  revindication 
for  a  more  ample  economic  democracy. 
"The  objection to  this situation started in factories,  as 
traditional aims  of syndical action concerning wages  above all and, 
therefore,  the re-distribution of the  enterprise profits,  then  were 
added revindications relative  to  rates,  to  qualifications,  to  work 
organisation in general  and  even  to  reinvestments.  Thus,  on  the  working 
side,  started a  new  balance  of power  in the  factory  with a  spread of 
always  more  varied negotiations  which  in short,  could not  prevent  being 
transferred at  community  level  where  the  imbalance  in the relation of 
power  society-industry was  supported by  uneasiness  caused  through stimulatior 
of regional  imbalance,  through  forced  emigration,  a  want  of infrastructure 
able  to  respond adequately  to  the  phenomenon  of urbanisation. -8-
I-4.  New  requirements  and  Community  organisms 
The  events of May  1968  shook  France  considerably also  the 
convictions of a  large  portion of European  citizens, at  the  time  in 
Community  circles surprise  was  expressed at  the  small  importance  attached 
in this explosion of  the  European  outlook  theme,  although many  claims  in 
those  days  put  clearly into  prominence  the national crisis. 
There  is no  doubt  that  from  that moment,  began  a  s~rious self-
criticism  on  the  way  to  proceed  with  the  integration process  even if it has 
remained hitherto  on  an  intellectual plane  or,  at most,  has  remained  in 
some  document  the  practical application of  which  permits  serious  doubts 
to  be  raised. 
In  the  document  on  Guidance  for  a Social Policy  (1),  for  instance, 
one  first of all notices  that at  the initial phase  in the  process of 
integration,  bar  a  few  exceptions,  "the  improvement  in  standard of living 
and  of  work  of labour  to  bring it on  a  par  with  progress"  was  generally 
mentioned as  expected and  attributed more  "to  the  functioning  of  the 
Common  Market  which  will  favour  the  harmonization of social  systems"  than 
"from  the  expected procedure  of  the  Treaty  and  the  approximation of 
legislative,  regulation  and  administration provision"  (art.  117  EEC). 
It is said moreover  that  "the  open  prospects  for  implementing 
an  conomic  and  Monetary  Umion  have  changed  the  condi.tions  of  the  problem. 
The  necessary  coherence  between  economic  and  social aspects of  the 
integration process  will· impose  itself always  more.  The  want  of 
simultaneousness  in  the  realisation of  economic  and  monetary  aspects,  on 
the  one  hand·,  ·and  of  the  social ones  of integration'on  the  other,  could 
compromis~ the  success of  the  process  set in motion". 
(1)  Preliminary  guidance  for  a  Community  social policy. 
EEC,  17th March,  1971. -9-
To  this end,three  so  called  11  major  aims  of society" are 
mentioned,  i.e. full and better employment,  a  greater social justice and 
finally,  a  better standard of living "to be  fulfilled no:t  only by  an 
improvement  in working  conditions in  themselves but also through  an efficient 
protection of the  physical  and  psychological health of  the  individual 
against  "perturbations" of different kinds,  with  the  protection and 
promotion  of natural  environment  and  through  improvement  of setting-up 
conditions,  a  better satisfaction of social-cultural needs". 
"Only  in the  measure  in which  the Economic  and Monetary  Union, 
with all its implications,  will effectively contribute  to  an  improvement 
in  the living conditions and  the  well-being of all, will  European 
integration secure  the  strong adhesion  of  the  population,  in particular, 
of  the  young  generation which,  in the  building of  the  new.  Europe,  seeks 
the  realisation of a  new  society,  conforming  to  its  deep  aspirations. 
This  implies  the  implementation  and  strengthening of an  economic  and  social 
democracy,  taking a  practical  form  either in the  democratisation of  economic 
and  social structures or  in  the assertion of the  autonomous  role  and  res-
ponsibility of the  social sector at  Community  level"·· 
At  this point,  one  understands  that it is necessary  to  couple 
this  theme  to  the  economic  development  and  to refer  to  the Third programme 
of medium  term  Fconomic  Policy  which states:  "The  economic  policy of  the 
Community  cannot  be  limited to  the  aims  of  common  objectives on  the  question 
of development  and  of stability.  It acquires  a  full meaning  in the 
contribution it makes  to  the  improvement  in living conditions:  it must 
tend  to  raise  the living standard and - 10-
at  the  same  time,  to  improve  the  qualitative  conditions  of existence; 
it must  moreover  contribute  to  a  greater solidarity of  the  less  favoured 
social classes". 
"In order  to better satisfy these  needs,  the  greatest  importance 
is to  be  attached  to  the  correlation of  economic  and  social evolutions.  A 
balanced  and  sustained  economic  evolution is an  essential  condition  for 
social progress;  but,  in its turn,  a  satisfactory economic  evolution 
pre-supposes  a  climate  of security and  of progress in the  social .field. 
Our  societies must  be  able  to  adapt  these  two  aspects". 
There  is no  doubt  that  we  are  in agreement  with  the  enunciation 
of  the  problem  and  the  objectives  to  pursue  in the  social field,  what  we 
do  not  find  convincing  on  the  other hand  are  the  means  available at 
European  level  to  proceed  from  the  enunciation  to  the  realisation of the 
objectives.  In  fact,  it seems  to  us  that  without  a  qualitative leap by 
the  Community  institutions in  the  sense  of their larger democratisation 
and  effectiveness,  these  objectives will  remain  on  paper.  In  view  of  the 
present institutional weakness,  we  feel  the need  to express 
some  reserves  on  the  proposals  of  consultation between  social partners, 
the  outcome  of  which  could  only  be  a  revenue  policy  carried out  from  an 
economic  outlook. 
To  justify our  preoccupation  over  the  effective possibilities 
on  the  part  of  Community  organs  to  fulfil  the  objectives  which,  it seems, 
they  propose,  we  think it is opportune  to  analyse  the  results achieved  by 
the  European States regarding objectives proposed  during  1965-70  on  social 
infrastructures. - 11-
Chapter II - THE  OBJECTIVES  MISSED  BY  GOVERNMENTS 
II-1.  Analysis of  the situation 
Necessities imposed  by  the  exodus of agricultural population 
towards  townn  and  to  a  no  smaller extent  through an  increasing demand  for 
improvement  in the  standard of living on  the part of European  populations 
have  induced many  Governments  to  introduce  these  problems  in their budget 
or programme  policies.  The  third medium  term  policy has  expressed  these 
enunciations as  follows: 
"A  better fulfilment  of collective needs,  particularly of 
education,  public  health and  housing,  aimed at ensuring a  balanced  progress 
and  a  fair distribution of services;  this priority requires  that in 
the Member  Countries,  private  consumption  increases less rapidly  than  the 
national product  to  allow for  a  faster  development  in collective services. 
The  intensification of  the  struggle against  the  harmful  effects 
of expansion  on natural environment  (air and  water pollution,  noise, 
excessive urban  concentrations)  taking into account  conditions of 
international  competition,  will  have  to  apply progressively  the  principle 
that  the  onus  of  these actions shall fall  on  those  who  have  caused  the 
noxious effects". 
Unfortunately,  however,  the  analysis of previous results is no 
cause  for  optimism.  A comparison  between  estimated and actual  consumptior 
and  of public  expenditure  in  the  six countries of the  EEC  leads  one  to 
rather discouraging conclusions. - 12-
G.N.P. 
(  ,..  \ 
19b5-70J 
Projections  Results 
Germany  (FR)  3,5  4,7 
France  4,8  5,8 
Italy  5,0  6,0 
Netherlands  4,6  5 '1 
Belgium  4 '1  4,4 
Bublic  consumption  (1) 
(196'5-70) 
Projections  Results 
3 '1  2,2 
4,5  3,6 
5,2  3,8 
3 '1  2,4 
5,6  5 '1 
These  results are  confirmed  by  information  on  expenditure  in  the 
capital accounts  of  public  administrations. 
EXPENDITURE  IN  THE  CAPITAL  ACCOUNT  OF  PUBLIC  ADMINISTRATIONS 
Projections  Results 
Germany  (FR)  5,5  2,0 
France  8,2  6,6 
Italy  18,4  4,6 
Netherlands  9,8  5,2 
Belgium  7,5  8,6 
EEC  4,0  3,2 
In  conclusion,  faced  with objectives of  increase  in  the  GNP 
largely  exceeded,  public  expenditure  has  not  increased as  expected  and 
(except  for,Belgium)  has  not  even  reached half what  had  been allotted 
by  Governments.  A  graphic  picture 
(1)  Source:  EEC,  Third  Medium  term  Economic  Policy  Programme - 13-
of this situation is given in calculating the  coefficients of increase 
or  decrease  of public  expenditure  in relation to  the  increase in GNP  for 
the  whole  Community.  An  estimated increase in public  expenditure  in capital 
account  of  8.5%  was  accompanied  by  an  estimated increase in the  GNP  of 
4.3%  (8.5  x  100)  the resulting coefficient is 197.7.  In practice, 
4.3 
however,  there has  been  an  increase in public  expenditure  of  the  order of 
4.9%  against  an  increase of  the  GNP  of 5.29, it follows  that  the  coefficient 
is in practice less than half that  which  had  been  proposed:  94.2. 
All  this  shows  undoubtedly  a  tendency  towards  a  gradual  deterioration 
in  the  role  of public  expenditure  in the  use  of resources.  Instead  of  a 
percentage reductian in private  consumption  compared  with  the  public  one, 
the  opposite  has  occurred.  The  programmed  estimates of private  consumption 
have  been  exceeded  in the  six countries. 
PRIVATE  CONSUHPTION  1965-70 
Projections  Results 
Germany. (FR)  3,5  4,9 
France  4,5  5,3 
Italy  4,7  6,5 
Netherlands  4,- 5,1 
Belgium  3,7  4,5 
EEC  4,1  5,3 
In practice,  therefore,  due  to  a  lack of success  in the  use  of 
public  expenditure  of about  20%,  there  has  been  an  increase  in expenses in 
private  consumption of 25-30% in the  EEC.  This analysis lends itself to  a 
series of considerations  on  the political and  social plane  which  confirm 
and  express  the  assertions made  earlier. - 14-
II-2.  Infrastructures and  social evolution. 
This  development  in public  expenditure  was  set in an  extremely 
energetic social  contest  characterised  by  an  imposing movement  of labour 
from  a  professional  and  geographical  point of  view. 
BREAKDOWN  OF  CIVILIAN  EMPLOYMENT  IN  NAJOR  SECTORS  IN .  76. 
SECTOR  1955  1960  1965  1970 
Agriculture  24,3  19,6  15,9  13,4 
Industry  40,0  42,4  43,5  43,0 
Services  (including 
35,7  38,0  40,6  public  organisms)  42,7 
In  the  agricultural sector,  the  number  of employed  has  decreased 
by  6.5 million  - equal  to  40%  - between  1958  and  1970,  whilst  employment 
in  industry has  increased  by  3  million  and  in the Services sector  (including 
public administration)  by  over 5 million. 
(1)  Second  medium  term  Economic  Policy Programme. -IS-
As  regards geographical movements,  the main  development 
has  occurred particularly in the  European agricultural  zones;  we  give 
the pertinent data concerning  the  Italian internal emigration and  the 
immigration in European  countries.  (1). 
This  dynamism  of the  labour  force  is outlined by  a  displacement 
of people  behind capital  dynamism  the attitude of which is irrational 
from  a  political and  social angle  and  does  not  correspond  to  the  wishes 
of  the  populations involved  (in countries of departure  and  in receiving 
ones),  this will  be  illustrated by  other reporters. 
(1)  Balance  of migration movements  inside and  abroad,  originally 
from  the  Italian Mezzogiorno  (1965-1969) 
1965  - 52.777  1967  - 122.465 
1966- 70.764  1968  - 148.283 
1969  -150.604 T
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As  regards  our  topic,  one  cannot but  underline  the  fact  that it 
would  have  needed  an  increased effort in social structures,  since  emigrants, 
in their displacement,  create  a  higher  demand  in the  amount  and  efficiency 
of urban  infrastructures.  In particular,  the  emigrant  from  an  agricultural 
zone  arrives in an  environment  where  problems  exist already of housing, 
of  congestion of  transport,  of  over-crowding,  thus  making  them  worse  and 
frequently  causing  a  reaction of rejection of immigrants  and  they  are 
the  source  of  deeply  hurt. feelings.  "These  reactions  frequently  cause 
tension  and  negative  repercussions  between  immigrants,  they  contribute 
to  resentment  and  discontent  which  increases  through uncertainty of real 
prospects of introduction in the  local life and  of inadaptability.  Social 
tensiomspring from  prejudices  through  a  lack of understanding  the  emigrant 
worker's problems  on  the  part  of certain strata of  the  local  population, 
insufficient information  on  the  part  of  public  opinion;  but  they also 
follow  the  inadequacies  of migration policy in  the  countries of immigration, 
for  instance,  on  the  subject  of social infrastructures  the  general  insuf• 
ficiency of  which  can  be  seen  in various  immigration  collectivities,  parti-
cularly in regions of major  industrial  concentration  (absence  of social 
reception services,  of housing,  schools,  health services,  recreation and 
culture,  lack of social assistants and  initiatives and  assistance  for 
young people,  women  and  the  family,  etc."  (1) 
From  the  point  of  view  of  the  effects,  the  unsuccessful 
setting up  of infrastructures hits above  all the  groups  and kinds  of 
persons less protected by  the  community,  such as  emigrants. 
CNEL,  observations  and  proposals  on  problems  of emigration. 
Rome,  1970  - P.150. - 18-
II-3.  Philosophy  of  economic  choices 
The  estimated objectives  of  public  expenditure  which  for  the 
EEC  showed  an  average  increase  of  4%  based  on  a  projected  GNP  increase  of 
4.3%  and  were  not  r~ached,  indicate also  a  policy  choice,  the  elements 
of  which  can  be  found  in the  Second  medium  term  Economic  Policy  Programme. 
The  programme,  in fact,  proposed  some  measures  which  should  have  determined 
above  all a  re-structurisation of  the  European  system  of  production  and 
thus  should  have  supplied an  answer  to  the  problems  arising  through inter-
national  competition.  Amongst  other  things,  this concept  provided  that 
"Member  States and  the  Community  institutions will  have  to  try  to  establish 
a  general  climate  favourable,as  far  as  possible  to  the  aims  of  enterprises 
and  their realisation.  In particular,  they  will  have  to  eliminate  obstacles 
to  competition  policy,  to  company  lnws,  to  taxation  and  to  administrative 
practices  which  risk being an  obstacle  to  this movement" • 
II  •  In particular,  it will  be  necessary  to  ensure  that  the 
conditions exist  for  a  satisfactory growth,  considered  indispensable  so 
that  structural  improvements  at  enterprise  and  sectoral levels  can  be 
achieved rapidly  and  without  serious  economic  or  social  inconvenience. 
It will  be  necessary  in particular  to  create  a  fourable  climate  for 
investments,  since  many  enterprises will  not  be  able  to  fulfil  the  adjustment 
of  their structures  to  the  evolution of  demand  and  to  the  conditions of 
production  without  a  sufficient attraction to  invest.  In  this connection 
it will  be  necessary  for  the  economic  trend policy  to  seek  to  distribute 
sparingly  the  use  of  financial  and  fiscal  means  so  as  not  to  run  the  risk 
of upsetting  inopportunely  the  investment  effort". - 19 
So  that enterprises'  programmes  w&re  not upset  and  in order 
"not  to  oppose"  investment  efforts, it was  evidently necessary  to avoid 
that public  organs  gave  the  impression of wanting to direct the  economy 
towards objectives other than  those  of the  enterprises.  This  thinking 
explains the fall in public  investments at  the  very moment  they  were  the 
most  needed  and it is through  this thinking that  can be  explained,  for 
instance,  the  choices made  in Italy in the  ambit of these needs~ 
II-4.  The  Italian situation 
The  Italian economy  with  a  frailer structure  compared  to  that 
' 
of other  countries has felt more  acutely this tendency  to  direct national 
~ 
resources  to  the  advantage  of private enterprises.  In  public  expenditure, 
these  basic  choices  can  be  clearly singled out. 
r. - 20-
SOCIAL  INVESTMENTS  BY  CATEGORY  ( 1) 
( 1966  - 1970) 
Programme  Results 
Public  Education  960  339  621 
Health  360  125  235 
Transports  4.125  3.007  - 1118 
Telecommunications  715  927  +  212 
Public  works: 
Public  Building  395  218  177 
Land  reclamation  330  361  +  31 
Various  1545  733  812 
Private building  9125  12.315  +  3190 
Errors  and  omissions  745  745 
TOTAL  18.300  18.025  275 
This  table  is hifhly significant  because  it reveals  a  frightening 
drop  (above  60%)  in  school  and  health  investments,  and  of  30-40% in 
transports  and  public  building.  The  only  items  which  have  exceeded  the 
programmed  application,  apart  from  land  reclamation,  are  telecommunications 
and  private  building.  In  effect  impulse  has  been  given  to  applications 
which  help  private  industry  (telecommunications)  and  private  investment 
(private building).  Without  the  investments  recorded  in  these  two  sectors 
the  so-called social  investments  would  have  shown  a  reduction of  20%  in  a 
period  during  which  national  revenue  has  increased  by  an  annual  average  of 5%. 
To  confirm  these  considerations,  we  reproduce  another  table 
relative  to  the  percentage  between  the  various applications of public  works 
from  which it is easy  to  see  that  the  only  sector in constant  percent 
increase is roadworks. 
(1)  Source:  EEC B
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Road  making  and  the  regression recorded in all sectors of public 
transport at  a  time  when  urbanization  was  becoming  more  intensive  was 
accompanied  by  a  constant distortion in Italian consumption  the  origin 
of  which  goes  back  to  the  fifties but  which  had  gone  on  at  an  increasing 
rate.  The  distortion  concerns  the  impulse  given  to  individual  durable 
consumer  goods  (mainly  cars)  compared  with  collective  consumption.  This 
is  shown  by  the  progressive  reduction  in  the  number  of passengers  in public 
transport  (tramways;  trolleybuses and  railways)  and  by  the  increase  in 
means  of private  transport. 
PASSENGER  TRAFFIC  (1) 
Tramways  Trolley  buses 
Indexes  Indexes 
1960  100,0 
1961  85,6 
1962  62,2 
1963  56,8 
1964  49,5 
1965  41  ,4 
1966  38,7 
PASSENGERS  CARRIED 
Railways 
Indexes 
1960 
1968 
547.396 
442.874 
(1)  Source:  ISTAT. 
1960  1 00 '0 
1961  105 '1 
1962  11 0 '6 
1963  107,3 
1964  103,9 
1966  96,7 
(thousands) - 22-
At  present  i'n  Italy the  number  of cars in circulation should be 
around  11  million  (1960:  1.97 million;  1965:  5.5)  with five  inhabitants 
per  ca~ whilst  estimates of  the  increase  in the  total number  of cars 
registered in  1980  show  a  ratio of  1  car per 3  inhabitants for  a  total of 
18 million.  The  estimates are based  on  an  assumption  of a  development  in 
home  demand  for  cars relative  to  the  development  of personal  revenue 
(see  estimates  by  IRI,  FIAT,  ISRIL,  etc.)  (1). 
To  better pin point  current  congestion,  we  quote  some 
information  on  the  amount  of space  available in the national territory 
for  every motor  vehicle  in relation to  the  road network. 
( 1) 
1950: 
1960: 
1968: 
Circulation:  Source  ANFIA 
3.5 kms. 
100  metres 
50 metres. 
Density of population per motorcar: 
1960  21  ,0 
1961  1 7 '1 
1962  14,3 
1963  11. '5 
1964  9,9 
1965  8,6 
1966  7,6 
1967  6,7 
1968  6,0 - 23-
The  phenomenon  of progressive  congestion  becomes  worse  if it is 
related  to  the  increase  of metropolitan areas  where  the  density  of population 
per  square  kilometer is still increasing,  an  occurrence  to  be  reconciled  with 
the  exodus  from  the  South  and  to  the  depopulation  of  the  countryside. 
To  evaluate  such  congestion  a  few  figures  are  sufficient: 
in  the  8  large metropolitan areas  (Nilan,  Naples,  Rome,  Turin,  Genoa, 
Florence,  Palermo,  Bologna)  resided  in  1961  in  an  area  equivalent  to 
3.58%  of  the  whole  country,  14,481,000  inhabitants  or  28.6%  of  the  whole 
population;  if the  present  trend is not  reversed,  in  the  year  two  thousand, 
we  shall  have  a  concentration  in  the  same  territory of  29,153,000  inhabitants, 
equivalent  to  44.B%  of  the  national  population.  (1) 
In  the  sector of  house  construction,  the  preference  given  to 
private  industry has  determined: 
(a)  a  heavy  increase  in  prices  and  an  outright  opposed  trend  in 
the  structure  of  supply  and  demand.  One  has  thus  witnessed 
the  discouraginG  sight  of  empty  luxury  flats  whilst  there 
persists the  phenomenon  of  so-called unhealthy habitations 
(barracks,  caverns,  walls  of  urban  defence,  towers,  etc.); 
(b)  the  systematic  evasion  of regulating plans  with  collateral 
occurences  of  corruption of  administration,  political  and  civil 
servants  and  of organised  delinquency. 
(1)  "Presupposed  knowledge  and  indications  for  an  organised policy 
of  transports"  (November  1970) - 24-
II-5.  Which  causes  have  determined this situation? 
It is clear that  modern  industrial sectors established to satisfy 
the  demand  of the  international market  had  a  vested interest in building up 
an  internal market  to  reduce  the  risks of economic  fluctuations.  All  this 
occurred,  however,  at  the  cost of rationality, i.e. of  development  of 
essential  consumer  goods  and  of collective  consumption  should  have  had 
priority,  not  only  for  reasons  of rationality. 
Yet it should  be  noticed that  this development  has  characterised, 
even if only  to  a  small  extent,  the  economic  evolution in all six countries 
of  the  Community,  as  shown  by  the  trend of public  expenditure  in relation 
to  increases  of  the  GNP.  The  Italian situation shows  painfully the  same 
defects  and it is the  result of a  more  backward  starting point  in the 
matter of strength of  the  productive  system  and  social infrastructures. 
In short,  we  are  facing  a  situation which,  having  escaped  from 
the  grasp of  the  organs_which  traditionally controlled it,  the  nations 
themselves,  found  no  other democratic  control points  and  produced 
that  imbalance  in power  between industry  and  society already mentioned. 
The  problem  of  a  want  of institutional adaptation must  not 
induce  one  to  lose  sight  of  the  responsibility  on  the  part of governments 
which  were  required  to  give  a  major  impetus  to  the  fulfilment  of  the 
infrastructures in the  face  of social  phenomenon  already outlined and 
which  did not  succeed in fulfilling even  the  objectives •  It 
seems  clear  to  us  that  they  were  persuaded  by  the  industrial lobby  to 
postpone  this topic,  even if, especially in Italy,  the  possibilities of 
financing  were  somewhat  extensive. - 25-
Distortions  caused  by  spontaneous  development  and  the  inability 
of established powers  to  "develop  harmoniously"  our  society,  indicate 
clearly  the  limits of  the  "system"  set up  in  Europe  immediately after  the 
Second  World  War  and  founded  on  the  opening  of economies  and  the  want  of 
instruments  to  direct it.  In  this examination,  the  missed  development  of 
infrastructures assumes  a  central  function. 
II-6.  The  political answer  of  reforms 
The  nucleus  of this  system  relies on  the  power  which  a  minority_has 
imposed  in practice  on all  development  of  the  society.  It is,  therefore, 
natural  that  the  conditions  of  the  encounter  should  be  sketched  in principle 
at  the  level  of  the  factory.  It  was  in fact  at  the  le,rel  of  work  that  was 
revealed  in  the  more  open  and  brutal manner  the  enslavement  of  working 
man  to  the  needs  of production.  But  it was  also  clear that  the  position of 
intolerable  subordination of  the  citizen in  the  factory  having been  charac-
terised,  it would  have  been  consistent  to  transfer by  analogy  the  same 
relationship of subordination  of  man  at  the  level of society and  of 
society  faced  by  the  production  system.  If at  factory level it was  possible 
to  settle by  negotiation with  the  owner,  problems  of rates,  of  chains  of 
production  and  assembly,  in  one  word  the  organisation of  the  work,  outside 
the  factory  those  problems  which  make  the  worker's life painfUl  could  be 
solved  by  using  the  same  methods,  also  problems  of regional  imbalance  and 
forced  emigration,  of  want  of essential  democracy,  of incapacity of  the 
system  to  fulfil  urban  infrastructures. -~-
Syndical  organisations in Italy have  become  the  interpreters 
of these  requirements  by  launching the  policy of reforms. 
Action  for  reforms  has  obtained  some  positive results,  implemented 
through protocols between  syndical  organisations and  the  Government  for 
the  reform  of homes  and  of health.  The  first protocol  with  some  pejorative 
amendments  has  become  law,  the  second  expired with  the  dissolution of the 
Chambers. 
Apart  from  the  practical results it seems  to  us  that  the 
positive elements  remain  valid in this first syndical initiative. 
The  first is the  individualisation of  the  parallel  between  the 
power  of  the  contractor in the  factory  and  in society and  the  statement 
of  the  problem  not  as  a  key  to  streamlining the  system  but  as  R  key  to 
the  change  in relationship of  power  inside  the  system  itself. 
The  second is represented  by  the  consciousness  acquired  by 
workers  of  the  necessity  for  action  for  the  fulfulrnent  of infrastructures 
as an  instrument  to  modify  the  development  mechanism,  changing  purely 
productive  aims,  of production  in itself and  for itself, by  aims  of 
social progress,  by  an  improvement  in  the  quality of living. 
In  the  third place,  the  choice  of syndical action with its 
aspects of  challenge  has  contributed in no  small  measure  to  showing  the 
unconcern  between  the  rea~ country  and  the  institutions,  pointing out  in 
the  Italian experience  the  most  significant political proof of  the  increasing 
inability of  the national  apparatus  to  cope  with the  new  social  requirements. 
The  action had its limits above  all in the  absence  of any 
precedent it could  follow,  in the  second  place  due  to  the  diffidence  with 
which political parties and  Parliament  have  surrounded it. - 27-
There  is no  doubt  that  during  some  phases  of  the  fight,  errors  were 
committed  but it is also  true  that  the  large majority  of  Italian workers 
has  given its full  support  to  this action  and  that its aims  remain  doubtlessl 
valid on  the  way  towards  a  renewal  of  Italian and  European  society.  ~he 
abundance  of  agreement  shown  on  the  part  of  workers  de~onstrates undoubtedly 
the  importance  of  these  needs  in  a  turning point  of  social  policy. 
II-7.  Philosophy  of action  for  ~he reforms  and  its "no':'elty". 
We  shall  now  quote  two  extracts  from  the  syndical  documents  on 
house  building and  transport  which  show  clearly  the  lines along  which  this 
action has  moved. 
"An  organic  policy  for  the  home  must  systematically aim  at 
establishing an  optimum  relation between  individual  and  environment  at 
the  level  of  culture  and  well-being with which present  society agrees 
This  means  that  enjoyment  of  the  home  must  in  the  first  place  be  assured 
by  high qualitative  standards  and  with  uniform  criteria for  the  collectivity 
of  citizens;  moreover,  it is linked  with  the  enjoyment  of all  the  civil 
and  social  services  which  go  with  the  dwelling:  urban  transport, 
parks,  schools,  hospitals,  libraries,  places  for  leisure,  etc.  In  this 
meaning,  the  policy  of  the  home  becomes  R  decisive  element  for  the 
implementation  of  a  hif>her  level  of living in  the  nation. 
The  means  throu~h which,  hitherto,  it has  been  attempted  to 
ensure  the  use  of  the  residence  are,  on  the  other hand,  entirely  contrary 
to  these  criteria.  They  give  rise  to  marked  inequalities between  the 
various  classes of citizens  and  give  the  home  a  permanent  character of 
scanty  resources.  This  is because it has  acquired  the  form,  the  destination 
r-tnd -~-
the  rule of any  economic  possession subjected to  the  laws  of supply  and 
demand  and  to  distortions of  income  and  of profit. 
The  only  coherent  way  to fulfil  an  optimum  relation between 
person  and  dwelling is,  therefore,  to  take  away  from  the  dwelling,  as 
happens  in the  case of other  fundamental  necessities of the  collectivity, 
its character of exclusive  economic  possession and  to  give it the  more 
ample  aspect  of prevailing social service". 
Transport  Policy. 
"The  same  bond  exists between  the  mechanism  of  spontaneous 
economic  development  of  our  system  with  the  relevant  territorial and 
sectoral  imbalances  and  overall  progress  in  the  transport  sector,  where 
are  proposed  again  the  same  mistakes  in  development  and  similar regional 
and  local  wants  .• 
The  lines of alternative intervention in  the  sector,  therefore, 
are subordinate  to  objectives of  a  radical  change  in  the  kind of  development 
carried out  up  to  now.  These  objectives must  take  a  practical  form  above 
all as  precautions against  public  expenditure  apt  to  slow  down  the  dangerous 
tendency  towards  the  concentration  we  have  at present  of buildings  and  indust 
installations in  few  metropolitan areas.  Thus  is outlined in  the  first 
place  the  necessity of  an  overall  planning of  the  transport  sector subordinat 
to  new  objectives of harmonious  general  development.  Yet  the  guiding idea 
of planning,  as  optimum  aim  of resources  in  function  of  certain objectives 
must  not  assume  a  Tierely  efficient appearance. 
The  objectives  aimed  at  and  the  technological  perspectives of  the 
sector in other  terms  cannot  be  subordinated  to  a  simple.reckoning of 
economic  costs  and  benefits.  They  must  be - 29-
rigidly established in relation  to  the  interests and  expectations of  the 
working  class,  not  only  in  terms  of  economic  and  social  growth  but  also  of 
increased  free  time,  of  a  more  extensive  participation in  the  political 
and  social life of  urban  centres  and  of  the  country,  of better physical 
and  psychological health.  From  this  point  of  view,  the  reckoning  of direct 
and  indirect  economic  costs,  must  correspond  to  an  evaluation of soci0l 
benefits,  with redistribution of  revenue,  of regional  re-balancing,  n 
higher rate  of mobility,  in civilization and  better  human  conditions". 
The  first  document  in  proposing  the  withdrawal  from  market 
attitude  the  building of  homes,  has  the  precise meaning  of eliminating 
speculation  from  an  essential need.  The  second  to  make  transport  policy  an 
active  element  in directing economic  development  and  not  to  be  its by-
product.  In  both cases,  the  revindications are  alternative  clues  to  present 
development  founded  on  the  priority given  to  development  objectives at 
short  and  medium  term  and  the  subordination  to  these  of long  term  ones  which 
alone  can  bring an  improvement  in  the  quality  of life. 
It is on  the  basis  of  these  considerations  that  can  be  seen  the 
irrationality of  the  present  real  power  structure  for  the  spreading of 
large  masses  and  the  inconsistence  of  the  assumption  that it is necessary 
"first  to  produce  then  distribute"  leaving  to  a  minority  the  task  of  definine: 
"what"  and  "how"  to  produce.  It is precisely  the  choice  of  "what"  and  of 
"how"  which  determines  the  features  of  a  society,  if it will  be  human  or 
inhuman,  if it shall  be  democratic  or oligocratic,  if in  the  end it will  be 
worthwhile  ~iving. 
These  revindications are  set  in entirely new  terms  as  to  previous 
syndical  ~perience, not  only  in means  of action  (the  strike),  but  also  in 
aims.  The  demand  is not  made  in fact -~-
according  to  tradition,  of benefits for  workers  in face  of an  economic 
development  the  direction of which is left to  other& but  an alternative 
development  capable of realising workers'  aspirations.  Hence  the 
harshness of the  encounter and  the  deep  strategic meaning  assumed  in the 
encounter,  the  revindication of social structures. 
Chapter III - PERSPECTIVES 
III-1.  Reality of  the  problem  at national  and  European  level. 
In  synthesis a  certa~n economic  development  favoured  by  the 
Treaty  and  by  national political behaviour  impedes  a  rational  and  adequate 
development  of infrastructures right at  the  time  when  this development 
becomes  the  junction between  citizens'  aspirations,  social  progress  and 
economic  development.  Certainly the  conflict  between  development  of infra-
structures and  short  and  medium  term  objectives based  on  the  preservation 
of  competitiveness of national  products,  in relation  to  the  other 
European  countries  and  of their products  in relation  to  inter~ational 
competition,  gives  the  problem  an  extremely political  ~haracter and  a 
continental  dimension. 
The  political moment  of  the  encounter of interests between  forces 
which  propose  to  carry  fo~ward a  certain development  of society and  the 
others  which  subordinate it to  needs  of productive  development  and  of 
European  and  international  competition,  is that of the  sharing out  of 
revenue  between  productive  and  social  employment.  The  present institutional 
structure of European  countries does  not  seem  to  be  able  to  solve  within 
itself this discussion  between  groups  of interests.  The  Italian experience 
of expressing this discussion  in  a  direct  confrontation  between  syndical 
action and  Government  has  resulted in  a  series of perplexities and  difficulties. 
Perplexities determined  even  ad  hoc  in  the  public  opinion - 31-
on  presumed  attempts  by  syndical organisations  to  occupy  a  place  outside 
their  competence  and  in particular to  occupy  the  very political  space  of 
the  parties.  Objective  difficulties are evidence  above  all by  insufficient 
syndical  action  to  solve  completely  such  problems  only  within  the  ambit  of 
a  direct  encounter  with  the  Executive  and  with  Parliamentary Groups. 
A  problem  of  syntheses  of new  instruments  of action,  not  of 
method  or  of  contents. 
Moreover,  the  economic  correlation of  EEC  countries,  tends  to 
leave  out  at  the  lowest  common  denominator  the  social  uses  of  resources 
as  a  way  of  thinking  of  increased  competition  in  the  area  and  in  the  absence 
of re-balancing mechanisms  at  Buropean  level. 
The  drop  in social  investments  and  goods  of collective 
consumption  brings  into  play  not  only  the  overbearing action  of European 
oligopolies  and  the  political  will  of  Governments,  but  also  limited 
institutional instruments  of  the  Community.  The  political forces  of  the 
Left  and  the  syndicates must  finally  take  charge  of  this  new  dimension  in 
their action. 
III-2.  Enlargement 
Certain hesitations  shown  by  parties of  the  Left  in certain 
candidate  countries are  in  fact  rather  justified in  view  of  what  was  said 
previously.  Above  all,  Great  Britain,  Denmark  and  Norway  enjoy  social 
and  infrastructure  deve.lop.p1ent  systems  more  satisfact'ory  than  those  of 
the  six countries of  th~  EEC.  We  do  not  know  in what  measure  the  economic 
structures of  these  countries will  succeed  in avoiding  a  slowing  down  in 
their infrastructures. -H-
It is realistic  to  suppose  that,  as matters  stand,  also  in  these 
countries results  can  be  obtained  of  the  same  type  as  those  which  have 
characterised  the  economic  and  social  developments  of  the  Six,  in  the 
sense  mostly  used  of assigning priorities to  uses  of resources. for  economic 
purposes.  We  are  of  the  opinion,  however,  that  given  the  present  situation 
of financial  institutions in  the  European  area,  pressures  could  occur  in 
any  case. 
The  increase  in international  competition,  the  transfer of 
capital,  the  large  international banks,  the  Euro-dollar market,  are realities 
which  weigh  also  in countries outside  the  EEC.  The  control  of  these 
phenome~u  certainly is not  due  to  an  expression of nationalism  but  to  a 
new  institutional revival  and  a  new  distribution of political and  economic 
powers  in  the  Community. 
III-3.  The  Werner  Plan 
The  solution,  according  to  some  expert~ could  be  found  in the 
implementation  of  the  Werner  Plan  and  in  the  decisions  of  the  Council  of 
Ministers of  the  8th  and  9th February  which  followed.  In  recent months, 
many  doubts  have  been  expressed  on  the  effective possibility of applying 
these  decisions,  nevertheless,  the  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  remains  one 
of  the  priority objectives in  the  present  phase  of  developmertt  of  the  EEC. 
The  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  raises at  once  the  problem  of 
the  Community's  external relations;  in fact  the  monetary  mechanism  with 
the  reduction of internal fluctuations  and  with  the  fixing of  a  specific 
exchange  rate  for  the  dollar,  implies  the  idea of an  immunisation of the 
economic  evolution of the  Community  in the  face  of  phenomenaa  developing 
on  the  international market.  It remains  to be  said that Werner's project will bring 
about  the unification of financial markets  and will determine  a  common  financial - 33-
policy.  which  may  allow  the  control  of  the 
same  phenomenon  of  the  Euro-dollar  and  of  Euro-emission.  This  perspective 
however,  is again  open  to  discussion  through  the  events  of  August  1971  and 
by  the  Washington  agreement  which,  not  having  solved  the  problem  of 
convertibility leaves  open  areas of major  uncertainty  not  easily linked 
with  monetary  decisions  foreseen  in the  Werner  Plan.  The  less reassuring 
aspects  are  to  situate in  various  degrees  of  efficiency  the  proposed 
monetary  measures  on  the  one  hand  and  the  economic  and  social policies 
(regional,  social,  budgetary,  etc.)  on  the  other. 
In  fact,  no  proposals  are  made  on  measures  nor  on  timing 
on  a  social level;  when  it is evoked  in  terms  of  finality it is as  a  by-
product  rather  than  a  point  of  reference. 
The  decisions  taken  on  8th and  9th  February  underline  the 
necessity of  continuous  collations  between States,  the  peremptory  recall 
to  stability as  an  end  in itself,  could  lead moreover  to  seeking  a  minimum 
common  denominator  at  the  lowest  possible  level  of  agreement  between  the 
Six  Governments  which  could  flow  in  a  philosophy  of  permanent  and  controlled 
"deflation"  for  the  whole  Community. 
The  essence  of  the  contrived monetary  union  entrusts,  moreover, 
a  prominent  role  to  economic  policy,  to  monetary manoeuvre  in  the  hands  of 
Central  Banks,it  constitutes  a  strong mechanism  of  monetary  co-ordination 
\oJhich  is  the  absolute  bond  between  Community  and national  economic  policies 
The  same  hypothesis  of  economic  programmes  (and  wider  ones  of 
economic  policy)  would  lead  back  to  the  choice  and  actions  of  the  Central 
Banks.  It  would  have - 34-
a  priority to  the  point of becoming in fact  exlusive,  lines of economic 
policy of accelerating and  braking,  of "stop and  go",  of inflation and 
deflation manoeuvred  so  as  to  regulate  and  correct  the  economic  trend 
deriving  from  mechanisms  of present accumulation and  development,  without 
aiming at modifying  t4em  structurally through  the  development  of social 
infrastructures and  of an  effective reversal of spontaneous  tendencies. 
In  substance,  if effective measures are anticipated,  they are 
concerned  with  the  monetary  situation  (reduction of margins of fluctuations 
and  co-ordination of monetary  and  budgetary policies).  For  correctives 
at  the level of  economic  integration there are  no  measures  nor  any  indications 
of  the  timing,  but  simple  expressions of wishes  for  their application. 
III-4.  The  Autumn  Summit  Meeting. 
Numerous  are  those  who  hope  that this change  of  tendency will 
be  examined  during  the  deliberations of the  Prime  Ministers  Summit  Meeting 
scheduled  to  take  place  in the  Autumn.  In  this connection,  we  can but 
express our  scepticism.  If there  emerges  a  single lesson  from  our 
twenty years of  community  life, it is that  such  a  Summit  may  take  a 
courageous decision like  the  one  of allotting a  consistent number  of 
resources  to  the  development  of infrastructures and,  in particular,  to 
the  social-cultural ones.  In  these  negotiations between  Prime Ministers, 
even if there  are  voices  in favour  of such  decisions  they will  vanish 
rapidly because  a  mechanism  of decision based  on  international negotiations 
is in itself destined  to  find  a  compromise  of a  passive  and irrelevant 
nature  in respect of  the  problems  and  of the structure of power  in the  EEC. 
It is probable  that  there will  be  a  declaration of principle  which mentions 
without  doubt  the  "quality of life",  but it is certain that  the means  will 
not  be  established nor will  the  conditions  to realise it be  determined. - 35-
CONCLUSION 
We  think  that  we  have  shown  sufficiently that  the  misery  of 
social infrastructures in  the  six countries of  the  EEC  is the  product  of 
a  certain  ideolog~ of  a  certain productive  system,  of  a  certain relation 
of  strength between  social  classes.  The  ideology  is  the  one  of  consumption, 
the  productive  system  is  ~ liberal one,  the  imbalance  in  the  relations of 
strength relies on  institutional insufficiency  which  makes  our  social 
structures  dependent  on  the  productive  mechanism.  The  result  determined 
by  these  three  elements is a  society  which  is inhuman,  irrational and 
disequilibrated in its development.  A  society  which limits democratic 
rights  in obsolete  territorial  dimensions  and  in incapable  institutional 
organs. 
The  unsuccessful  development  of infrastructures constitutes, 
however,  the  neuralgic  point,  the  Achilles  heel  of its ideological  fabric 
tending  to  the  preservation of  present  equilibrium.  Because  their scarcity 
is more  noticeable  in industrialised urban  clusters,  they  are  more  easily 
channelled  into  movements  of  public  opinion.  Because  they  tend  to  penalize 
the  needs  and  aspirations  for  a  higher  quality  of life  which  are  necessarily 
born  in  a  society  which  has  got  over  the  threshold  of poverty.  Finally, 
because  the  principals responsible  for  this situation feel  frustrated  and 
challenged.  (1) 
(1)  Article  by  Agnelli,  Espresso,  27th February  1972. - 36-
·•' 
The  real  problem  is,  therefore,  how  to  give  an outlet for  these 
human  aspirations born  from  the  crisis of the  way  of life  an~ the  principle 
myths  which  had  characterised political and  economic  discussions in Europe 
after  the  Second  World  War.  Because  the privation of infrastructures above 
all brings into  cause  the  progressive parties and  the  syndicates,  in short, 
the  European  Left parties which have  been unable  to  give  an outlet to  these 
new  aspirations of the masses. 
The  inability shown  by  these  forces  to  give  a  political synthesis 
to  those aspirations felt  by  all European citizens and  to  give it a 
Community  dimension is one  more  of  the  elements  which  favoured  the 
prevalence  of productive  objectives over social ones. 
This  delay must  be  caught  up  with as rapidly as possible  so  that 
social Europe  may  be  born  from  a  movement  of extensive  and  organised public 
opinion  capable  of  imposing  brave  solutions  (this,  Summits  cannot  do)  and 
institutional progresses  able to  reverse  present  tendencies.  This  is 
a  matter of linking the  fights  in factories  with  a  far-reaching political 
scheme,  the  starting point  of which is the  fight  against man's  subordinatio 
to  the  productive  apparatus in the  factory,  and  finds  the means,  the 
institutions and  the  kind  of  the  most  efficient fight  to  give  a  human 
aspect  to  the  European  society of the  future.  This is a  matter  of making 
a  European  proposal  of the  workers,  rooted in their real interests and  in 
their conscience,  which  questions the  aspect  of power  and  the lines of 
development  along  which  has  moved  the  process of European integration. 
Only  by  taking over  the  burden of these  interests can  the  Community 
institutions realise  the  facts of  "an original model  of development"  and 
"improve  the  quality of life". PROBLEMS  OF  INFRASTRUCTURE  FINANCING 
by 
Giuseppe  Reggio 
Conference on  Indust;y and Society 
{Annex to Report  No.  7) 
Commission  of the European  Communities 
Venice - 1972 PROBL'HHS  OF  FINAlfCING 
The  need to establish general policy conditions favourable to the 
development  of infrastructures and hence  for a  movement  of public 
opinion in this direct  ion,  changing the present balances which 
govem the fundamental  choices of our system,  does not,  although 
a  priority need,  entirely exhaust the subject.  This policy action 
is inherentlY long-term and can be carried out only in successive 
stages, with the occasional launching of projects having more 
advanced objectives.  It therefore seemed  worth while to pinpoint 
the problems posed by infrastructure financing in the present 
economic  balances and sort out the information,  albeit fragmentar,y, 
which  the trade unions have  given on  this problem in the EEC  Member 
States.  The  aim of the investigation is not  so much  to produce a 
list of proposals as to determine the common  background of trade 
unionists of the various countries on  a  problem such as this, 
involving the whole  of society but of special importance to workers. 
The  investment  made  in socio-cultural infrastructures,  which are 
the most  neglected but  of the most  interest to workers,  almost 
always  represents a  t~sfer of income  between  social classes,  in 
that it is mostly the poorer classes.who benefit from it, and 
often a  transfer in time,  in that in many  cases it is particularly 
the socio-cultural infrastructures  (hospitals,  schools,  etc.) which 
have  the effect of increasing productivity in the long-term only 
and therefore from  a  purely economic  point of view may  generate 
inflationar,y pressures. 
According to the prevailing opinion,  in open  economic  systems  such 
as those of the Community  countries the channelling of some 
resources towards  such uses may  in the short term engender a  loss 
of competitiveness in relation to other countries'  products on  the 
domestic market  and on  international markets,  accompanied by -2-
monetar.y  trends and fluctuations which would  jeopardize the 
establishment  of the  economic and monetar.y  union.  These 
opinions based on  a  liberal economic  conception,  while they are 
apparently indisputable from  the standpoint of social  justice, 
can easily be refuted from an  economic  standpoint if the long-term 
development  projections are taken into consideration.  There  is 
no  doubt  that,  in a  wider view of economic  evolution,  social and 
cultural progress is indispensable to  such competitiveness of 
the  system.  Even  in the short  and medium  term,  however, 
notwithstanding the stabilizing effects which may  be  exercised 
by a  policy to stimulate low-cost  housing or public transport, 
it has to be admitted that it was  precisely in a  period of 
decline in public investment  (1965-70)  and social infrastructures 
that inflationar.y strains caused increasing anxiety and affected 
both countries with high public  spending rates  (such as the 
Scandinavian countries)  and com1tries with less highly-developed 
social services  (such as Italy and France).  This means  that 
the inflationar,y pressures deriving from  increases in public 
investment  of a  not  immediately or not  directly productive 
character are negligible factors  in an  economic  context  which 
contains far more  significant  factors of inflation.  The  other 
implicit criticism in the steps previously set  out  in the Second 
European Medium-Term  Programme  is that any diversion of financial 
resources  into social applications would result  in inadequate 
structures of production and thus inhibit the necessary 
reorganization measures,  since private enterprise would not  be 
able to find on  the capital markets the means  of carr,ying them 
out.  This assertion too  can easily be  refuted,  either on  the 
grounds  of the qualitative objectives which  economic  growth 
should have and which would,  on  the basis of this argument,  be 
perpetually deferred,  or on  the grounds  of the~ng-term economic 
outlook.  However,  even  in the medium  and  short  term it is a -3-
fact that the current abundance of :tunds  on  the capital market 
serves rather to generate phenomena  of a  speoulativ~ nature and 
the accumulation of unused resources than to bring about 
technological progress or give a  fresh impulse to production. 
The  speculative capital released by the inability or unwillingness 
of the authorities to develop the social infre.straotures and by 
the accompanying "disaffection" of private enterprise is both 
one  of the causes of the rapid growth in unemployment  and a 
"strategic reserve"  for speculators  {a matter of 50-60 thousand 
million dollars) which,  if not  supervised and directe4,  hangs 
like a  sword of Damocles  over the economic and monetary union. 
After these matters of,  in our opinion,  unjustified concern are 
removed  from  the general picture, there  remains the necessity 
of considering this problem and determining the priority 
objectives and the best means  of channelling resources to them. 
While there is and will still be a  problem regarding limits to 
the assignment  of resources for social uses,  this will depend 
on  the development  of the economic  and monetar,y union,  since, 
in the long run,  unduly divergent trends in public spending in 
the various countries will be incompatible with that union. 
European t re.de  unions and infra.st  ructu,res 
We  have already spoken of the action of the Italian unions in 
the previous part of this paper.  A rapid glance at the official 
programmes  or statements of other unions  shows  that analysis of 
inadequate development  of infrastructures is a  preoccupation 
common  to almost all European unions.  The  action programme  of 
the three Dutch confederations starts with a  statement of the 
reasons for the need for the trade unions to become  involved in 
the fundamental  choices of economic  and social development. -4-
One  of these  reasons is the danger of economic  development  being 
based solely on  a  private-enterprise economy  with respect to the 
natural  environment,  the undervaluing of social infrastructures 
against  individual  goods  and services and the  (negative)  influence 
of an  economic  doctrine built  round  concepts of production growth 
on  the education and behaviour of consumers  and on  the mentality 
of the general  public.  To  combat  these negative aspects the NVV, 
NKV  and  CNV  have  submitted a  whole  series of demands  to the 
government,  including a  call for more  housing construction,  a  10% 
reduction of classroom overcrowding,  and environmental protection. 
A large part of the report by George  Debunne  to the  FGTB  Congress 
putting forward demands  is devoted to the  improvement  of the 
quality of life and,  in the  same  context,  to problems of housing, 
urban and rural development  and transport.  The  final  resolution 
calls for the coordination of the various means  of transport,  a 
dynamic  housing policy and the creation of public enterprises to 
fill the gaps left by private enterprise in these sectors.  The 
Congress  of the  FD  in France was  uncompromising on  the housing 
problem;  one  clause of the final motion  says that housing is an 
inalienable right  for  ever,y  individual and every family and that 
the full exercise of this right is a  condition of human  dignity. 
The  debate in France  on  infrastructures was  stimulated by the 
formulation of the Sixth Economic  Plan.  On  this subject, all 
three of France's leading trade-union organizations  (the  FO,  CFDT 
and CGT)  criticized the tendency in the Plan to neglect  social 
infrastructures. 
Methods  of financing 
The  method  generally advocated by the unions  for financing in 
order to sustain public  spending,  which has to be  increased to a 
higher rate with respect to the  GNP  (as is generally maintained 
outside the trade union  movement  also),  is taxation. -5-
At  the last FUTB  Congress this problem bad a  prominent place and 
it was  reaffirmed that the State should find the resources 
necessary .for ensuring social progress by increasing the taxation 
on  large incomes,  inheritances and corporate profits.  The  same 
kind of demand  is found again in the proposal for taxation reform 
launched in Italy under the reform policy: 
"1.  'l'he  GGIL,  CISL and UIL  affirm that the institution of a  more 
modern  and more  equitable system of taxation is now  urgent,  as a 
fundamental  structure to prortde the State with resources and 
means  to permit the achievement  of public,  economic,  social and 
democratic  ends and the carrying out  of major structural reforms, 
in the general context of the redistribution of income  to the 
benefit of the less privileged classes.  The  taxation reform 
should thus be inspired by the constitutional principles of 
progressive taxation and of adequacy and efficiency with regard 
to the vast public resources necessar,y for the gradual elimination 
of the many aspects of the field of charges equivalent to taxes." 
One  of the points in t~e Dutch unions' action programme  is that 
the trade union movement  is ready to take the consequences of the 
choices made  and of the demands  for an increase in public spending 
on  infrastructures, and hence a  reduction in the rate of growth 
of private consumption.  It is also stated that a  survey among 
union members  indicated that the 0.52% increase required in the 
taxation burden to meet  the demands  of the unions was  regarded 
as tolerable.  All the unions in the EEC  countries assert, 
however,  that account  must  be taken not  only of the increased 
nee~ for state revenue and the consequent necessity of introducing 
taxation reforms but also of the inequitability of the taxation 
systems and that efforts should be made  to remedy this inequitability. 
This  demand,  coupled with a  call for higher public  spending on -6-
infrastructures,  is also made  by the DGB  in the "DGB  proposals 
on  tax reform".  With this in view,  the German  unions are 
demanding that the proposal of the Commission  set up  in West 
Germany  to prepare the way  for the tax reform be amended  so  as 
to ensure steeper tax graduation. 
Capital market  and national debt 
A second source of infrastructure financing,  according to the 
unions,  is use of the capital market  by  the authorities.  The 
Italian unions consider that the financing of new  housing when 
the  reform is in full  swing should also be  covered by  recourse 
to the capital market.  The  Dutch unions  in turn speak of the 
use of both private and public funds.  In this connection the 
policy advocated in some  countries,  particularly West  Germany,  on 
workers•  funds  is of special interest.  The  DGB  has,  of course, 
alw~s urged better distribution of business assets and workers' 
participation in capital formation,  but  has  sought  to prevent 
such participation from affecting wage  development  and  from  being 
passed on  in prices by business enterprises.  Ways  and means  of 
implementing this policy are therefore special union agreements 
and tax concessions by the State for this type of fund.  So  far 
the aims  of this policy based on  thw  DGB  statement  of 9 October 
1968  are an intensification of asset  formation by workers and 
participation by workers  in asset  growth.  The  development  of 
such union agreements has been  impressive in recent years;  to 
quote  only one  figure,  about  eight million workers are receiving 
benefits from  their employers under such agreements. 
The  benefits furnished by the employers  may  be  in the  form  of 
bonds,  shares or liquid money.  These  funds,  however,  were 
largely inaccessible in the period when  workers  could not  have 
them under their supervision and thus found their way  into the -7-
normal financial channels.  In November  1971,  however,  the DGB 
called in a  further statement for the institution of autonomous 
funds  managed by the  workers and the authorities for money 
payments  and bond  issues.  On  the basis of this new  stipulation, 
a  debate has been taking shape  from  which is emerging a  possibility 
of using these fUnds  for investment  in infrastructures and for 
rendering decisions by private enterprise sociallY more  rational. 
In this way the f'unds  would be one  of the means  of securing a 
~  in general economic  decisions,  which  has been one  of the 
more  important demands  of the  German  trade unions in recent 
years. 
Infrastructure costs 
The  problem of financing is also closely connected with the cost 
of social infrastructures,  especially the cost of land and 
building construction.  While  the trade union documents  provide 
numerous  impulses to  further technological development  in the 
construction sector, whose  backwardness is viewed as a  defect 
in the system,  which  has given priority to other sectors of 
production,  criticisms and demands  have  been chieflY concerned 
with the legal provisions governing building land.  The  Frenqh 
unions,  for instance,  have  repeatedly shown  up  the incompatibility 
of the lines in the Sixth Plan,  which  relies mainly on  the market 
machiner,y,  with the solution to the problem of social 
infra.st  ructures.  In a  motion  carried by the Belgian FGTB 
Congress,  one  of the demands  was  for a  genuine  land policy and 
the elimination of speculation in land;  the Action Programme 
of the Dutch unions states that the ownership of building land 
should be limited in order to prevent  speculation and to permit 
immediate  expropriation and a  land policy.  But  the most 
explicit and incisive statements are perhaps those issued by 
the Italian unions which ha..-e  since fo1md  their way into law, 
with some  modification. -8-
"Compensation of expropriation of farmland should be at an 
agricultural price determined on  the basis of soil utilization 
at the time of making the compulsory purchase order.  Any 
appreciation in market  value as a  result of existing or planned 
infrastructure work  which has been,  is being or will be carried 
out  ~Y the local authorities or by any action on  the part of 
the public authorities should not be taken into account. 
Compensation  for already developed land should be by the 
application to the  farmland value of coefficients established 
for determing a  price which is never higher than the  Land 
Registr,y value or the assessed fiscal value of the construction 
or land,  whichever is lower." 
Regarding the criteria to be applied to compensation  for 
expropriation,  the principle is thus  reaffirmed that it is 
necessary to avoid shifting on  to the community  the burden of 
the  income  stemming  from the increase in land prices caused by 
urban development  phenomena.  The  amount  of the compensation 
should therefore be calculated on  the basis  of the agricultural 
market  value of the land. 
The  problem of infrastructure management  is also closely linked 
with the financing problem.  It has certain aspects which  give 
rise to heated argument  between  the  cent~l and local authorities 
and,  in the matter of vocational training,  for example,  between 
employers and workers.  Vocational training in Europe  often 
takes the form  of apprenticeship;  the trade unions have pointed 
out the abuses and inefficiency to which this system is exposed, 
at a  time when  there is a  need for more  training than private 
enterprise can offer.  With  regard to the level of management 
in general,  the unions  support decentralization  (France,  Italy 
and Belgium). -9-
CONCLUSIONS 
The  main  financing tool proposed by the unions is taxation,  even 
if some  of the methods  advocated are original.  This is clearly 
. because of.  the · greater faimess ensured and the  possibil~  ty of 
income  transfer, which taxation offers.  In the CFDT  and CGT 
p~grammes in Fra.rice,  an  addit~onal tax on  employers using 
. migrant  labour,  equivalent to  1%  of the wage,  is demanded  for 
the construction of housing·for migrant workers.  Such a  meesure 
.  ha·s·  two. advantages:·  it increases the resources for housing . 
construction and  it.discou~ges labour-intensive investment  in 
inunigration areas,. uia.king  such investment more  costly  • 
. Measures  of this type have been. announced in some  regions in 
Northern Italy,  mo;re  particularly by the Lombard  authorities. 
A quasi-fiscal measure  has been proposed by the trade unions in 
Belgium with respect to commuters  (workers)  The  employers 
would ~  contributions for workers'  journeys which would be used 
to form  a  fund which  would  have  the effect of making  such 
occupational travelling free and at the same  time assist the 
financing of transport infrastructures.  These  independent  steps 
by trade unions and other bodies  show  that there is also a  need 
for rationalization of the taxation system. 
A second consideration is that the tax system throws  into clear 
relief how  far the administrative levels and shop-floor 
representation have  lagged behind the expansion at the economic 
level.  Nevertheless,  we  feel that this instrument  remains 
useful,  subject to appropriate adjustments to this new  state of 
affairs.  The  matter of multinational companies  is dealt with 
in other papers.  It is sufficient here to say that the unions 
are watching with great interest the progress of the Commission's - 10-
"European"  company  project and consider that the proposed statute, 
though it may  be  open  to criticism in other ways,  has undoubted 
advantages in that its aim is to standardize the legal pattern 
for European  companies.  With  regard to multinational companies 
transcending European  frontiers,  the  ICFTU  has on  a  number of 
occasions proposed an international convention to regulate the 
conduct  of these centres of economic  and political power,  with 
reference to,  among  other matters,  taxation problems. 
Taxation will therefore remain  irreplaceable as a  major component 
of infrastructure financing only if subjected to a  radical reform 
based both on  its greater flexibility and decentralization and on 
its gradual transposition to Community  level.  This,  however, 
does not  rule out  recourse to methods  of direct financing  (for 
infrastructures more  closely linked with production and those 
involved in combating the pollution caused by certain industries) 
and recourse to savings capital.  The  IRI  moto~  experiment  in 
Italy,  financed by bond  issues,  is what  we  consider an interesting 
example  and we  are also of the opinion that in future too the 
capital market  should have  sufficient availabilities to solve 
problems  of social infrastructure.  The  problem is rather that 
of setting up  financing machinery to channel  savings in a 
different way  from  that currently in operation.  It is precisely 
the supervision and channelling of investments by the author1ties 
and the resulting effects of democratization of the economy  ~bat 
form  the bedrock of Europe's power to create an original pattern 
of civilization. 
In  conclusion,  I  would like to add that  we  are confronted by a 
situation marked by some  encouraging and some  disappointing 
features.  They  are encouraging because the background to and 
general conceptions of the problem are common  to almost all the -ll-
European trade-union organizations,  and it theretore seems 
possible to develop a  unified  st~tegy for this p~otioal problem, 
as for others.  They are disappointing because this strategy 
has nevertheless not yet been established and we  have all 
remained confined within our frontiers while our governments 
have  responded to union demands  by expressing anxiety concerning 
the decline in power to compete with other countries - which 
would have been far less controversial if expressed by a 
European  executive. 
On  the other hand,  only one  other type of political outlook would 
'have  enabled the Commission to accept  these demands. 
Unfortunately the. increasingly confedera.l and diplomatic  ·:trend 
in the Community,  which seems  to be towards a  period of intel'-State 
negotiation,  does not  seem the best approach to solving the 
problem.  Hence,  as in other sectors, the need for political 
development and democratization of the EEC  constitutes·::'& fundamental 
demand  by the trade union movement. 
Rome,  April  1972. COMM:>N  MARKET 
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The  problem of the cost and  ti~oing of pUblic sector resources 
is both vast and insutf'icient1y known.  In a  simple report like this one, 
a  global analysis of a:ar  significance cannot be expected. 
The  only acceptable method is a  partial approach.  ~t haa  therefore 
been agreed with the Direction g8nera1e des Jtfaires industrielles that 
this report should attempt rather to answer  the following questions  : 
Is there, within the Commanity  or,  to be more  exact, because of the way 
the Common  Market  operates at present,  a  tendency towards  a  type or 
society where  private prosperity, or even opulence,  would  contrast with 
relative povert,y in public services and  resources  ?  Does  not tree 
competition and lack of compensatory factors within a  customs  union 
involve a  risk of widening  the resources  gaps  between the member  countries ? 
Haw  could such a  development be  prevented ?  What  contribution could the 
Com:anmi ty make  in this respect ? 
With  this approach in mind,  and  after thus  placing limits to our 
subject, we  shall merely study the retrospective accounts  and the economic 
projections drawn  up by the six member  countries within the framework  of 
the Committee  on medit1»-term  economic  policy, and  educe  the significance 
or the results of that stu.dy. -2-
CRAPI'ER  I 
THE  PROBLEM  AND  WHAT  IS  AT  STAKE 
Are  public resources,  like buildings,  collective by nature or 
by reason of their utility ?  Bbw  does  this, originally budgetar,y, 
ide.a dovetail in with national accountancy principles  ?  Let us  take 
what  m~  be  considered the minimum  elements  in order to outline, 
immediately after the more  European aspects of the problem,  those 
aspects which  constitute what is at stake for all inhabitants of the 
Community. 
A.  BASIC  IDEAS 
Public infrastructure and  resources  are investments designed 
to satisfY public needs.  What  are those needs  ? 
The  description by B.  CAZES  (1)  is clear and  useful 
"In addition to individual consumption for which  the  consumer must  p~, 
individuals and  families  have  needs  of which  the satisfaction is 
dependent  on  the decisions  of the authorities.  The  relative importance 
of those  decisions and  the relevant public spending may  vary from  one 
country to another,  depending  on  the political traditions which 
determine in each  country the division between the public and  the 
private sectors,  on ethical considerations  (one  puppose  of providing 
free  compulsor,y  education is to avoid parents'  having to compare  the 
expense  of education with other expenditure for more  immediate benefits), 
and  on the extent to which  services rendered by certain investments, 
such as  urban road maintenance,  can be  0individualized" and  invoided. 
It will thus be  seen that public resources may  be  collective by 
nature or by reason of circumstances.  The  border which  separates them 
from  invested assets in the private sector varies with time  and  place. 
{l)"La vie economique 0 ,  A.  COLLIN -3-
Tb·  consider solel7 resources which are collective by nature is t0 
adopt the narrow definition which Professor MANCUR  OLSON,  the initiator. 
of the first attempts in the U.S.A.  to draw up a  social report,  sett:e 
out as follows  (1)  :  "Leaving certain terminological subtleties  asid~, 
we  m~  define a  collective good  as  a  good which non-bu,ers  cannot be 
prevented from  consuming.  National defence is a  classical example ot 
such a  good,  as it is practically impossible to exclude an inhabitant 
of a  country from  the advantages  (or dangers)  of the nation's system of 
defence.  To  a  great extent,  the advantages of the police and  judiciary 
systems are also part of the  common  weal.  A constitutional monarch is 
a  particularly clear example  of a  collective good;  the benefits of his 
reign extend to all his subjects, vhether they be more  royalist than 
royalty itself or republicans. 
•lfon-collecti  ve,  or private, goods,  by contrast, are goods  which 
can be denied non-buyers.  For example, if a  person b~  a  loaf or a 
car, other people are denied the article bought.  In other words,  private 
goods  are not consumed  severally or in common•. 
Js  can be  seen this is an extremely restrictive definition. 
It would mean  that a  school or a  hospital bed would not be considered 
as a  public good,  vhen in fact they are symbolic of what are frequently 
called public resources. Whatever it is worth for the purpose of making 
an a.nalysis,  therefore,  we  must adopt a  broader concept vhich, in practice 
is necessarily the idea of gross fixed capital asset formation or public 
sector investment. 
The  reason tor this assimilation is simply that the gross  fiDJd 
capital assets of the public sector are the only use.tul.  aggregate which 
has been statistically standardized whithin the Community  (2). 
(1)  The  Public Interest - N°  12 - summer  1968 
(2)  However,  as  this standardization could not be affected for the 
various  components  of the aggregate, this reasoning remains  necessarily 
of a  macro-economic  kind. -4-
The  concept we  have  thus  adopted is largely a  matter of form  : 
the criteria are the source of finance  (public funds)  and  the legal 
status of whoever is in charge  (exclusively the State or local author-
ities}. This  concept,  adopted for the purpose of our analysis, applies 
to the great majorit,y of capital expenditure for equipment required 
tor the provision of non-negotiable goods  and services by the public 
sector,  and  to the main  functions  of general administrative departments, 
such as education,  transport and  communications,  expenditure on public 
health and  urban and  rural utilities. 
Nevertheless, it may  be  considered unsuitable or deficient for 
several reasons,  particularly because  : 
a) it reflects inputs but gives no  indication of the total stock. 
So  far there is no  universally applicable means  of comparing  overall 
public sector resources  in the various  countries of the Community. 
Inventories for the various sectors are seldom  useful.  For instance, 
it is almost impossible to make valid comparisons  of hospital 
resources, whereas  market  research provid.es  very detailed 1nformation 
on  private sector resources.  It is known,  for example,  that fifty-two 
per cent of households  in the Netherlands  have  an electric hair-
dryer, that in twenty-three per cent of Italian households  there is 
at least one  cat,  and  that thirteen per cent of German  families 
have  at least one  bird •••  {1); 
b)  the figures  of gross  fixed capital asset formation in the public 
sector are of course gross  inputs which  give no  information on  the 
real value of the resources  they represent (e.g.  overheads  connected 
with the awarding  of contracts,  output of public service}; 
c)  gross  fixed capital asset formation in the  public sector does  not 
include all public investments  :  e.g.  investments  for public under-
takings  as  a  whole,  including the  Post and  Telecommunications  (2}; 
(  1)  30  j ours  d'  Europe,  January 1  o/72. 
(2)  For instance,  the  concept adopted by the French Commissariat general 
du  Plan is broader  :  it includes, besides  the investments  made  by 
public administrative departments  and  hospitals,  those  made  by the 
Pbst and  Telecommunications  and by the Paris transport service,  the 
Begie  autonome  des  transports parisiens. -5-
d)  the factors  covered by the  concept are not entirelY homogeneous • 
.,or instance, in Italy' a  large part of investment in roads,  and 
none  of the investment for motorways,  is exclude from  the figures 
ot gross fixed capital assets in the public sector (1); 
e)  some  capital transfers within the pUblic sector, by definition 
excluded from  the figures tor gross fixed capital assets,  nonetheless 
contribute to the stock of public sector resources; 
t)  the distinction between expenditure on  capital investment and 
operating costs is o rten reached by arbi  trar;y decision. It is of 
little importance whether a  public service requires more  equipment 
or more  manpover  (2);  the main thing is that the service should 
satisfy needs.  ConsequentlY,  the most advanced research today seeks 
to go  beyond the conflict between investment expenditure and  operating 
costs by endeavouring to quantit,y the benefits with which public 
financing provides the end-users,  the consumers. 
Considerable progress in this respect has been made  in France, 
thanks  to the first attempts to measure  the  "broad household consumption•, 
which i.ncludes  consumption as  understood in national ac.counting principles; 
community services which are "divisible", that is to say those of which 
the beneticiairies m_, be fairlY easilY identified;  and  transfers related 
to the consumption of goods  or services  (e.g.  social security benefits)  (3). 
It has,  for instance, been calculated that public expend!  ture 
attects hardly one  per cent or food  consUIIlption,  whereas it accounts 
tor two-thirds of expenditure on  education, sports and  health. 
{1)  In France,  on  the other hand,  the investments of the mixe1  economy 
companies  holding concessions tor the operation of motorways,  which 
have  amounted  over the last few  years to about 2-.3  %  or the additions 
to gross  fixed capital assets in the public sector, are included in 
the aggregate. 
(2)  This is also the  case in education, vhere audio-visual techniques 
can partly, but only part17, substitute tor teachers. 
(3)  CJWX)C.  aJ".  D:SSCI,  ConsoJJIII8.tion  1969,  n°  2. -6-
7his  extremelY interesting research has  prompted  UNESCO  to 
develop it at the European  Centre for the Co-ordination of Research 
in Social Science  (ECCBSS)  in Vienna.  The  results of this research 
are available only in France.  This  is all the more  regrettable as the 
research has  a  bearing not only on  Western  Europe  but also on  the 
socialist democracies. 
Reverting to the gross  fixed capital asset formation  (GFCJF) 
in the public sector, for want  of a  preferable alternative,  the question 
must be  asked, before broaching the European  aspects of the subject, 
whether there is a specific problem of cost and  financing of public 
infrastructure and  resources. 
'So  far as  the first point is concerned,  a1  though  the cost ot 
public investment often increases at a  relatively rapid pace, it does 
so mainly because  as  much  as  two-thirds  of it is in building and  con-
struction, which  is subject to the two-fold effect of rising vages 
and  the increasing cost of land which is in short supply. 
However,  these remarks  are of minor significance  ~ompared to what 
Bertrand de  JOUVENEL  (  1)  has  to say concerning the sector of •non-
declining  cost activities", that is to say, where  economies  of seale 
are not operative, productivity remaining  constant or onl7 slightlY 
increasing.  This  is the case,  inter alia .in medical  treatment,  the cost 
of which  in the United States increases  three times  as  fast as  overall 
purchasing power.  Bertrand de  JOUVENEL  shows  that goods  produced by 
sectors where  increasing productivity is the rule tend to be supplied in 
terms  of market forces  (2), whereas  the public authorities are required 
to dispense the other goods  (3). 
(1)  Analyse et Prevision - November  1969. 
(2)  Cf.  developments  in the telecommunications  system mentioned  on  p. 
(3)  There  is perhaps  a  sort of financial burden here which in a  way 
reminds  us  of the relationship between the  Communit,y  and  the member 
States which  agree to pool problems  and  old techniques  (coal, 
agriculture,  customs  dues)  but are intent om  keeping what may  be 
future advantages to themselves  (atomic energyl  scientific research, 
the problem of direct investment,  and  so forth). -7-
Bbwever,  the public authorities otten lack the means  of doing 
ao satisfactorily". BV'en  in the atnuent societies, impending shortage 
is characteristic or the activities incumbent on the pUblic sector. 
EYen  worse,  as G:AIB1lAI'l'B  demonstrated long ago,  the industrial system 
tends to make  increasing private wealth coincide with iapoverishment 
of the pUblic sector. 
Underlying this contrast is the consumer-taxpayer argument. 
When  a  consumer blVB  something on  the market he obtains an immediate 
personal satisfaction;  when  the taxpayer settles his tax liability, 
he  obtains  cold comfort trom the prospect of much  later or hardly 
perceptible satisfaction in exchange.  or course' ve all know  that 
the taxpayer's tribute is essential, or only to permit the consumer 
to enjoy in peace the income  which remains  to him.  This  type of 
argument,  however, is hopelessly inadequate to redress the character-
istic imbalance of our industrial societies. 
Consequently,  the hordes of ei  ty dwellers,  every morning  and 
evening,  crowd into the  comfortless public transport vehicles while 
private cars in the increasingly traffic-jammed streets are three-
•uarte,rs  empty  (1) ;the excessive individual consumption or drugs is 
exacerbated concomitantly with the shortage of ha~pital beds  (2);  a 
plethora of children's toys is now  accompanied by a  scarcity of playing 
grounds,  and  so on.  In every aspect or society the same  disequilibrium 
is to be found  to some  degree. 
(1)  In France,  the report published in 1969  on  the nations  •transport• 
accounts,  showed  that the average Frenchman in 1967  devoted 82  %  of 
his  •transport" budget to private transport and  only 18 %  to publie 
tra.IlSport;  from 1962 to 1967,  the total cost or transport by private 
car rose 7  %,  whereas  the cost for public transport rose 25  .. .3  '· 
(2)  In 1965,  inmates or psychiatric hospitals in France  exceeded capactt7 
by 19  %,'  one  patient in six having to make  do with a  stretcher 
instead or a  bed.  In addition, 67,000 beds  ~ut of 108,000 were 
more  than 80  years old  (•L'argent signe de  sante ?",  Convergences, 
SP.BS,  1969). -8-
This  iabalance points to the central problem of the  financing 
of public resources which,  as  such, will not, however,  be dealt with 
here.  We  shall thus avoid ~  exposition of old theories according to 
which  orthodox budgeting enables  investments  to be made  from  borrowed 
funds  whilst current expenses  must be covered by revenue  :  in both  cases 
funds  are dravn from  the national product and  consequent~ the satisfaction 
of private needs  compete  with the satisfaction of community  needs. 
This  is what we  are concerned with here.  The  problem of recourse,  to 
a  variable extent,  to borroving is related rather to political 
considerations. 
B.  EUROPEAN  ASPECTS 
Nowhere  more  so than in Europe  is it necessary to remedy  this 
disequilibrium betveen increasing private wealth and  impoverishment 
of the public sector. It stands  condemned  by our whole  tradit.ion, 
from  ancient Athens  which  might not have  been Athens  were it not for 
its public monuments,  through the Middle  Ages  with its cathedrals, 
to the invention in Europe  of free  compulsor,y  education and  of social 
welfare services in a  free society. 
Yet  the economic  revolution bids fair to aggravate the 
disequilibrium,  due  to the raising of the standard of living which 
henceforth takes  the form  of a  relatively excessive increase in tertiary 
consumption in which  the share of the public sector,  and  hence  the need 
for public financing,  is particularly large. 
It can be understood,  therefore,  that in the initial stages 
of their economic  programming,  the  EEC  countries laid stress on  the 
problem of collective resources. 
Event  in matters in which  the  Common  Market has  made  most headway 
(customs  union,  common  agricultural policy)  success was  achieved only 
after protracted efforts to bring the member  countries' initial stand-
points into line with one  another.  In contrast, it was  a  striking fact 
that their essential aims  in matters  of collective resources were 
spontaneously defined in terms  of consentaneous  points of view. -9-
This is shown by the analysis of the projections adopted by the member 
States for the first programme  of'  medium-term  economic  policy (MTEP), 
and is reflected in a  figure of' S1Jlbolic value  :  the rate or increye 
in pp.blic investment during arg five year period should on an  average, 
throughout the Community,  be double  that of the gross  overall product 
(S,S.%  per annum  in volume,  as  against 4,3 %  for the GNP).  In addition, 
this very remarkable difference was  no  more  than the work of chance  or 
of a  fleeting combination of circumstances. It reflected a  political 
determination based on  one  of the soundest ot principles. 
1bat official policy of the Six condemns  the disequilibrium 
between the ever greater satisfaction of private needs  and the inadequate 
satisfaction of collective needs.  It was  defined as  follows by the 
Commission  and later by the Council of Ministers in 1967  (1)  with the 
tull approval of the Economic  and Social Committee  and  the  Parliament 
or Europe  : 
DJpparently,  the onl.7 possibility of ensuring a  larger margin 
for growth in private consumption lies in checking expansion in pUblic 
expenditure.  It is a  possibility, however,  which is largely illusory. 
•At  the beginning of the centur,r, public expenditure by the 
large States vas  rarely greater than fifteen per cent of their gross 
national product.  Everywhere  today,  in spite of the sacrifices imposed 
by the pressure of taxation to meet it, pUblic expenditure exceeds 
one-third and, in States which have most v.Ldely developed their social 
security systems,  sometimes  accounts for almost half of the GNP. 
This is an evolution which it seems  difficult to reverse. 
•ito believe that it could soon be broUiht to a  halt would be 
tantamount to claiming that a  balance had been achieved in the 
satisfaction of private and collective needs. But no  such balance has 
been achieved.  The  demands  of' pUblic health are still neglected compared 
with feeding habits;the density of motor traffic increases at a  greater 
pace than the provision or  roads  and  parking space;  the infrastructure 
tor education, culture, science and lags far behind the development of' 
J>,I-ivate  resources of all kinds. 
(1)  J.O.  des  Communautes,  2S  April 1967.  •Premier progr811118  de  P.E.M.T.• - 10-
Under  these  circUIIStances,  we  must all realize that excessive grovth of 
private consumption will inevitably lead to yet more  stringent privation 
in terms  of hospitals, roads  or schools.  In addition,  future  economic 
expansion  (transport,  education, research,  housing)  is largelY dependent 
on public expend.i ture. 
•consequently, living standards,  even  the  very quality of existence, 
are already,  and  in the future will be even more,  dependent to a  great 
extent on  the sum  total of collective resources  and  services which,  vhen 
all is said and  done,  only taxation can pay for in the long run. 
"In any case, if the increase in public investment were  curtailed, 
the result would  be  no  more  than a  very moderate  improvement  in private 
consumption,  which would  increase by hardly one  per cent for a  15-20 
per cent cut in such investment  a. 
This  makes  interesting reading today,  the more  so because, if it 
still conveys  the intentions of the governments of the member  countries, 
those governments  have,  on  the whole,  by no  means  achieved their 
objectives in this field. 
Hence  the basic question  :  is there not, behind the machinery 
which  runs  the  Common  Market  in its present form,  some  invisible force 
thwarting national governments  and  favouring  a  type of growth which  is 
commercial  and  inequitable,  a  notable characteristic of which is the 
contradiction between private prosperity and  the mediocrity of a  large 
part of the public services  and  resources  ? 
To  reply to this question we  must  consider the facts,that is  to 
say the objectives on  the  one  hand  and  the results on  the other, both 
of the Community  as a  whole  and  of the individual member  States. -II-
CHlPTIR  II 
THE  DX; PUBLIC  SECTOR  RESOURCE  POLICii 
COMM)N  FlU.TURl!S 
The  table given in Annex  I  shows,  for the five main  c()untries 
of the Ell:,  the forecasts  and  resul.~ for the period 1965-70,  and 
the forecasts for  1~0-7·5, of the rate of growth in the overall product 
and of the four major uses of that product,  namely public and  private 
consumption,  and gross capital asset formation in the direct production 
sector and~in the public sector  • 
.l.  OBJECTIV!S 
The  projections  (1)  of the Communit,y's  first programme  of 
medium-term  economic  policy tor the 1965-70 five-year period are a 
clear illustration of the principle mentioned above. 
Whatever  the differences in gross  prod~et growth rates  (2) 
(Germaey 3.,5  %,  Italy 5 %) ,  the distribution of that growth among  the 
tour major uses is cons is  tent v.1 th a  philosophY· which to a  remarkable 
degree is common  to all member  countries.  The  policy or each is to 
limit consumption in order to increase capital. investment  (GJ'CJF), 
with priority to investment in the public sector. 
Such is the target of those projections  a  redress the imbalance 
between the satisfaction of private and  public needs.  A useful formula 
for the calculation of the advance  which  each countr,y allocates to 
public investment in comparison with the gross national product can be 
obtained thanks to a  •coefficient of equalization•  (see Annex  II). 
{1)  These  projections,  prepared by the national administrations  concerned, 
show both contingent forecasts  and definite objectives. 
{2)  Calculated in terme  of volume.  It should be noted,  incidentally, 
that, unlike  the projections for the third progr8JIIJie  (1970-75)  which 
are based on values,  those for the first progr8JIIDle  had to be baaed 
on volume. - 12-
This  simple calculation sho~ also more  or less  the  same  pattern 
in the new  projections for 1970-?5,  except for the special features  of 
concern to France which vill be discussed later. This  continuity of 
intent is the more  notable for the fact that,  as  can be  seen from 
Annexes  I  and  II, the  Community  as  a  whole  resulted not in the desired 
restoration of the balance, but in a  relative decline in the volume  of 
its collective resources  :  the "coefficient of decline•  (1)  is 94.2. 
B.  RESULTS 
That result is curious,  the more  so as  forecasts  of overall 
product growth were  appreciably exceeded  (5.2% as  against 4.3  %). 
Indeed,  that extra margin should have  been assigned as  a  matter of 
priorit.f to those  uses  which it is considered should be granted 
precedence,  namely,  pubJic resources.  It would  seemingly have  been more 
easy to do  so as  those resources are equivalent to about only 3-5 %  of 
the GNP.  Their rate of volume  increase,  therefore, if the States had 
had  the slightest degree  of mastery over their own  finances,  should 
have been of the order of about ten per cent per annum.  Yet,  in fact, 
the rate was  less than half that figure  (4.  9  %) • 
This  short-fall is the more  serious  as it concerns all member 
countries  except Belgium;  its impact is the more  widely felt as  public 
sector consumption also vas below the levels forecast,  and  in that 
respect there was  no  exception.  The  contrast between  objectives  and 
results as  a  whole,  and  throughout the entire Community,  is a  contrast 
between the public and  the private sectors. 
1.  The  Private Sector 
a}  Private Consumption 
The  countries of the Community  as  a  whole  endeavour  to 
keep  the rate of expansion in private consumption below the rate 
of overall product growth.  This  is shown  by the projections for 
(1)  According  to  the  definition adopted,  decline occurs  when  the 
"coefficient of equalizationa goes below 100. - 13-
the first programme  for all countries except Germany.  That 
exception suggests  a  bold approach,  in view of the rather warning 
tone of the  followir~ excerpt from  the first programme  : 
•All things considered, it would  hardly be realistic to expect 
real private consumption over the period concerned  to exceed  the 
projection forecasts.  If private consumption growth at the 
beginnil€ of the five-year period were  to reach a  higher rate, 
a  relatively abrupt check  on  private spending vould be inevitable 
at the end  of the period.  The  consequences,  vhich would  be  non-
productive and  even harmfUl,  particularly for employment  in 
certain sectors, would  far outweight the earlier advantages  {1) "• 
It is a  striking fact that the relative  a~terity thus 
forecast for all the co1mtries  in 1965  failed,  except in France·. 
This  can be seen from  the comparison of forecast and  actual 
figures  for private consumption and  overall product.  The  failure 
was  so marked,  indeed,  that the orders of magnitude  were  inverted 
and  this inversion, incidentally, as  already mentioned,  was  the 
more  significant in view of the fact that the real value of the 
overall product in each  countr,y had  increased much  more  rapidlY 
than expected. 
It is difficult to believe that the  Common  Market had 
~  direct influence on  these results. 
On  the  other hand, it may  vell be  assumed  that there was 
an  indirect, albeit minor  1  influence favourable  to the limitation 
of real consumption increase, in so far as  increased competition 
results in equal production at relatively lover cost. 
b)  Gross  fixed capita1 asset formation in the private sector hardly 
calls for comment.  That results vere appreciably higher than 
forecast in all countries except Italy (that countr,y's  projections 
for investments  as  a  whole  being over-ambitious)  was  undoubtedly 
{1)  It was  only the particularly favourable international situation 
for the greater part of the five-year period which  prevented the 
occurrence of such difficulties which,  moreover,  may  have  been 
onlY  deferred for some  countries. - 14-
due  both to the fact that they reflected the general  prospe~ity 
and  to their direct medium-term  link vith the momentum  of private 
consumption. 
2.  The  Public Sector 
Unlike  the private sector,  the public sector is characterized 
by results which  in general fall short of the forecasts,  often to a 
considerable degree. 
This  is shown  in the first place by figures  for  : 
a)  Public Consumption  :  .3.2 %  as  against 4  %,  throughout the  EJOO. 
Germany  is a  special case.  The  growth rate ofconsumption 
in the public sector,  averaging 2.2 %  per annum,  is almost one-
third less than the apparently cautious  forecast of 3.1 per cent. 
These  findings  are all the more  important because  not only 
vas no  part of the unexpected excess  overall product assigned to 
current needs  in the public sector, but the share which was 
allocated to those needs  was  lower than had been allowed for in 
the projections, in spiteof the higher than expected overall 
economic  performance  of the member  countries. 
Growth  in public sector consumption  no  doubt depends  to 
some  extent on  the year-to-year policy of governments,which are 
not trammelled by projections based on  economic  reasoning. 
None  the less, it is difficult to understand why  in all countries 
results in this field - where  forecasting is less a  matter of 
chance  than it is in others - vera so strikingly below expectations. 
It may  well be  asked whether some  powerful  and  unexpected forces  -
inflation for example  - have  not been working  against the govern-
ments'  intentions. 
Be  that as it may,  the nev forecasts for the  current five-
year  period show  tvo kinds  of reaction to the results reported, 
namely  either a  change in policy with a  view to inhibiting in 
var.ying  degrees  the increase of consumption in the public sector - 15-
(as is the case in France,  Italy and the Netherlands), or, on 
the contrary, as in Germany,  a  clear determination to bridge 
the gap  : 
I 
11the growth rate  exceeding; that of.  the expected GNP  in the 
Federal Republic,  is unquestionably an expression of policy and 
or  11the need to bridge the gap• in many  sectors  (particularly' 
in education, vocational training and public health)  11 •  (1) 
b)  Investment in the PUblic Sector 
This is both the most interesting aggregate in itself, and 
the one which is at the  ce~tre of our subject. It m~  therefore 
be useful to examine  the factors which, in this field, have,  as 
already mentioned,  led to results radically different from  fore-
casts. 
The  first question which arises concerns  prices.  All 
factors in Annex  I  refer to quantity.  Could not the low public 
sector investment from  1965 to 1970 be due, at least in part, 
to a  rapid increase in the cost of such investments  ? 
The  reply is given in Annex  III, which shows  how  the public 
sector GFCAF  price index  flu~tuated in the six member  countries 
or the Community  and in the four  candidate countries from  1961  to 
1 '170.  It would  seem  that no general law can be interred from  a 
comparison of that index vi  th the index of impled GNP  prices. 
The  actual process itself, that is to say the quantitative 
development of public sector investments  from  one  year to the next, 
is characterised by a  marked  lack of uniform continuity ( cf.  annex 
IV,  pp.  1-10)  which,  tor the six member  countries  and for Great 
Britain, is reflected in the comparison of their GFCAF  variation 
coefficients and their GNP  variation coefficients.(cf. annex  V) 
Apart from  in Luxembourg,  the GNP  coefficient varies between about 
0.2 per cent and 0.5 per cent, whereas  the coefficient for public 
(1)  Study group on medium-term  economic  outlook,  11Ferspectives  pour 
127.2. 11 ,  part one, Brussels ,  Mareh  1971. - 16-
sector GFCAF  is about double  those figures.  In other words, 
public sector investment variations  from  one  year to another are 
twice  as  large as  those  o£  the GNP. 
These  general indications are  perhaps  less eloquent than 
some  concrete examples.  For example,  from  1966  to 1968,  the rate 
of increase in public sector investment,  calculated in terms  of 
value, rose  : 
- from  - 12.3 %  to  +  11.8 %  in Germany,  and 
- from  - 2.6  %  to  +  20.4 %  in Italy  • 
.As  can be seen,  public sector budgets  for fixed capital 
in recent years,  whatever the intentions of the States,vere 
merely used as  a  means  of balancing out or adjusting. 
Whereas  governments  intended the aggregate of such fixed 
capital assets to be  the mainstay,  the permanent objective around 
which  the others  should be  deployed and varied to serve a  strategic 
aim  vhich was,  more  or less explicitly, to be  a  European response 
to the  challenge and  dilemma  of "Industry and Society",  that 
aggregate in reality resembled rather a  cork bobbing on  the waves, 
buffeted about by fluctuating circumstances. 
Those  fluctuations were  singularly lacking in symmetry, 
dependent  on rising prices exceeding the most  pessimistic fears, 
and  regularly inhibiting progress in the building up  of pu1'lic 
sector assets. 
This  central phenomenon  m~  be resumed  as  follows  for  the 
whole  of the EEC  from  196  5 to 1  '!70 
Forecast 
Actual 
4  .  .3 
5.2 
Public sector 
investment 
8.5 
4.9 
Such a  phenomenon  ean only be explained in two  ways  : - 17-
- either the projections of the first MTEP  programme  were  complet-
ely vild- yet it is so surprising that all countries made  the 
same  mistakes, in the same  direction and  on  such a  massive scale{l); 
that this hypothesis may  be discounted; 
- or it must be admitted that the increased rate of real growth, 
far from  favouring public sector resources development,  can in 
certain circumstances actually hinder it and  even lead to its 
relative regression, not only in the short term, but also in 
the, medium  term  (2). 
This is undoubtedly what has  happened in the EEC  since 1965, 
considering the rate of inflation which  has  accompanied its 
relatively rapid growth.  Under  the circumstances, which still 
persist today, it might be easier for the countries of the 
Community  to achieve rapid development of their public sector 
resources with a  more  moderate rate of increase of the order or 
four per cent, rather than with accelerated developnent of up  to 
tive per cent {.3). 
This  conclusion, which is about as senseless as Galileo's 
theoey that the earth revolves about the sun,  and not the sun 
about the earth, runs  counter to all ideas prevailing in official 
circles, partlcul.arly in France where it is disproved by the 
experience of the last tev years,  seeing that, from  1968 to 1971 
(1)  The  projections on which  the MTEP  programmes  are base are 
undoubt~  defective in some  respects and  inadequately 
synchroniz.3d.  No  doubt the reservations expressed above  on 
the content and significance of public sector investment and 
resources  must be borne in mind.  Nevertheless,  the trend 
indications examined here appear to be indisputable. 
(2)  This is particularly the case in default or an effective 
monetary policy and  where,  for political reasons, fiscal 
fierlbili  ty cannot be  used sufficiently. 
(3)  In this respect, it is rather intriguing that during the last 
decade Great Britain, whose  economy is so mediocre, maintained 
a  relatively high rate of increase ill public sector investment, 
at least until 1969, sinee the share of GNP  allocated to such 
investment rose from  .3.4 %  in 1961  to 4.8 %  in 1970  (cr  •  .Annex 
IV,  P•  10). - 18-
an unprecedented overall growth  (20.4 %  by volume.  i.e. 6.4% 
annually)  has been accompanied by diminished expenditure in 
public sector investment in absolute terms.  Furthermore,  how 
widespread is this erroneous belief, has  been recently ob.served 
during the discussions  on  the major options of the Fourth Plan 
when  the representatives of heads  of undertakings  proposed opting 
for a  "J'apanese  style" rate of growth,  arguing,  inter alia, that 
accelerated growth would  produce  surpluses available for public 
sector resources.  This  option vas rejected because of the 
sacrifices such accelerated change  would  involve for certain 
sections of the population  (1), but no  one,  not even from  the 
government  representatives,  questioned the grounds  of the 
employers'  argument  concerning the relationship between growth 
and  public sector resources. 
For instance, we  all know  that a· high rate of growth -
other things being equal - makes  for increased private investment 
and inflation.  We  are all aware  that,  the monetary policies of 
the  EEC  member  States proving less and  less effective, greater 
(l)"To advocate vigorous  growth is to urge  a  country not to spare 
~  effort. But we  are equal to the task,  for there is no 
question of committing  the nation to disorderly growth,  that 
is to say,  of releasing all the brakes which  control the 
changes  under way.  This  event.uali  ty was  envisaged when  the 
options were  being prepared,  and  thoroughly examined in the 
symbolic  form  of an annual  GNP  growth  rate of 6.  5 per cent. 
That work,  like the in-depth consultations carried out by the 
socio-industrial bodies  concerned,  showed  the lack of realism 
in such a  hypothesis.  Indeed,  the nation is not prepared to 
accept the  consequences,  such  as the intensification of the 
rural exodus,  the increased mobility of manpower,  the  rapid 
disappearance of small-scale enterprises  engaged  in crafts, 
trade  and industry.  Violent and  abrupt efforts are incompatible 
with the stage of development which  we  have  reached.  What  is 
more,  we  need orderlY and  regular progress limiting individual 
inconveniences.  To  encourage  and  keep  abreast of change,  that 
is the type of growth we  aim  for". 
(Introduction to the report on the Fourth Plan,  P•  12) - 19-
recourse must  be  made  to the economic  regulators of budgetary 
systems;  that is to say, the input of public sector resources -
the ol'lly flexible element within the purview or budgets  dependent 
on fixed-rate taxation - must be  considered merely as an instrument, 
or even,  in a  sense, as  a  measure  of surplps.  No  national policy, 
however,  seems  to take into account that the accelerated growth of 
the  G~  in fact restricts that pUblic demand  which  causes  the EEC 
to drift towards  a  type of society very different from  that chosen 
by the responsible governments. 
Such a  society, moreover,  would  hard~ be acceptable to the 
less favoured  sections of the population.  Indeed,  a  shortage of 
public sector goods  and  resources aggravates social inequalities. 
In the absence  of suitable public hospitals,  the wealthy can afford 
private clinics;  if public education is not provided,  they can 
send their children to private schools;  inadequate pUblic  transport 
is no  inconvenience to those who  are masters  of their own  time-
tables, especially if they have  their private chauffeurs. It is 
/  ' 
the small and  the weak  who  are the first victims of all these 
shortcomings. 
Such is the lesson to be learnt from  a  macro-economic  stuqy 
of the pUblic  financial policy of the member  countries  since 1965. 
United in an ambition to reduce  the social inequalities by bringing 
better living conditions within the reach of their populations,  they 
are united also in the almost general disappointment of their 
ambition. 
Moreover,  the resultant relative aggravation of social 
discord is doubled,  as ve  shall nov  see, by the widening of the 
structural inequalities in the infrastructures and  public sector 
resources  of the member  countries. - 20-
CHJ.Pl'ER  III 
TWO  TYPES  :  FJ.CTOffi  FOR  DIVERGENCE 
So  far we  have  based our arguments  on  growth rates,  that is to say 
data derived from  inputs.  Let us  now  consider those inputs  themselves. 
Unlike  the previous study, this  one  shows  what  is more  or less stable in 
each of the national systems  and  underscores  the differences between  them. 
In this way  an attempt may  be made  to interpret the differences  from 
country to country of the general phenomena  analyzed above. 
The  six member  countries  and  the four  candidate  countries are 
classified hereunder according to the average  GFCAF  rates in their public 
sectors in relation to GNP  over  the last reported five years  (1). 
Table 1 
Netherlands  •••••••••••••  4.96 
United Kingdom  ••••••••••  4.80 
Denmark  •••••••••••••••••  4.66 
Norw~ ••••••••••••••••••  4.40 
Ireland •••••••••••••••••  4.20 
Luxembourg  ••••••••••••  4.19 
Germany  •••••••••••••••  4.00 
France  ••••••••••••••••  3.40 
Belgium  •••••••••••••••  3.20 
Italy •••••••••••••••••  2.42 
It can clearly be seen that these ten countries fall into two 
categories which  seem  to be  connected neither by geographic nor socio-
religious factors.  It seems  reasonable  to assume  there from  a distinction 
between two  types,  the  "Nordic" and  the  11Latin11 • 
So  far as  the EEC  countries are  concerned,  moreover,  that distinction 
is corroborated by many  other factors,  such  as  the more  old-fashioned 
economic  structures in the Latin countries,  higher protective tariff before 
the founding  of the Common  Market,  and  so forth  •  .Is  a  result of those 
differences,  France  and  Italy, particularly the latter, have  had  to make 
special efforts to adapt to the Customs  Union.  The  fact is  undoubted~ not 
unrelated to the following  remarks  about those countries. 
{1)  (cr.  Annex  IV,  pp. 1-10).  For the  candidate  countries  the source was 
the  OECD  and  not the  •  Last year, 1970,  except for Luxembourg, 
Denmark  and  Norway,  which vas 1969;  and  Ireland. 1968. - 21-
A.  THE  "NORDIC"  TYPE 
The  first category seems  to confirm the  existence of a  sort 
of "Nordic"  type in which  not  only is the scope of public welfare 
particularly extensive  - as is well  known  - but in which public 
sector investment  - and  this is und.oubtedly  less well  known  -
absorbs at least four  per  cent of  the  GNP  (1). 
The  four  candidate countries fall naturally into this 
category.  It can readily be  imagined  that  they are keen  to  know 
whether  the  Common  Market  system does  not  include some  sort of 
concealed  mechanism  leading to a  "competitive deflation" of standarde 
in the  finance  procedures  of the public authorities. 
Two  cases,  Germany  and  the Netherlands,  are particularly 
interesting in this respect. 
1.  Germany 
With  a  four  per  cent rate,  Germany  is in a  midway  position. 
However,  although  calculated on  the  average  of  five  years,  that 
posit~on seems  to be  more  circumstantial  than structural.  From 
1963  to  1965,  in fact,  the Federal Republic  had  reached  a  distinctly 
higher rate,  namely 4.4  per  cent  (cf.  Annex  IV,  p.  1) 
(1)  From  this angle,  it would  appear useful  to point out  that 
the level reached by  the  USA  has  been both  lower  (3  ~) and 
stable for  a  decade  (cf.  Annex  IV,  p.  11). 
This is sound  confirmation that  the effort devoted  to 
private sector resources is not proportionate to overall 
wealth. 
In this connection, it may  be  tempting to draw a  parallel 
l)etween  the  "American  type"  and  the  "Latin type",  both 
distinct from  the  "Nordic  type". - 22-
Political history in Germany  may  show  that  from  the  time 
they  assumed responsibility for  the  country's  economic  affairs, 
the Social Democrats  - in spite of the  fact that  their doctrine is 
the  one  which  is most  in favour  of developing public sector resources  -
never  achieved  growth rates  exceeding one-third of  the rates  that  the 
Christian Democrats  had  set as their targets.  However,  to see  in  that 
a  change  of policy or  the  effect of  an  error  in calculation would  be 
an illusion. 
The  cause  is two-fold  : 
In the first place,  during  the  1965-67  recession,  the  Lander 
and  the district authorities drastically reduced  investments,  for 
the  simple  reason that their revenue  from  taxation had itself declined 
due  to  the  reduced  economic  activity.  Local authorities did  not  even 
take  advantage  of the  lower  interest rates  to  increase  their borrowings. 
That,  among  other  things,  caused  the  collapse of public sector GFCAF  to 
- 12.3 %  in 196?. 
Far  from  redressing the  balance,  as it should have  done,  the 
public sector  in the Federal Republic at  that  time  acted as  a  pro-cyclic 
aggravation of  the recession  (1). 
Later,  from  1968  to  1970,  the rate of  growth  in public sector 
investment  increased,  but  a  larger part of  the  increase  was  accounted 
for  by  higher prices,  which  rose by  more  than  16  per cent in  the  year 
1969-70  (cf.  Annex  III).  This  extraordinRry inflation was  itself largely 
due  to  the  following  paradox  :  in spiteof its growing  economic  strength, 
the Federal Republic  of Germany  over  the  preceding years  had  experienced 
increasing and  particularly serious difficulties  in the  way  of  an 
independent  and  effective  monetary  policy,  due  to  the  increased amount 
of  floating capital speculating on  the revaluation of  the  DM. 
(1)  This  phenomenon  was  at the origin of the  important  law of  1967 
relating to  the  programming of public  finances.  This  example 
shows  the  need  for  a  regulating organization along similar 
lines  for  the  future European Economic  and  Monetary  Union. • 
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This inability to control its money  could  only be  overcome 
by Germany  in three  ways  : 
- revaluation of the  DM  (experience has  shown  the  possible 
disadvantages); 
- restrictive regulations on  capital transfers  (which are necessarily 
detrimental  to  the  proper allocation of resources  and are,  at least 
in the long  term,  a  factor  which  weakens  the country's institutions); 
- formation  of a  European monetary union  (which  was  ·essential to enable 
the  Community  to regain independence in credit policy). 
It so happens  ·that all the EEC  countries have  experienced,  in 
varying degrees,  difficulties comparable  to  those besetting Germany, 
as is shown  in Annex  II.  Least affected were  the Netherlands and 
F~ance. 
Bearing in mind  the role which  public sector resources  can 
play in the reduction of social inequalities, it can be stated that 
the absence  of an  economic  and  monetary union indirectly contributes 
to aggravate  those  inequalities in the  member  countries  of the EEC. 
2.  The  Netherlands 
The  Netherlands,  a  typical  example  of  the  "Nordic  type"  vas 
able to avoid  these difficulties until 1969. 
It is the first in line of the  ten,  in the  order of ratio of 
public sector GFCAF  to GNP,  with a  rate approaching 5  per  cent. 
It is its firm intention to maintain that position and  even  to 
increase its lead,  its 1975  target being 5.6 per  cent  (1). 
{1)  This  record is undoubtedly not unconnected  with  the  cost  of 
port installations and  protection from  the sea. • 
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The  strange thing,  however,  is the  fact  that apparently Holland 
has  been,  and  is still, able  to retain mastery of its policy when 
it ie,  of the  ten countries,  the  one  which  is most  dependent  on 
external trade.  External trade,  indeed,  accounts  for  about  fifty 
per  cent  of its GNP. 
If is a  fairly widespread belief in the  Common  Market  -
particularly in France  - and  a  fear  which is sometimes  acute in 
the  candidate  countries  - especially among  some  trade union  circles  -
that  the  wider  a  country  opens  its  economy  to  foreign trade,  the  more 
difficult it is  for it to put into practice ambitious  financial  policies 
designed  to  make  the  country  a  model  society.  In short,  free  trade 
necessarily leads  to  ''consumer  societies" of  a  standard  type. 
This  idea was  particularly clearly expressed in a  recent 
report  (1)  by  an  extremely  competent French  expert,  Monsieur  Claude 
TRABUC  which  was  presented by  Monsieur  Jean  CHARBONNEL,  Chairman  of 
the  National  Assembly Finance  Commission  :  "The  width  of  the  opening 
for  foreign  trade,  and  the  trading partners'  share  in the  GNP,  are  what 
determine  the  options available in policies  concerning prices,  wages, 
budgets,  taxes  and  rates  of interest,  in which  government  action has 
a  regulating effect but  beyond  which  its decisions  have  no  effect or 
an effect which is unsought  or  which  leads  to  disequilibrium". 
According to  this idea,  then,  there  is no  way  out.  Economic 
interpenetration would  inevitably  give rise to  an irreversible 
process leading to dependence  on  abroad  which  would,  inter alia, 
"dictate" the lines of  t':ludget  policy.  The  simile  of  the  cork  on 
the  waves  comes  to  mind  once  more. 
(1)  "Systeme  monetaire  international et politique  monetaire  europeenne", 
June  1971. - 25-
There is something admirable  about  the  fact  that  proof to 
the contrary is provided by Holland,  a  country which  is small  only 
in size,  and  for  which  to bring such messages  to others is in keeping 
with its tradition. 
But  we  have yet  to understand  why  the Netherlands  has  had  a 
particularly wide  margin of  freedom  in this matter. 
Several  factors  may  have  contributed.  In the  early days  of 
the  Common  Market,  Holland was  very  competitive,  due  largely to its 
relatively low wage  levels,  and  remained  so  for  several years  thanks 
to a  relatively effective revenue  policy.  Subsequently,  public sector 
budgets  were  very useful  compensators  during  the  recession of 196?-68. 
On  a  more  general level,  the buffer against  the disequilibrium prevailing 
abroad  was  maintained,  thanks  no  doubt  to  exceptional  circumstances 
(such as  the  coming  into operation of Gronningen Gas)  but also to  the 
excellent results of  a  policy of specialization and  acquisition of 
foreign markets,  which  for  a  whole  generation has  constantly strengthened 
the  competitve  position of the Netherlands  economy. 
However,  the  tolerable limit of inflation was  reached in 1969, 
when  Holland had  to reduce  considerably the rate of increase in public 
sector investment  (cf.  Annexes  III and  IV,  p.  9),  in company  with  the 
other countries. 
It is not  for  that,  however,  that  we  may  ignore  the lesson to be 
drawn  from  the Netherlands'  example  :  the  possibility of  financing an 
ambitious  policy of public sector resources,  even  for  a  small EEC 
country,  may  depend  as  much  on  the soundness  of its economic  institut~ons 
and  of the policy relating to those institutions as it does  on  the  extent 
of its intercourse with  the rest of the  world. 
B.  THE  "LATIN"  TYPE  (1) 
In table  one  on  page  20,  three of the  ten countries have  an average 
public sector  SFCAF  I  GNP  ratio of less than 4  per cent. Three of the  four 
are  "Latin type"  countries,  the  fourth is Belgium,  where  the  "Latin" 
character has  become  attenuated. 
(1) 
\  "Contemporary L,atin  type"  might  be  preferable. Whereas  a  low rate of 
public sector resources  development is a  feature of  the  modern  Latin 
type,  the decadence  of Ancient Rome,  by contrast,  was  due  to the fact 
that too  many  citizens lived in idleness for too long at the  expense  of 
a  lavish exchequer. - 26-
Italy and France call for special consideration. 
1.  Italy,  or  the  "growth race" 
The  structural backwardness  of Italy compared  to  the  other 
European  countries is not its only singularity.  It is the  only  one  of 
the  ten member  and  candidate countries which,  for  the last ten years, 
has  devoted  a  decreasing fractiqn of its GNP  to public sector resources 
(cf.  Annex  IV,  p.  5)  :  the average rate of  2.78  per cent  for  the  years 
1961-65  declined to  2.42  per  cent for  1966-70  (1). 
How  can  we  explain this  trend  in a  country  about  which  the  least 
that  can be said is that its public sector infrastructure in general  is 
by  nd  means  satisfactory  ?  The  reply  may  perhaps  be  found  in the  reasons 
underlying the break in the  trend  which  is shown  in the  following  table. 
Table  2 
ITALY  (2) 
Average  ra.te  of  annual  growth  (at 1963  prices) 
GNP  Public  sector 
GFCAF 
1951  - 1955  ..........  5.6  7.2  )  8.6 % 
1955  - 1960  ..........  5.6  10.0  ) 
1960  - 1965  ..........  5.3  3.4  )  4.0 %  1965  - 1970  ..........  6.0  4.6  ) 
Projection  .......... 
1970 - 1975  ..........  6.0  12.3 
(1)  The  ANAS  and  IRL  investments  in roads  are  not  included in public 
GPOJF.  If they  were  the  percentages  would  be  increased to 3.2 for 
1961-65  and  3.0  for  1966-70. 
(2)  Source,  except  for  the years  1951-55  :  Third  MTEP  programme,  Report 
of  the  medium-term  economic  prospects study  group  known  as  the 
"Groupe  de  WOLF"  (p.  104). -27-
As  can be seen,  from  the ti•e when  the Treaty of Rome  came  into 
effect  (to all intents and  purposes in 1960),  the  growth rate of Italian 
public sector  investment  fell by  half  (8.6  per cent  from  1951-60,  as 
against 4  ~ from  1960-70),  despite the  fact  that  the  increase in GNP 
was  stable. 
No  doubt  private investment  in Italy also slackened  o~f, and  perhaps 
more  markedly still, from  1960-65,  but  only  to  make  a  vigorous  recovery in 
the years  which  followed.  Another  important  factor  no  doubt  is the Italian 
budget  items  known  as  "residui passivi",  that is to say,  credits carried 
forward  because an ill-equipped public sector has  be·en  unable  to spend  them. 
None  the less,  the overall,  savage  and lasting character of the break in 
the  trend  suggests that  the  following hypothesis is the  most  plausible 
At  the  time  when  the Treaty of Rome  became  effective,  Italy was  very 
concerned about its industrial backwardness.  It even  feared  that there 
might  develop,  and  on  a  European scale,  cumulative  phenomena  similar to 
those  which  had  reduced  the  Mezzogiorno  to  economic  decadence  a  century ago. 
Hence  the  existence of a  scale of priorities for  the satisfaction of the 
capital needs  of industry,  behind  a  screen of apparently  favourable 
programmes  for  the  promotion of public sector resources  development. 
Italy plunged headlong into the  growth race,  and  in that way  confirmed 
the "Italian miracle". 
But  the  miracle  was  made  possible only by an  excessive  geographic 
concentration of industry and  by  large· population movements;  the backlash 
was  the crisis, not  only social but  economic  or,  to be  more  precise, 
industrial,  which  has  beset  the  country  for  the last two  years. 
·  What,  indeed,  was  the  cause  of the crisis if it was  not,  at least 
to  a  great extent,  that the  workers  who  migrated  from  the  south to the 
north of Italy bore  the brunt  of the  inadequancy of the  public ressources 
necessary for  a  higher standard of living than that  which  was  theirs  ? 
In other words,  by  concentrating on  the quantitative progression of its 
economy,  to the  detriment  of the qualitative needs  of its most  vulnerable - 28-
workers,  Italy managed  to  place its economic  developm~nt in  jeopardy  (1). 
So  true is this,  that  the  crisis began  in  1969  with  a  series of general 
strikes  for  a  new  public sector  resources  policy covering  transport,  to~~tn 
planning,  hospital reform  and,  especially,  housing. 
The  Conference  for  which  this  paper  is  intended is entitled 
"Industry  and  Society"  and it seems  that  we  have  broached here  one  of 
the  main  points  of  this vast  subject. 
In  the  framework  of  the  Conference,  it would  seem  useful  to  give 
close attention tot  he  two  cases  of  Italy and  the  Netherlands. 
In  1958,  they  were  the  Community  countries  with  the  lowest  per  capita 
income.  The  former  staked  every~hing on  industry.  After  a  slendid start, 
its  forced  march  towards  industrialization seems  now  to  have  become 
sluggish,  like  a  man  struggling  th~ough a  quagmire.  The  latter,  by 
contrast,  while  placing the  satisfaction of  public  needs  high  on  the 
list of priorities,  and  in spite of  the  difficulties of  the  economic 
situation,  can be  held up as  an  example  for  the  success  of its industrial 
economy. 
Let  us  take  a  concreteexample  of  that  contrast.  Although  public 
sector resources  as  defined  for  the  purpose  of  this study  do  not  include 
housing,  housing  policy is  a  case  which  is particularly enlightening. 
In  the  Netherlands,  where  9.6  houses  per  thousand  inhabitants  were  built 
in  1969  (as  against  only 5.  2  per  thousand  in Italy),  hou,r~ing is to  a  great 
extent  considered as  a  public  resource.  Of  the  houses  built in the 
Netherlands  that year,  84.9  per  cent  were  subsidized  from  public  funds, 
in  othe~ words,  nearly  ten times  the  8.8  per  cent  in Italy. 
(!)  A by  no  means  original  conclusion.  It was  reached  by  the  Italian 
employers'  representatives  (Confindustria)  in  1970.  It is,  however, 
useful  to  show  how  it ia  justified by  the  results  of  macro-economic 
analysis,  the  more  so  as  the  Italian case  offers,  for  the  firct  time, 
decisive  experimental  proof of  the  importance  of  the  criticisms  which 
B.  de  JOUVENEL  has  been  levelling for  more  than  ten  yearR  at  the 
calculation methods  current  in national  accounting. -29-
The  corresponding proportion  for  the  EEC  as  a  whole  was  48.3 per cent  (1). 
In  the  Netherlands,  40  per  cent of the  total cost of housing  was  subsidized 
from  public  funds,  as  against 5  per  cent in Italy,  so  that  from  1958  to 
1967,  rents  rose  by  51  per  cent  in the Netherlands  and  by 97  per  cent  in 
Italy (2). 
On  the  morning of 19  November  1969,  no  doubt  for  the  first  time 
in history,  a  general strike as  a  protest against  the housing policy  -
and  not  against low  wages  - broke  out  in Italy. 
2.  France  in the  wake  of Italy 
Now  we  come  to something  even  more  surprising. Just as,  ~ome ten 
years ago,  it laun·ched  out  into its well-known ambitious  policy of techno-
logical independence,  in the  wake  of England  which  was  then in fact 
beginning  to falter along the  road  on  which it had set out,  France is 
now  set on  a  course very similar to the  one  Italy has  been  following since 
the  sixties and  t'he  results of which  we  have  just mentioned. 
However,  there is one  notable difference.  The  Italian authorities 
proceeded  on  their course  with reluctance,  and  because  they  saw  no~eferable 
Alternative.  This is confirmed  by  the  very ambitious Italian projections of 
public sector GFCAF  {cf.  Annex  I).  In France,  on  the other hand,  the 
decision  was  freely  chosen,  a  decision which  was  barely outlined in the 
Fifth Plan but clearly set out in the Stxth Plan,  and  the  central aim of 
which  seems  to be  to offset the decline of its political influence by 
rapidly developing its economic  power. 
Page  4  of Annex  IV  shows  that  the  ratio of public sector  investment 
to GNP,  after regularly increasing - in all bl  about  a  third  - from  2.5 
per  cent  in 1961  to 3.3  per  cent  in 1965,  became  stable at 3.5 per cent. 
(1)  Commission  dee  Communautee  europeennee 
Rapport  sur la situation en  1970  P•  258. 
(2j  This  comparison should in no  way  be  construed as  a  plea  for 
rent  c~ntrol. 1960 
- 30-
Similarly,  the  following table,  taken  from  the report  of the 
Study Group  on Medium-Term  Economic  Prospects  - known  as  the  "Wolf 
Group"  - shows  that since  1965  the  growth rate in public sector 
investment has  fallen by half. 
- 1965 
Table  3 
FRANCE 
Average  annual  growth rate of 
GNP  appropriations 
G N P  Consumption 
at market 
prices 
Private  Public 
5.8  6.1  3.2 
·- ·- . 
G F  C A F 
Total  ~wellings Enterpr. 
without 
dwellings 
10.1  11 .4  8.9 
Public 
sectox 
13.5 
1965  - 1970  5.8  5.3  3.6  7.7  5.9  8.7  6.6 
1970  - 1975  {1)  5-7  5.8  3.6  6.3  3.4  7.2  7.0 
(2)  5.8  5.5  4.2  6.8  7-3 
a. 
6 % 
(P. I .B.) 
There  are  many  indications,  concerning both public sector revenue 
and  expenditure,  which  combined  to underline  the  change  of  policy which has 
gradually  come  about  in France  and  which  culminates,  in the Sixth Plan,  in 
an  even  more  definite option in favour  of the  "Latin type". 
{1)  Figures  taken  from  the report of the Study Group  on  Medium-Term 
Economic  Prospects,  annex  to  the Third MTEP  programme  (p.  104). 
(2)  Source  :  Sixth Plan - Detailed programmes  of action,  p.  5.  The  figures 
given here are  merely for  guidance.  Reasoning must  be  based  on  the 
data given in the Third  programme,  which are the  same  as  those in the 
Sixth Plan but  presented with data  for  other countries in a  aanner 
which  is standard  for all. - 31-
With resard,  first of all, to public sector investment, it is 
intereatins to co•pare the  two  successive projections and  the equalization 
coefficient·a which  can 'be  educed  froa thea; still baaing ·o~rselves on  the 
report of the experts of the  Wolf  Group. 
Table 4 
FRANCE 
Rate of annual  growth in volume 
Public Sector  Equalization 
GNP  G  F  C  A  F  coefficient 
(1)  '  (2)  = (2)  X  100 
~1, 
Projection for  1965-19?0  4.8  (•)  8.2 ~(•)  170.8 
Projection for  1970-1975  5.7  7.0  122.8 
The  medium-term projections  for  1970-75  drawn  up  by  the six EEC 
countries  confirm that flexion of French policy has  a  bearing on  overall 
public demand  (consuaption)  and  public sector investment. This is clear 
fro• the  following table. 
(•) Taking the revised national accounts  for France into consideration, 
the up-dated  figures  are 5.5 ~and 10.1  ~. Table  5 
E  E  C 
Public  demand  on  the  GNP 
Year  Germany  France  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands  Belgium 
1960  16.7  15.2  15.1  15.2  17.5  14.4 
1965  19.6  15.8  16.6  15.0  20.0  15.4 
1970  20.2  15.5  15.1  - 21.0  17.3 
1975  21.0  15.3  16.7  - 21.1  18.9 
% 75/60  +  25.7 %  +  0 '7 %  +  10.6 %  +  20.6 %  +  31.3% 
It can be  seen  from  this table  that,  of the  EEC  countries,  only 
France  intends  the  public sector  demand  on  GNP  in 1975  to  remain at a  level 
approximately  the  same  as  the  one it had  reached  fifteen years  previously 
(Demand  by  private industry and  households  is excluded by  definition). 
Consideration of public  financial activities as  a  whole,  including 
inter alia transfers  and  social services,  in comparison with  the  GNP,  leads 
to  the  following basic  conclusion  :  after being the  first of the EEC 
countries  in order of  GNP  allocations  tothe public sector  (including 
transfers) in 1960,  France  intends  to be  the last in  1975. -33-
!able 6 
Share of GNP  aaaisned to public use 
1960  1975 
Rate  Order in  Rate  Order  in 
rank  rank 
Ger•any .............  33.0  3  38.8  3 
France ..............  33.9  1  38.0  5 
Italy ...............  30.7  4  38.3  4 
Netherlands .........  33.5  2  47.9  1 
B~lgium .............  29.8  5  39.'7  2 
The  originality of this policy is the  more  deserving of attention 
for  the fact  that it follows  a  concept  of public sector  financing in regard 
to which  views,  particularly those  of Germany  and  of France,  are conflicting. 
In Germany,  the  new  idea of target-setting programming  of public 
financing,  introduced by  the  Act  of 8 June  1967  on  economic stability and 
growth,  implies  tha~ in any  event  a  degree  of development  in public sector 
resources  must  have priority  :  that is one  of the  aims  of  the  public  finance 
programming.  It needed  some  unexpected  circumstances,  and  in a  way  a  case 
of force aajeure for  the spirit of that Act  to be respected  - although in 
a  somewhat  perfunctory  fashion until 1970  (cf.  Annex  IV,  p.  1). Finally, 
however,  the Federal Republic  agreed to what  we  may  call the  supreme 
sacrifice,  the revaluation of its currency in order to maintain or 
r~store balance among  the  main linesot force. 
In France,  on  the  other hand,  stress is laid increasingly,  as  in 
the Sixth Plan,  for  exaaple,  on  the  "decisive contribution" which  the 
ad•iniatration of public  finance  can •ake to the  "moderation of prices, 
private incoaes  and  trade balance"  (1)  and  even,  within limits,  to  the 
coapensation of laxis• in credit policy or to the effort to  counter the 
consequences of monetary under-evaluation. 
(1)  Introduction,  pase  20. - 34-
In spite of the relatively favourable results in France  from  1965 
to 1970,  so  far  as  public sector GFCAF  is concerned  (cf.  Annex  I), 
it would  seem  that  the  following distinction may  be  drawn  :  Germany 
henceforth seeks  to  manage  its public  finance  in a  manner  more  directly 
related to  the satisfaction of public needs,  whereas  in France  public 
finance  has rather been  considered  for  some  years  as  an  instrument  for 
the strengthening of industrial power. 
There is an  obvious  analogy  between  the latter feature  and 
the Italian policy of  the sixties. 
The  analogy  becomes  even  more  striking if we  consider revenue, 
rather  than expenditure,  and  especially their structure as  summarized 
in the  following  table  taken  from  the  report  of  the  Wolf  Group. - 35-
Table  7 
Tax  revenue  expressed as  a 
percentage of GNP 
' 
Tax  Revenue 
indirect  direct 
( 1)  (2) 
Germanz  (Fed.ReE.) 
1960  13,6  9.3 
1965  1,:5.2  9.9 
1970  12.8.  11.0 
1975  12.1  12 .o 
France 
1960  16.1  6.1 
1965  16.7  6.3 
19'70  15.3  ?.0 
1975  14.1  7.4 
I tall 
1960  11.3  )  5.5 
1965  10.9  )(1)  6.4 
.122.2.  10.7  )  6.9 
1975  10.6  )  8.7 
Netherlands 
1960  9.8  12.2 
1965  10.0  12.6 
1970  11.4  13.9 
1975  11 .4  15.6 
Belgium 
1960  11.4  7.5 
1965  12.0  8.6 
1970  12.9  10.9 
1975  12.0  14.0 
total 
~=(1)+(2) 
22.8 
23.1 
23.9 
24.1 
22.2 
23.1 
22.3 
21.5 
16.8 
17.3 
17.6 
19.3 
22.1 
22.6 
25.4 
27.0 
18.9 
20.6 
23.8 
26.0 
(1)  After  deduction of subsidies,  1-2%  of which  came  from 
the  GNP  in the sixties. 
) 
)(1) 
) 
) - 36-
The  first  thing to be noticed·is that France is going the  opposite 
direction to its partners  :  its intention is that by  1975  the  pressure 
of taxation should be less than it was  in 1960  (21.5  ~as against 22.2  ~). 
This objective is deserving of our attention because  there is a  link 
between  the  pressure of taxation and  the  development  of  public sector 
resources. 
Even  more  significant,  however,  is the  change  in direct taxation. 
NotJcontent  with having  fallen to  the bottom of the  league in 1970,  when 
even Italie overtook it (1), it fully  intends  to stay there,  and  even 
to reduce its points rating by 1975  (2). 
The  simp1est  way  of measuring  the  extra effort which  the various 
countries are  prepared to exert to  improve  the  financing of their public 
sector resources is perhaps  to cinsider that it is equal  to their direct 
tax effort  index  (E.I.).  The  latter effort may  be  calculated by  the 
following  formula  : 
EI  = 6  tb 
where  :~  = the  increase in direct  taxation over  the  period considered, 
and 
Tb  = the basic rate, i.e.  the  tax rate at the start of tne 
period. 
(1)  The  above  figure relates to  1969.  More  recent data  show  that in 1970 
direct  taxation in terms  of  a  percentage of  GNP  was  higher in Italy 
than in France. 
(2) This objective is all the  more  remarkable  as it seems  rather to 
contradict  the central idea  of the Sixth Plan  (1970-75),  i.e. 
industrialization. This,  we  know,  generally  goes  together with 
increased taxation,  particularly of the direct kind  (cf.  in this 
respect,  the  five  stages described by  H.H.Hinrichs  in "A  General 
Theory  of Tax Structure Change  during Development"). - 37-
The  results,  froa 1960  to 1975  (projections) are 
- Ger•anr ......  270 
- France .......  130 
- Italy ••••••••  320 
- letherlands  ••  362 
- Belgium ......  650 
It can be seen that  two  of the  "Latin type"  countries, 
especially Belgium,  are •aking real efforts to follow the  "Nordic 
types"  (1). France,  on  the  other hand,  accorting to all the  indicatio~s 
studied,  is characterized by its quasi-immobility,  a  sort of structural 
stopper which is even reflected in its projections.  Consequently,  the 
gap is increasing between it and  its progressing partners,  and  even 
between it and Italy,  whose  course it seems  to be drifting into, if 
not deliberately adopting,  at the risk of being puni&hed  for its sins 
toaorrow as Italy is today. 
It is posmble,  indeed,  that,  in the  future,  economic  prosperity 
will be  in the nature of a  premium  earned by  tho~e countries which  were 
able  to give first priority to the  tangible  instruments of higher living 
a.tandards  which are known  by the abstract term "public sector investment". 
(1) The  effort in Belgium was  probably made  easier by  the large influx 
of foreign capital seeking investment  in that country,  and  which 
acted as  a  buffer against a  trade deficit. The  increasing volume 
of public sector investment thus  financed  was  in part the result 
of duplications arising from  the existence of  two  languages 
(e.g.  education,  etc.). -~-
C 0  N C L U S  I  0  N S 
It is scarcely ten years since  the  more  perspicacious  began 
to understand that  the  future  of western society would  depend  not 
only on  economic  growth  but also  on  the  quality of life ·which 
developed in that society. 
That  qualitative aspect  of  development is closely linked to 
the  available public sector resources:  first  and  foremost  on those 
which,  like roads  and  telecommunications,  are  essential for private 
production and  consumption;  secondly  on those  which  provide  the 
intangible  benefits of security,  culture  and  health (1);  and 
finally those  which are daily becoming  more  necessary for  a  healthy 
life without artificial nuisances  and  for  man  to re-establish con-
tact with nature.  Air,  water  and  other benefits of nature  which  are 
free  today may  be  available  tomorrow  thanks  only to  costly invest-
ments  in the  public sector. 
The  rising tide of social needs  which will  continue  to 
accelerate will  demand  of every  country  an enormous  effort to adapt 
which it would  be  interesting to analyze.  However,  we  can only  men-
tion it in passing here,  in order to underline  those  consequences 
for  the  Community  which  may  be  as  demanding  as  they are  productive. 
(1)  To  ehow  to  how  recent  are  the  geaerally accepted ideas on the 
growth of public spending,  we  need  only  say  that  not  so long 
ago  there  were  well-meaning people  who  were  convinced  that 
progress in preventive medicine  - vaccination and  so  forth -
would  stabilize public health expenditure.  So  different  from 
reality were  expectations of  the  influence of progress in 
medical  science  that no  one  was  surprised in 1942  when 
BEVERIDGE  forecast  that the  cost of the  national health ser-
vice in Great Britain would  not rise before 1965. - 39-
A.  towards  a  new  public finance  structure 
In the first place, it is highly likely that before  the  end 
of  the  ce·ntury,  in every industrial western country,  the  share  of 
GNP  finding its way  into the  public  coffers will  become  stable. 
Fiscal and para-fiscal pressure will in general  continue  unabated, 
but in the  most  advanced  countries it is already  approaching  the 
tolerable limit.  This  statement  seems  to  be  confirmed  by,  among 
other things,  the  early work  of  the  ECCRSS  (1)  which suggests  that 
on  both sides of  the  Iron Curtain the  share  of  GNP  assigned  to 
public  consumption is today  comparable. 
Moreover,  there is every reason to  believe  that  the  needfor 
public infrastructure  and  resources will  continue  to  grow  at  a  much 
faster  pac.e  than.  the  GNP.  Let  us  take  an  example.  Only  a  few  years 
ago States had  to offer subsidies  to  encourage  local authorities to 
acquire  resources  and  overcome  excessive  caution in their management. 
Today,  the  situation everywhere  is quite  different.  Local  elections 
are  won  by  the  provision of schools,  swimming-pools  and  cultural 
centres,  so  that  the  State tries to direct, if not  to  control,  the 
propensity of local  au~horities to  make  investments.  Only  recently 
was  the  political life of  one  of  the  member  countries  almost  totally 
paralyzed  for  weeks  as  a  result of  a  quarrel  between  two  towns  about 
the  course  of  an  autoroute. 
The  interplay of  these  conflicting trends will probably  lead 
to  profound  changes  in policy  and  even in public financial structures. 
To  follow  the  underlying logic,  infrastructures must  be  distinguished 
according  to  the  nature  of  the  needs  they  are  intended  to satisfy. 
1)  No  notable  change  is to  be  expected in infrastructures for 
administrative  purposes  of public order,  justice  and  national 
defence:  the  impossibility of  attributing the  benefits of such 
services  to individuals  makes it necessary to retain the  relevant 
financing system. 
(1)  Cf.  page  6  above. -40-
·2)  Infrastructures for socio-cultural purposes  are  necessary 
for physical,  intellectual and  moral  welfare  (health,  education, 
culture,  leisure activities).,  and  their overall cost increases more 
rapidly  th~n does  the  coat of other types of infrastructure,  mainly 
due  to the  present  need  for  urban resources.  The  services  they pro-
vide  can· generally  be .attri  b:uted  to individuals and  measured,  so 
that·a·price .can  be  charged for  them.  To  what  extent this technique 
of financing infrastructure.s  by  charging for their services ·should 
be  adopted will be  one  of the  major  questions  of future  policy in 
every  country. 
An  apparently irr,versible ev9lution has  so  far impelled our 
societies· to make  socio-cultural services collective.  But  due  to 
the rising tide of new  needs·  which  tne market  cannot satisfy, it 
seems .difficult to avoid certain changes  of dividing lines in a 
direction opposite  to the .one  we  are  accustomed to. 
For  the last  centur>"  the  outstand-ing feature  of .the  e"Yolu-
tion of public financing, ·particularly in Europe,  has  been a  vast 
rearrangement  of the  dividing lines between needs,  according to 
whether  they were  considered to  be  ... within the  purview of private 
enterprise  or  ~o ·be  the responsibility in a  small or large degree 
of  the  community  (educa.tion~ health,  care  of the elderly,  housing). 
Since  the  thirt~es, it has  be~n the  ext~aordinary expansion of 
expenditure  on .social services which has  caused  the  greatest  changes 
in public budge.ts.  Today  the  limits are in sight. It is probable 
that social services will·have  to be  more  closely adapted  to the 
social condition of the  benefici-aries.  The  time fmay  not  be  far off 
when  a  choice  will have  to be  made  between,  for instance,  the  noise 
abatement  campaign  and  the  refunding of dental expenses  to some 
sections of the  population,  particularly in view  of the  fact  that 
free  service is always  costly for  someone,  and  arbitrary decisions 
favourable  to  the  subsidized  consumer  but detrimental to  the  sub-
sidizing taxpayer are often costly for everyone. - 41-
Correlatively, it will  become  necessary in ma~y cases  to 
decentralize  administrative  activiti~s in order  to  bring the  teller 
of public  funds  closer to the  object  to which  those  funds  are 
assigned.  The  principles of  budgetary unity  and  universality are 
therefore  going to  be  breached ever-wider  by  the  need  to find  new 
resources  and  especially to  "fleece  the  lamb  without  a  bleat".  The 
best  method  of  doing so  would  be  to  apply  to public services, 
wherever possible,  rules similar to  ~hose of  a  market  economy,  by 
substituting a  selling price  for  a  budget  appropriation. 
3)  That  should  be  the rule  for  infrastructures for  economic 
uses  which  are essential to private enterprise  and  individuals 
(power  supply,  transport,  communications,  etc.).  They  should in 
principle  be  entirely financed by  the  proceeds  of  the  sale of their 
services at  cost price.  This  principle  should  brook  no  exception 
other  than certain specific cases,  for  instance with part exemption, 
that is to  say,  the  price  charged  to  certain categories  of users 
being lower  than cost,  when  this is adopted  as  a  method  to  bring 
about  re-allocation (regional policy)  or redistribution (social 
policy);  or full exmption,  that is free  supply,  when  such priority 
is granted  to  the  economic  need  that its satisfaction must  be 
ensured  by  the  community  (e.g.  footpaths). 
This  principle definitely implies  the  revision of public 
financing  and  certain budget  operatio-ns,  one  significant example 
of  which  we  can give.  Faced  with  the  sudden  enormous  demand  for 
telephones in 1969,  Great Britain and  France  decided  simultaneously 
to  grant  their telecommunications  services  a  wide  degree  of  autonomy. 
The  competent  Ministry in Germany  drew  up  a  project  on  the  same 
lines  (1). 
(1)  "Vision",  July-August  1971. - 42-
The  same  principle eapeciall:r concerns  the  Community  in an 
increasing number  of fields  of public serYice  where,  paradoxically, 
public funds,  so  inadequate  elsewhere,  are,  at least in part,  wasted. 
Why?  Because  they constitute an instrument of international competi-
tion within the  Common  Market.  Consider the  sea ports and inland 
waterways,  and industrial areas or airports in the frontier regions, 
and you will see that the  credits and subsidies layished upon  them 
act as  a  sort of concealed protectionist policy seeking to  promote 
national actiYities to the  detriment  of the  foreign competitor. 
Since 1958  expenditure of this type  has  assumed  totally unexpected 
proportions. 
That all these  excesses  continue  to  be  tolerated is contrary 
to the spirit of the Treaty. 
B.  The  Community's  new  ~esponsibilities 
At  the  time  when  the Treaty of  Rome  was  signed,  however,  the 
very expression "public sector resources" had  scarcely become  current 
with its present  acceptation.  We  can regret  that eyen today  the 
Community  has  not  fully weighed  up  the  new  problems  which that 
expression implies.  So  inadequately has it done  so,  indeed,  after 
its fourteen years  of existence,  that the  methodical  comparison of 
the state of public infrastructures and resources in the  various 
member  countries has  even yet  not  begun. 
The  important dates in financial history are  those  of inven-
tories:  and  this is an inventory which  must  be  undertaken as  a 
matter of  urgency. 
Preparation  fo~ the  future  is not  envisaged either,  even in 
respect of research.  Each member  encounters  the  same  difficulties 
in rationalizing budget  alternatiYes,  yet  a  start has  hardly  been 
made  to the  comparison of experience,  and  each  country duplicates 
its neighbours  mistakes. 
Worse  still: free  competition,  the  elimination of  trade 
barriers founded  on nationality,  nearly always  stops at the  door 
of the  public sector.  The  EEC  is a  Tery  uncommon  market  so far as - 43-
the  public sector is concerned.  Domestic  suppliers retain a  de  !acto 
monopoly  for  the  supply  of public sector resources,  just as  they  did 
in the  worst  years  of protectionism,  at  no  matter  what  cost  to  the 
taxpayer.  The  collective loss is the  greater because  public sector 
investments  are  already  on  the  increase  and will  climb  more  rapidly 
in the  future. 
There  is even worse  to  come. 
What  is the  meaning  of "to govern"? It means,  according to 
the  etymologist,  to set  a  course,  to  choose  and  make  for  an  objec-
tive.  So  far  as  the  infrastructures which  are  gradually  to reform 
Europe  are  concerned,  the  goTernments  of  the  Six countries,  as  we 
haTe  seen,  have  chosen their objectiYes  and,  by  a  miracle,  those 
objectives are all more  or less the  same.  But  they  cannot  hold 
their course  and  the  six countries  continue  to drift,  carried off 
by  the  currents  from  across  the Atlantic. 
It would  certainly  be  useful if, as  suggested in the first 
MTEP  programme,  and  like Germany  or  Belgium recently,  the  member 
countries  adopted  a  several-year programme  system for  public 
financing.  But  that is not  enough.  If a  period of  eyen minor  econo-
mic  stress should occur,  the  Ministers  of Finance,  of whatever  coun-
try  and  party,  would  be  compelled  to  cut expenditure  on public 
sector investment.  Let  the  inflationist trend  continue  as it has 
for  several years,  and  the  financial  programming will  be  reduced 
to  the  value  of  a  pious  hope. 
What  has  been happening  since  1965  in the  EEC  should sur-
prise  no  one.  As  early as  1964  the  Currency  Committee  expressed 
regret that  th~ monetary  policy was  powerless  to  solve  the  problems 
of adjustment  to  combinations  of events without  increasing support 
from  the  budget.  It is  just as  powerless,  and  even more  so,  in 1972. -44-
If they wish to escape  the  constraints to sacrifice their 
public sector resources,  the member  countries must  tace  the  fbllowing 
alternative:  either they must  considerably improve  the  flexibility of 
their tax systems  - and  how  narrow the latitude for action is in t.hat 
fiel4 is well known;  or they must  make  their monetary policies much 
more  effective •  without,  however,  resort to the  methods  of protec-
tionism.  There is only  one  way  out,  namely,  the  founding o! the 
monetary  union or,  to be  more  exact,  the  economic  and  monetary 
union  (EMU)  ( 1 }. 
Since 1965,  all member  States have  been  under increasing 
pressure to lay stress in the  "policy-mix"  on  the  instrumental 
aspect of the  budget,  because  they  have  been progressively losing 
their grip on their own  monetary situation.  The  dwindling of this, 
in principle,  sovereign power is related to  the  increase  of the 
share  of foreign trade in contributing to  the  GNP  and,  especially, 
to the  predominant influence of the  USA  in international monetary 
relations. 
That is why  it would  be  absurd  to  transpose  to  Europe  ideas 
such as  those  of  MILTON  FRIEDMAN,  according to which adjustment  to 
circumstances should be  made  solely by  control of  the monetary  cir-
culation.  Such ideas are  notoriously typical of  a  citizen of  a 
country which has retained mastery of its own  style of growth.  It 
is only at the  level of the  Community  that the  necessary ways  and 
means  may  be  found  for the  achievement  of  comparative  autonomy. 
But it is communally  that the  Community  must  give  effect of  those 
ways  and  means. 
In other words, it must  build  up  the  EMU;  not  ten years 
hence,  but  now.  It would  have  been easier to take  the  plunge  in 
1965  than in 1970  or 1972.  It will  be  even more  difficult to make 
the decision in 1970  or 1980. 
(1)  The  aim  would  be  not  only the  necessary  co-ordination of economic 
policies,  but also  the  implementation of a  genuine  community 
spirit in matters of infrastructure financing in depressed areas, 
an4  community  budgeting on a  considerably greater scale with a 
view  to redressing the structural balance. - 45-
First because  the  mistakes,  laziness,  retreats  and pusillan-
imity of  the past  undermine  the  best of resolutions  and  jeopardize 
the  future,  but  especially because,  for  many  years,  the results of 
the  member  countries'  policies  on prices,  economic structure  and 
public sector resources  have  been widely dissimilar  and  even  contra-
dictory.  And  finally,  that  contradiction will  be  further  aggravated 
by  expansion. 
We  already knew  that the  absence  of an  economic  and  monetary 
un~on was  equivalent  to  a  concealed  tax  burden on the  income  of 
every inhabitant of  the  Community. 
We  must  now  recognize  that  the  situation is far  worse  even 
than that. 
The  Common  Market,  incontestably,  has  been  a  powerful  factor 
in the  economic  progress  of the  member  countries.  But  due  to  the 
very  fact  that it has  not  been  completed  by  suitable  common  policies, 
it tends  more  and  more  to  be  a  structure  favourable  to  the  creation 
of social inequalities. 
This is true  for the  various  arrangements  for social progress, 
which  are  likely to have  an adverse  effect  on productivity and 
economic  competition  (working hours  and  conditions,  notably in 
industry):  the  more  trade  among  members  of  the  Community  develops, 
the  greater the  risk of disequilibrium,  and  the  more  the  members 
must  be  circumspect in their dealings  with  one  another. 
It is true  also  of public sector investment,  which  should 
nevertheless  be  given pride  of place in government  action with  a 
view  to  improving  the  quality of life and  reducing social dispari-
ties. It must  indeed never  be  forgotten that in general it is the 
poorest  and  the  weakest  who  suffer most  from  the  inadequacies  of 
public sector resources. -~-
Yet  all the  experience of the EEC  countries in this field -
eyen of the Netherlands,  which is exemplary in this respect - shows 
that it is impossible  to fulfil in lasting fashion an ambitious pro-
gramme  tor public sector resources  without  acting in a  sufficiently 
broad  economic  spectrum. 
The  countries which  comprise  the  EEC  cannot,  at the national 
leTel,  escape  the  constraints which,  since 1965,  have  caused their 
public resources policies to flounder  time  after time,  nor  can they 
find  the  ways  and  means  of ensuring a  better social policy,  unless 
they retreat to some  form  of protectionism which,  in any  case,  would 
tor them  be  a  factor of economic regression. 
It is a  grieYous  dilemma: 
- either continue  the  EEC  in its present  unfinished state,  and 
tolerate year in year out  a  strict limitation on  action for  social 
progress; 
- or reYert  to protectionism and  theNby  place in jeopardy 
the· development  of the  economy  itself. 
Reconciliation can only be  brought  about  through the  Economic 
and  Monetary  Union.  This is now  so  clear that it  permits of the 
following  three-fold  conclusion: 
mean. 
1.  the  absence  of the  EMU  means  greater social inequality 
within each member  country; 
2.  the  absence  of the  EMU  means  greater inequality between 
the  member  countries,  that is to say  a  lesser degree  of 
community  among  them,  unless it be  the  undesirable  form 
of  community  described in the  third aspect  of this 
conclusion; 
3.  the  absence  of the  EMU  means  greater pollution,  bottle-
necks  and  all the  other evils to which industrial  so~ieties 
are heir. 
For,  in the  long run,  that is what  public sector resources G
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 ANNEX  II 
COEFFICIENTS  OF  EQUALIZATION  ( 7  100) 
OR 
OF  DECLINE  ( < 100) 
concerning  the  GFCAF  growth in  the  public  sector 
compared  to  the  growth  of  the  GNP 
(  ~  GFCAF  (Pub.) 
~ GNP 
X  100) 
Germany  projections 65-70  5•2  X  100  157.1  .}.5  = 
achieve'ts  65-70  220  X  100  42.5  4.7  = 
projections 70-75  6.3  X  100  140.0  4.5  = 
France  projections 65-70  8.2  X  100  170.8  4.8  = 
achieve'ts  65-70  6.6 X  100  113.8  5.8  = 
projections  70-75  7.0  X  100  122.8 
5-7  = 
Italy  projections  65-70  18.4  X  lOO  368.0  5.0  = 
achieve'ts  65-70  4.6  X  100  76.7  6.0  .... 
projections 70-75  12.3  X  100  205.0  6.o  = 
Netherlands  projections 65-70  2•8  X  100  213.0  4.6  = 
achieve'ts  65-70  5.2  X  100  102.0 
5-1  = 
projections 70-75  5.8  X  100  126.1  4.6  = 
Belgium  projections 65-70  7•2  X  100  182.9  4.1  = 
achieve'ts  65-70  8.6 X  100  195.4  4.4  = 
projections 70-75  9.1  X  100  = 189.6  4.8 
EEC  projections  65-70  8.5 X  100  197·7  4.3  = 
achieve'ts  65-70  4.9  X  100  94.2  5.2  = 
projections 70-75  7•3  X  100  = 140.4  5.2 G
E
R
M
A
N
Y
 
(
F
e
d
.
 
R
e
p
.
)
 
-
G
F
C
A
F
 
i
n
 
.
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
-
G
N
P
 
-
(
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
.
G
F
C
A
F
)
 
F
R
A
N
C
E
 
-
G
F
C
A
F
 
i
n
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
-
G
N
P
 
-
(
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
)
 
I
T
A
L
Y
 
-
G
F
C
A
F
 
i
n
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
-
G
N
P
 
-
(
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
)
 
N
E
T
H
E
R
L
A
N
D
S
 
-
G
F
C
A
F
 
i
n
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
-
G
N
P
 
-
(
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
)
 
B
E
L
G
I
U
M
 
-
G
F
C
A
F
 
i
n
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
-
G
N
P
 
-
(
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
)
 
L
U
X
E
M
B
O
U
R
G
 
-
G
F
C
A
F
 
i
n
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
-
G
N
P
 
-
(
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
)
 
E
 
E
 
C
 
G
R
O
S
S
 
F
O
R
M
A
T
I
O
N
 
O
F
 
F
I
X
E
D
 
C
A
P
I
T
A
L
 
A
S
S
E
T
S
 
(
G
F
C
A
F
)
 
I
N
 
T
H
E
 
P
U
B
L
I
C
 
S
E
C
T
O
R
 
P
r
i
c
e
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
(
a
)
 
:
 
1
9
6
3
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
1
9
6
1
 
1
9
6
2
 
1
9
6
3
 
1
9
6
4
 
1
_
9
_
6
5
 
1
9
6
6
 
1
9
6
7
 
9
Q
.
l
 
9
5
.
8
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
1
.
9
 
1
0
2
.
1
 
1
0
3
.
9
 
1
0
1
.
4
 
9
3
.
2
 
9
7
·
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
2
.
8
 
1
0
6
.
5
 
1
1
0
.
2
 
1
1
1
.
6
 
(
9
1
.
7
)
 
(
9
7
 
.
o
)
 
(
1
0
0
)
 
(
1
0
2
 
.
4
)
 
(
1
0
5
.
5
)
 
(
1
0
8
.
0
)
 
(
1
0
6
.
8
)
 
9
0
.
7
 
9
3
.
4
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
4
.
6
 
1
0
7
.
2
 
1
0
9
.
0
 
1
1
1
.
3
 
9
0
.
0
 
9
4
.
3
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
4
.
0
 
1
0
6
.
5
 
1
0
9
.
7
 
1
1
2
.
8
 
(
9
1
.
2
)
 
(
9
4
 
.
4
)
 
(
1
0
0
)
 
(
1
0
4
 
.
1
)
 
(
1
0
7
 
.
1
)
 
(
1
0
9
 
.
2
)
 
(
1
1
2
.
0
)
 
9
0
.
6
 
9
3
.
8
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
8
.
7
 
1
1
5
.
4
 
1
2
0
.
9
 
1
2
5
.
0
 
8
7
.
0
 
9
2
.
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
6
.
3
 
1
1
0
.
4
 
1
1
2
.
8
 
1
1
6
.
2
 
(
8
9
.
2
)
 
(
9
3
.
0
)
 
(
1
0
0
)
 
(
1
0
7
 
.
4
)
 
(
1
0
9
.
7
)
 
(
1
1
1
.
2
)
 
(
1
1
3
.
7
)
 
9
1
.
8
 
9
4
.
9
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
7
.
7
 
1
1
3
-
9
 
1
2
0
.
9
 
1
2
4
.
1
 
9
2
.
2
 
9
5
.
2
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
8
.
0
 
1
1
4
.
3
 
1
2
1
.
1
 
1
2
6
.
1
 
(
9
3
-
7
)
 
(
9
5
.
6
)
 
(
1
0
0
)
 
(
1
0
6
.
0
)
 
(
1
1
0
 
·
9
)
 
(
1
1
6
.
4
)
 
(
1
1
8
.
7
)
 
9
1
.
2
 
9
4
.
8
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
6
.
5
 
1
1
1
.
6
 
1
1
7
-
5
 
1
2
5
.
8
 
9
6
.
1
 
9
7
.
2
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
4
.
7
 
1
1
0
.
0
 
1
1
4
.
9
 
1
1
8
.
3
 
.
,
 
(
9
1
.
5
)
 
(
9
5
.
2
)
 
(
1
0
0
)
 
(
1
0
6
.
 
6
)
 
(
1
1
1
.
5
)
 
(
1
1
5
-
5
)
 
(
1
2
0
.
3
)
 
.
 
.
 
1
0
0
 
.
 
.
 
•
 
•
 
9
5
-
5
 
9
5
.
6
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
7
.
2
 
1
1
0
.
1
 
1
1
3
.
7
 
1
1
5
.
9
 
(
8
8
.
2
)
 
(
9
2
.
8
)
 
(
1
0
0
)
 
(
1
1
0
 
.
8
)
 
(
1
1
4
.
6
)
 
(
1
1
6
.
9
)
 
(
1
1
6
.
7
)
 
A
N
N
E
X
 
I
I
I
 
1
)
 
1
9
6
8
 
1
9
6
9
 
1
9
7
0
 
1
0
4
.
4
 
1
1
0
.
4
 
1
2
6
.
7
 
1
1
3
.
4
 
1
1
7
.
3
 
1
2
5
.
8
 
(
1
0
7
 
·
9
)
 
(
1
1
2
.
 
9
)
 
(
1
2
5
.
1
)
 
1
1
6
.
0
 
1
2
3
.
4
 
1
3
1
.
0
 
1
1
8
.
1
 
1
2
7
.
5
 
1
3
4
.
6
 
(
1
1
5
.
1
)
 
(
1
2
1
.
6
)
 
(
1
3
0
 
.
1
)
 
1
2
8
.
3
 
1
3
5
·
6
 
1
4
7
.
3
 
1
1
7
.
9
 
1
2
2
.
7
 
1
3
(
)
.
4
 
(
1
1
6
.
1
)
 
(
1
2
3
.
4
)
 
(
1
3
7
 
.
o
)
 
1
2
8
.
6
 
1
4
1
.
1
 
1
5
3
-
7
 
1
3
0
.
6
 
1
}
8
.
0
 
1
4
4
.
4
 
(
1
2
0
.
8
)
 
(
1
2
8
.
8
)
 
,
1
3
8
.
5
)
 
1
2
9
.
6
 
1
3
8
.
9
 
1
5
3
-
1
 
1
2
1
.
5
 
1
2
6
.
2
 
1
3
2
.
7
 
(
1
2
3
.
2
)
 
(
1
2
8
.
5
)
 
r
-
1
4
0
.
 
6
)
 
•
 
.
 
•
 
1
2
0
.
4
 
1
2
8
.
5
 
1
3
8
.
8
 
(
1
2
4
.
7
)
 
(
1
}
5
·
3
)
 
1
4
9
.
5
)
 
(
a
)
 
P
a
a
s
c
h
e
 
i
n
d
i
c
e
s
 
o
b
t
a
i
n
e
d
 
b
y
 
d
i
v
i
d
i
n
g
 
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
b
y
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
a
t
 
1
9
6
3
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 U
N
I
T
E
D
 
K
I
N
G
D
O
M
 
-
G
F
C
A
F
 
i
n
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
_
.
 
G
N
P
 
-
(
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
)
 
D
E
N
M
A
R
K
 
-
G
F
C
A
F
 
i
n
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
-
G
N
P
 
-
(
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
)
 
N
O
R
W
A
Y
 
-
G
F
C
A
F
 
i
n
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
-
G
N
P
 
-
(
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
)
 
I
R
E
L
A
N
D
 
-
G
F
C
A
F
 
i
n
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
s
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
-
G
N
P
 
-
(
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
)
 
G
R
O
S
S
 
F
O
R
M
A
T
I
O
N
 
O
F
 
F
I
X
E
D
 
C
A
P
I
T
A
L
 
A
S
S
E
T
S
 
(
G
F
C
A
F
)
 
I
N
 
T
H
E
 
P
U
B
L
I
C
 
S
E
C
T
O
R
 
P
r
i
c
e
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
(
a
)
 
:
 
1
9
6
3
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
1
9
6
1
 
1
9
6
2
 
1
9
6
3
 
1
9
6
4
 
1
9
6
5
 
1
9
6
6
 
1
9
6
7
 
9
2
.
9
 
9
6
.
9
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
3
.
0
 
1
0
6
.
0
 
1
0
9
.
6
 
1
1
2
.
2
 
9
4
.
4
 
9
8
.
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
3
.
0
 
1
0
8
.
0
 
1
1
2
.
7
 
1
1
6
.
1
 
9
5
-
3
 
9
8
.
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
2
.
4
 
1
0
6
.
0
 
1
0
9
.
9
 
1
1
1
.
3
 
9
1
.
5
 
9
4
.
6
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
3
.
5
 
1
0
8
.
9
 
1
1
6
.
3
 
1
2
1
.
0
 
8
8
.
7
 
9
4
.
7
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
4
.
9
 
1
1
2
.
4
 
1
2
0
.
8
 
1
2
7
.
9
 
8
2
.
7
 
9
5
.
8
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
3
.
4
 
1
0
9
.
8
 
1
1
4
.
7
 
1
1
9
.
9
 
9
3
-
5
 
9
7
-
1
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
1
.
3
 
1
0
9
.
9
 
1
1
5
.
7
 
1
2
0
.
2
 
9
4
.
9
 
9
7
.
6
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
5
.
5
 
1
1
0
.
5
 
1
1
5
.
3
 
1
2
0
.
0
 
9
6
.
9
 
9
8
.
6
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
.
6
 
1
0
6
.
9
 
1
1
1
.
0
 
1
1
3
.
6
 
1
0
0
 
9
4
.
4
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
9
.
5
 
1
0
5
.
7
 
1
1
0
.
7
 
1
1
2
.
5
 
9
3
.
2
 
9
7
.
4
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
9
.
2
 
1
1
4
.
0
 
1
1
8
.
2
 
1
2
1
.
8
 
9
4
.
9
 
9
8
.
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
5
.
9
 
1
0
9
.
5
 
1
1
2
.
7
 
1
1
5
-
7
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
:
 
O
E
C
D
 
:
 
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
s
 
A
N
N
E
X
 
I
I
I
 
2
)
 
1
9
6
8
 
1
9
6
9
 
1
1
5
.
1
 
1
2
1
.
2
 
1
2
0
.
9
 
1
2
6
.
9
 
1
1
5
.
1
 
1
2
0
.
1
 
1
3
1
.
3
 
1
3
5
.
1
 
1
4
2
.
7
 
1
2
5
.
3
 
1
3
1
.
2
 
1
2
4
.
4
 
1
3
1
.
8
 
1
2
4
.
3
 
1
2
8
.
0
 
1
1
9
.
6
 
1
2
3
.
8
 
.
 
.
 
1
2
6
.
8
 
.
 
1
1
9
.
4
 
.
 
(
a
)
 
P
a
a
s
c
h
e
 
i
n
d
i
c
e
s
 
o
b
t
a
i
n
e
d
 
b
y
 
d
i
v
i
d
i
n
g
 
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
b
y
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
a
t
 
1
9
6
3
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
~
 
1
9
7
0
 G
E
R
M
A
N
Y
 
G
R
O
S
S
 
F
O
R
M
A
T
I
O
N
 
O
F
 
F
I
X
E
D
 
C
A
P
I
T
A
L
 
A
S
S
E
T
S
 
{
G
F
C
A
F
)
 
I
N
 
T
H
E
 
P
U
B
L
I
C
 
S
E
C
T
O
R
 
1
9
6
1
 
1
9
6
2
 
1
9
6
3
 
1
9
6
4
 
1
9
6
5
 
1
9
6
6
 
1
9
6
7
 
1
9
6
8
 
1
9
6
9
 
A
.
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
a
s
 
a
 
w
h
o
l
e
 
{
S
t
a
t
e
)
 
.
 
1
0
9
 
D
M
 
-
l
.
n
 
1
1
.
2
3
 
1
4
.
0
2
 
1
6
.
2
6
 
1
9
.
5
1
 
2
0
.
1
9
 
2
1
.
0
2
 
1
8
.
4
3
 
2
0
.
6
0
 
2
3
.
3
0
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
-
~
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
2
5
 
1
4
5
 
1
7
4
 
1
8
o
 
1
8
7
 
1
6
4
 
1
8
3
 
2
0
7
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
+
1
8
.
3
 
+
2
4
.
8
 
+
1
6
.
0
 
+
2
0
.
0
 
+
 
3
-
5
 
+
 
4
.
1
 
-
1
2
.
3
 
+
1
1
.
8
 
1
+
1
3
.
1
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
1
3
.
4
 
1
5
.
0
 
1
6
.
4
 
1
7
.
2
 
1
6
.
5
 
1
6
.
6
 
1
6
.
1
 
1
6
.
5
 
1
5
-
9
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
3
.
4
 
3
·
9
 
4
.
2
 
4
.
6
 
4
.
4
 
4
.
3
 
3
-
7
 
3
.
8
 
3
-
9
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
9
 
D
M
 
(
2
6
.
0
9
)
 
(
2
6
.
4
8
~
 
(
2
4
.
 
8
9
 
~
 
(
2
8
.
7
6
 
(
2
3
.
0
6
:
 
(
2
4
 
.
5
(
)
 
J
 
(
1
6
.
4
3
)
 
(
2
0
 
.
2
9
)
 
(
3
6
.
6
7
J
 
B
.
 
C
e
!
!
t
r
a
l
 
G
o
v
t
.
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
9
 
D
M
 
4
.
2
2
 
5
-
1
3
 
6
.
0
2
 
6
.
9
9
 
7
-
3
5
 
7
.
4
6
 
8
.
1
1
 
7
-
8
5
 
8
.
8
0
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
2
2
 
1
4
3
 
1
6
6
 
1
7
4
 
1
7
7
 
1
9
2
 
1
8
6
 
2
0
9
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
+
1
2
.
2
 
~
2
1
.
6
 
r
t
-
1
7
.
3
 
+
1
6
.
1
 
+
 
5
.
2
 
+
 
1
.
5
 
+
 
8
.
7
 
-
3
.
2
 
+
1
2
 
.
1
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
5
.
0
 
5
-
5
 
6
.
1
 
6
.
2
 
6
.
0
 
5
-
9
 
7
.
1
 
6
.
3
 
6
.
0
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
P
§
i
c
e
s
 
1
.
3
 
1
.
4
 
1
.
6
 
1
.
7
 
1
.
 
6
 
1
.
5
 
1
.
6
 
1
.
5
 
1
.
5
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
 
D
M
 
(
1
8
.
2
9
J
 
(
 
1
7
 
.
3
6
)
 
(
1
6
.
3
7
~
 
(
1
9
.
3
4
;
 
(
1
4
.
1
9
;
 
(
1
6
.
0
7
J
 
(
1
2
.
7
3
;
 
{
1
6
.
4
0
~
 
(
2
8
 
.
0
3
 
J
 
c
.
 
L
o
c
a
l
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
9
 
D
M
 
6
.
9
0
 
8
.
7
1
 
1
0
.
1
6
 
1
2
.
2
5
 
1
2
.
6
8
 
1
2
.
6
5
 
1
1
.
5
2
 
1
2
.
0
6
 
1
4
.
0
0
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
•
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
2
6
 
~
4
7
 
1
7
8
 
1
8
4
 
1
8
3
 
1
6
7
 
1
7
5
 
2
0
3
 
~
.
%
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
+
1
9
.
8
 
+
2
6
.
2
 
r
+
-
1
6
.
6
 
~
2
0
.
6
 
+
 
3
-
5
 
-
0
.
2
 
-
~
-
9
 
+
 
4
.
7
 
+
1
6
.
1
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
8
.
2
 
9
-
3
 
1
0
.
3
 
1
0
.
8
 
1
0
.
4
 
1
0
.
0
 
1
0
.
1
 
9
·
7
 
9
.
6
 
-
%
 
.
o
f
.
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
9
i
c
e
s
 
2
.
1
 
2
.
4
 
2
.
6
 
2
.
9
 
2
.
7
 
2
.
6
 
2
.
3
 
2
.
2
 
2
.
3
 
(
4
 
.
6
9
;
 
(
 
5
.
5
1
J
(
 
5
.
1
1
:
 
(
 
5
-
3
4
:
 
(
 
4
.
8
4
:
 
(
 
4
.
8
o
J
 
(
 
4
.
4
8
:
 
(
 
4
.
3
7
;
 
(
 
'
 
-
-
-
N
B
·
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
 
D
M
 
7
-
2
9
J
 
-
•
 
b
 
D
.
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
l
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
9
 
D
M
 
0
.
1
1
 
0
.
1
8
 
0
.
1
8
 
0
.
1
7
 
0
.
1
6
 
0
.
2
1
 
0
.
2
4
 
0
.
1
7
 
0
.
1
9
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
5
4
 
~
6
4
 
1
5
5
.
 
1
4
5
 
1
9
1
 
2
1
8
 
1
5
4
 
1
7
3
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
-
4
2
.
1
 
+
6
3
.
6
 
-
-
5
.
6
 
-
5
-
9
 
+
3
1
.
3
 
+
1
4
.
3
 
-
2
9
.
2
 
+
1
1
.
8
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
 
r
a
l
1
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
0
.
1
 
0
.
2
 
0
.
2
 
0
.
1
 
0
.
1
 
0
.
2
 
0
0
.
2
 
0
.
1
 
0
.
1
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
0
.
0
3
 
0
.
0
5
 
0
.
0
5
 
0
.
0
4
 
0
.
0
3
 
0
.
0
4
 
0
.
0
5
 
0
.
0
3
 
0
.
0
3
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
l
0
9
D
M
 
(
 
3
.
1
1
)
 
3
.
6
1
)
 
(
 
3
 
.
•
 
4
1
)
 
(
 
4
.
6
8
)
 
(
4
.
o
3
:
(
 
3
.
6
3
~
 
(
-
o
.
7
8
;
 
{
-
o
.
4
8
J
(
 
.
,
 
1
.
3
5
.
 
A
N
N
E
X
 
I
V
-
1
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
:
 
O
S
C
E
 
1
9
7
0
 
2
9
.
4
0
 
2
6
2
 
+
2
6
.
2
 
1
6
.
2
 
4
.
3
 
(
4
0
 
.
8
6
)
 
1
0
.
9
3
 
2
5
9
 
+
2
4
.
2
 
6
.
0
 
1
.
6
 
{
2
8
.
8
2
)
 
1
6
.
8
8
 
2
4
5
 
+
2
0
.
6
 
9
·
3
 
2
.
5
 
(
 
4
 
-
9
5
)
 
0
.
2
0
 
1
8
2
 
+
 
5
.
2
 
0
.
1
 
0
.
0
3
 
(
 
7
.
0
9
)
 B
 
E
 
L
 
G
 
I
 
U
 
M
 
G
R
O
S
S
 
F
O
R
M
A
T
I
O
N
 
O
F
 
F
I
X
E
D
 
C
A
P
I
T
A
L
 
A
S
S
E
T
S
 
(
G
F
C
A
F
)
 
I
N
 
T
H
E
 
P
U
B
L
I
C
 
S
E
C
T
O
R
 
1
9
6
1
 
1
9
6
2
 
1
9
6
3
'
 
1
9
6
4
 
1
9
6
5
 
1
9
6
6
 
1
9
6
7
 
1
9
6
8
 
A
.
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
a
s
 
a
 
w
h
o
l
e
 
(
s
t
a
t
e
)
 
-
i
l
l
 
1
0
9
 
F
B
 
1
2
.
5
 
1
4
.
7
 
1
7
.
5
 
2
3
.
1
 
2
1
.
2
 
2
5
.
5
 
3
0
.
2
 
3
5
-
5
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
1
8
 
1
4
0
 
1
8
5
 
1
7
0
 
2
0
4
 
2
4
2
 
2
8
4
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
+
1
4
.
7
 
+
1
7
.
6
 
+
1
9
.
0
 
+
3
2
.
0
 
-
8
.
2
 
+
2
0
.
3
 
+
1
8
.
4
 
+
1
7
.
5
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
1
0
.
3
 
1
0
.
9
 
1
2
.
3
 
1
3
.
5
 
1
1
.
4
 
1
2
.
5
 
1
3
-
9
 
1
6
.
3
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
I
I
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
2
.
1
 
2
.
3
 
2
.
5
 
3
.
0
 
2
.
5
 
2
.
8
 
3
-
1
 
3
.
4
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
9
 
F
B
 
(
 
4
.
6
)
 
(
 
6
.
2
)
 
(
 
2
.
9
~
 
(
1
6
.
6
)
 
(
 
7
.
6
)
 
(
1
6
.
1
)
 
(
 
1
9
 
.
o
)
 
(
 
8
.
1
)
 
B
.
 
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
 
G
o
v
t
.
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
9
 
F
B
 
5
-
9
 
7
-
9
 
9
.
6
 
1
3
.
9
 
1
3
.
3
 
1
6
.
7
 
1
9
.
0
 
2
2
.
5
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
3
4
 
1
6
3
 
2
3
6
 
2
2
5
 
2
8
3
 
3
2
2
 
3
8
1
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
+
 
7
-
3
 
+
3
3
-
9
 
+
2
1
.
5
 
+
4
4
.
8
 
-
4
.
3
 
+
2
5
.
6
 
+
1
3
.
8
 
+
1
8
.
4
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
4
.
9
 
5
-
9
 
6
.
8
 
8
.
2
 
7
-
2
 
8
.
2
 
8
.
7
 
1
0
.
3
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
P
§
i
c
e
s
 
1
.
0
 
1
.
2
 
1
.
4
 
1
.
8
 
1
.
 
6
 
1
.
8
 
1
.
9
 
2
.
2
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
 
F
B
 
(
-
1
.
5
)
 
(
 
1
.
 
1
)
 
(
-
2
.
7
)
 
(
 
2
.
5
)
 
(
 
-
1
 
•
 
7
)
 
(
 
3
.
9
)
 
(
 
4
.
4
)
 
(
-
0
 
.
2
)
 
C
.
 
L
o
c
a
l
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
9
 
F
B
 
6
.
6
 
6
.
6
 
7
.
6
 
8
.
6
 
7
.
1
 
7
-
7
 
9
-
9
 
1
1
.
7
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
1
5
 
1
3
0
 
1
0
8
 
1
1
7
 
1
.
5
0
 
1
7
7
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
+
2
2
.
2
 
-
+
1
5
.
2
 
+
1
3
.
2
 
-
1
7
.
4
 
+
 
8
.
5
 
+
2
8
.
6
 
+
1
8
.
2
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
5
.
4
 
4
.
9
 
5
-
3
 
5
.
0
 
3
.
8
 
3
.
8
 
4
.
6
 
5
.
4
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
P
§
i
c
e
s
 
1
 
.
1
 
1
.
0
 
1
 
.
1
 
1
 
.
1
 
o
.
8
 
0
.
8
 
1
.
0
 
1
.
1
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
 
F
B
 
(
1
.
4
)
 
(
 
1
.
3
)
 
(
 
1
 
.
2
)
 
(
-
0
.
1
)
 
(
 
0
 
.
5
)
 
(
 
3
.
4
)
 
(
 
4
.
9
)
 
(
 
4
.
9
)
 
D
.
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
9
 
F
B
 
-
0
.
2
 
0
.
3
 
0
.
6
 
0
.
8
 
1
.
1
 
1
.
3
 
1
.
3
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
-
1
0
0
 
1
.
5
0
 
3
0
0
 
4
0
0
 
5
5
0
 
6
5
0
 
6
5
0
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
-
-
+
5
0
.
0
 
+
1
0
0
.
0
 
+
3
3
-
3
 
+
3
7
-
5
 
+
1
8
.
2
 
-
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
-
0
.
1
 
0
.
2
 
0
.
3
 
0
.
4
 
0
.
5
 
0
.
6
 
0
.
6
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
-
0
.
0
3
 
0
.
0
4
 
0
.
1
 
0
.
1
 
0
.
1
 
0
.
1
 
0
.
1
 
-
N
B
 
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
9
 
F
E
 
(
4
.
7
)
 
(
 
3
.
8
)
 
(
 
4
.
4
)
 
(
1
4
.
2
)
 
(
 
8
.
8
)
 
(
 
8
.
8
)
 
(
 
9
.
7
)
 
(
 
3
.
4
)
 
-
A
N
N
E
X
 
I
V
 
-
2
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
:
 
O
C
S
J
:
 
1
9
6
9
 
1
9
7
0
 
3
7
.
0
 
4
4
.
4
 
2
9
6
 
3
5
5
 
+
 
4
.
2
 
+
2
0
.
0
 
1
5
,
4
 
1
5
,
8
 
3
.
2
 
3
-
5
 
(
1
3
.
1
)
 
(
2
1
.
3
)
 
2
4
.
6
 
2
8
.
5
 
4
1
7
 
4
8
3
 
+
 
9
·
3
 
+
1
5
-
9
 
1
0
.
2
 
1
0
.
1
 
2
.
1
 
2
.
2
 
(
 
7
-
5
)
 
(
 
1
0
.
8
)
 
I
 
I
 
1
1
.
9
 
1
5
.
4
 
I
 
I
 
1
8
o
 
2
3
3
 
+
 
1
.
7
 
+
2
9
.
4
 
5
.
0
 
5
-
5
 
1
.
0
 
1
.
2
 
(
 
2
.
6
)
 
(
 
2
.
8
)
 
0
.
6
 
0
.
5
 
3
0
0
 
2
.
5
0
 
-
5
3
.
8
 
·
-
1
6
.
7
 
0
.
2
 
0
.
2
 
0
.
0
5
 
0
.
0
4
 
(
 
3
.
0
)
 
(
 
7
.
 
7
)
 D
E
N
M
A
R
K
 
-
-
G
R
O
S
S
 
F
O
R
M
A
T
I
O
N
 
O
F
 
F
I
X
E
D
 
C
A
P
I
T
A
L
 
A
S
S
E
T
S
 
(
G
F
C
A
F
)
 
I
N
 
T
H
E
 
P
U
B
L
I
C
 
S
E
C
T
O
R
 
1
9
6
1
 
1
9
6
2
 
1
9
6
3
 
1
9
6
4
 
1
9
6
5
 
1
9
6
6
 
1
9
6
7
 
A
.
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
a
s
 
a
 
w
h
o
l
e
 
{
s
t
a
t
e
)
 
-
-
i
n
 
1
0
6
 
D
a
n
i
s
h
 
c
r
o
w
n
s
 
1
6
1
6
 
1
8
.
5
3
 
1
9
3
4
 
2
3
5
9
 
2
8
8
6
 
3
2
7
4
 
3
9
8
1
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
•
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
1
5
 
1
2
0
 
1
4
6
 
1
7
9
 
2
0
3
 
2
4
6
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
+
2
1
.
1
 
+
1
4
.
7
 
+
 
4
.
4
 
+
2
2
.
0
 
+
2
2
.
3
 
+
1
3
.
4
 
+
2
1
.
6
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
1
7
.
2
 
1
7
.
4
 
1
7
.
9
 
1
7
.
3
 
1
9
.
1
 
2
0
.
1
 
2
1
.
8
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
3
-
.
5
 
3
.
6
 
3
-
5
.
 
3
.
8
 
4
.
1
 
4
.
3
 
4
.
7
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
6
 
(
1
4
6
4
)
 
(
2
0
1
0
)
 
(
2
6
8
2
)
 
(
3
2
5
1
)
 
(
3
8
4
0
)
 
(
4
7
1
5
)
 
(
3
9
4
6
)
 
D
a
n
i
s
h
 
c
r
o
w
n
s
 
B
.
 
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
 
G
o
v
t
.
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
6
 
D
a
n
i
s
h
 
c
r
o
w
n
s
 
.
5
0
1
 
5
6
2
 
6
1
6
 
6
8
2
 
9
6
2
 
1
1
3
4
 
1
3
3
4
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
1
2
 
1
2
3
 
1
3
6
 
1
9
2
 
2
2
6
 
2
6
6
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
+
2
3
.
4
 
+
2
1
.
2
 
+
 
9
.
6
 
+
1
0
.
7
 
+
4
1
.
1
 
+
1
7
.
9
 
+
1
7
.
6
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
.
A
F
 
5
-
3
 
5
·
3
 
5
-
7
 
5
.
0
 
6
.
4
 
?
.
0
 
7
-
3
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
1
.
1
 
1
 
.
1
 
1
 
.
1
 
1
 
.
1
 
1
.
4
 
1
.
5
 
1
.
6
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
6
 
(
 
1
2
5
2
)
 
(
1
8
3
8
)
 
~
2
0
9
1
)
 
(
2
4
5
3
)
 
(
3
0
3
2
)
 
(
3
6
2
1
)
 
(
2
7
9
4
)
 
D
a
n
i
s
h
 
c
r
o
w
n
s
 
C
.
 
L
o
c
a
l
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
.
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
6
 
D
a
n
i
s
h
 
c
r
o
w
n
s
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
6
 
D
a
n
i
s
h
 
c
r
o
w
n
s
 
D
.
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
z
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
6
 
D
a
n
i
s
h
 
c
r
o
W
D
S
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
8
6
i
c
e
s
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
 
D
a
n
i
s
h
 
c
r
o
w
n
s
 
A
N
N
E
X
 
I
V
 
-
3
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
:
 
O
E
C
D
 
1
9
6
8
 
1
9
6
9
 
1
9
7
0
 
4
4
8
6
 
5
5
3
2
 
2
7
8
 
3
4
2
 
+
1
2
.
7
 
.
-
2
3
.
3
 
2
3
-
7
 
2
4
.
0
 
4
.
9
 
5
·
3
 
(
5
3
5
3
)
 
(
5
7
7
8
)
 
1
4
9
2
 
1
6
o
O
 
2
9
8
 
3
1
9
 
+
1
1
.
8
 
+
 
7
.
2
 
7
-
9
 
6
.
9
 
1
.
 
6
 
1
.
5
 
(
3
6
8
1
)
 
(
3
4
4
0
)
 F
R
A
N
C
E
 
G
R
O
S
S
 
F
O
m
i
A
T
I
O
N
 
O
F
 
F
I
X
E
D
 
C
A
P
I
T
A
L
 
A
S
S
E
T
S
 
(
 
G
F
C
A
F
)
 
I
N
 
T
H
E
 
P
U
B
L
I
C
 
S
E
C
T
O
R
 
1
9
6
1
 
1
9
6
2
 
1
9
6
3
 
1
9
6
4
 
1
9
6
5
 
1
9
6
6
 
1
9
6
7
 
A
.
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
a
s
 
a
 
w
h
o
l
e
 
(
S
t
a
t
e
)
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
6
 
F
F
 
8
2
5
4
 
1
0
1
8
0
 
1
2
0
5
2
 
1
4
3
2
9
 
1
5
9
3
6
 
1
7
6
0
8
 
1
9
9
7
3
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
2
3
 
1
4
6
 
1
7
4
 
1
9
3
 
2
1
3
 
2
4
2
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
+
1
8
.
5
 
+
2
3
.
3
 
+
1
8
.
4
 
+
1
8
.
9
 
+
1
1
.
2
 
+
1
0
.
5
 
+
1
3
.
4
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
1
1
.
7
 
1
2
.
7
 
1
3
.
2
 
1
3
.
-
2
 
1
3
.
3
 
1
3
.
3
 
1
3
.
9
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
5
i
o
e
s
 
2
 
5
 
2
.
8
 
2
.
9
 
3
.
1
 
3
-
3
 
3
.
3
 
3
.
5
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
 
F
F
 
(
1
3
0
6
2
)
 
(
1
1
9
3
7
)
 
(
1
4
9
9
8
)
 
(
2
1
3
1
9
)
 
2
3
3
2
2
)
 
(
2
5
5
7
8
)
 
(
2
4
9
0
3
)
 
.
 
B
.
 
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
 
G
o
v
t
.
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
6
 
F
F
 
2
3
1
7
 
2
9
3
6
 
3
5
7
3
 
4
0
4
5
 
4
7
4
7
 
5
5
0
2
 
6
3
7
2
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
2
7
 
1
5
4
 
1
7
5
 
2
0
5
 
2
3
7
 
2
7
5
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
+
2
0
.
3
 
+
2
6
.
7
 
+
2
1
.
7
 
+
1
3
.
2
 
+
1
7
-
3
 
+
1
5
.
9
 
+
1
5
.
8
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
O
A
F
 
3
.
3
 
3
-
7
 
3
-
9
 
3
.
7
 
4
-
0
 
4
.
2
 
4
-
4
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
~
i
c
e
s
 
0
.
7
 
0
.
8
 
0
.
9
 
0
.
9
 
1
.
0
 
1
.
0
 
1
.
1
 
-
N
B
:
 
r
.
l
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
 
F
F
 
(
8
3
1
1
)
 
(
6
5
3
0
)
 
(
9
5
9
0
)
 
(
1
6
0
2
9
)
 
(
1
7
8
9
8
)
 
(
1
9
6
6
2
)
 
(
1
3
3
3
5
)
 
c
.
 
L
o
c
a
l
 
A
~
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
6
 
F
F
 
5
8
1
5
 
7
0
8
4
 
8
2
8
6
 
1
0
0
0
6
 
1
0
8
5
6
 
1
1
7
7
7
 
1
3
2
7
5
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
2
2
 
1
4
3
 
1
7
2
 
1
8
7
 
2
0
6
 
2
2
8
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
+
1
8
.
4
 
+
2
1
.
8
 
+
1
7
.
0
 
+
2
0
.
E
 
+
 
8
.
5
 
+
 
8
.
5
 
+
1
2
.
7
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
8
.
2
 
8
.
9
 
9
.
0
 
9
.
~
 
9
.
1
 
8
.
9
 
9
.
2
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
~
i
c
e
s
 
1
.
8
 
1
.
9
 
2
.
0
 
2
.
~
 
2
.
2
 
2
.
2
 
2
.
3
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
 
F
F
 
(
1
9
5
3
)
 
(
2
6
4
5
)
 
(
2
6
9
5
)
 
(
2
9
1
3
)
 
(
4
0
8
8
)
 
(
5
2
9
5
)
 
(
5
5
6
9
)
 
D
.
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
l
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
6
 
F
F
 
1
2
2
 
1
6
0
 
1
9
3
 
2
7
8
 
3
3
3
 
3
2
9
 
3
2
6
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
-
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
3
1
 
1
5
8
 
2
2
8
 
2
7
3
 
2
7
0
 
2
0
-
7
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
-
1
.
6
 
+
3
1
.
1
 
+
2
0
.
6
 
+
4
4
.
C
 
+
1
9
.
8
 
-
1
.
2
 
-
0
.
9
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
0
.
2
 
0
.
2
 
0
.
2
 
o
.
:
 
0
.
3
 
0
.
2
 
0
.
2
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
0
.
0
4
 
0
.
0
4
 
o
.
o
;
 
O
.
C
p
 
0
.
0
7
 
0
.
0
6
 
0
.
0
6
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
6
 
F
F
 
(
2
7
6
8
)
 
(
2
7
6
2
)
 
(
2
7
1
3
)
 
(
2
3
7
7
)
 
(
1
3
3
6
)
 
(
6
2
1
)
 
(
5
9
9
9
)
 
A
N
N
E
X
 
I
V
-
4
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
:
 
O
S
C
E
 
1
9
6
8
 
1
9
6
9
 
1
9
7
0
 
2
1
5
1
0
 
2
4
6
0
8
 
2
7
6
9
8
 
2
6
1
 
2
9
8
 
3
3
6
 
+
 
1
·
1
 
+
1
4
.
4
 
+
1
2
.
6
 
1
3
.
7
 
1
3
.
4
 
1
3
.
1
 
3
·
4
 
3
.
4
 
3
.
4
 
(
2
2
1
6
2
)
 
(
3
5
9
4
0
)
 
(
3
8
4
6
6
)
 
7
1
5
9
 
7
5
4
7
 
8
6
4
3
 
3
0
9
 
3
2
6
 
3
7
3
 
+
1
2
.
4
 
+
 
5
·
4
 
+
1
4
.
5
 
4
.
6
 
4
.
1
 
4
.
1
 
1
.
1
 
1
.
0
 
1
.
1
 
(
1
2
6
2
0
)
 
(
2
2
6
3
2
)
 
(
2
5
5
6
5
)
 
1
3
9
8
4
 
1
6
6
5
5
 
1
8
6
2
2
 
2
4
1
 
2
8
6
 
3
2
0
 
+
 
5
·
3
 
+
1
9
.
1
 
+
1
1
.
8
 
8
.
9
 
9
.
1
 
8
.
8
 
2
.
2
 
2
.
3
 
2
.
3
 
(
6
4
5
1
)
 
(
8
0
5
8
)
 
(
9
1
9
9
)
 
3
6
7
 
4
0
6
 
4
3
3
 
3
0
1
 
3
3
3
 
3
5
5
 
+
1
2
.
6
 
+
1
0
.
6
 
+
 
6
.
7
 
0
.
2
 
0
.
2
 
0
.
2
 
0
.
0
6
 
o
.
o
 
$
 
o
.
o
s
 
(
3
0
9
1
)
 
(
5
2
5
0
)
 
(
3
7
0
2
)
 I
R
E
L
A
B
D
 
G
R
O
S
S
 
J
r
o
R
M
A
T
I
O
:
N
 
O
F
 
F
I
X
E
D
 
C
A
P
I
T
A
L
 
A
S
 
B
E
l
'
S
 
(
G
F
C
A
F
)
 
I
N
 
T
H
E
 
P
U
B
L
I
C
 
S
E
C
T
O
R
 
1
9
6
1
 
1
9
6
2
 
1
9
6
3
 
1
9
6
4
 
1
9
6
5
 
1
9
6
6
 
1
9
6
7
 
1
9
6
8
 
A
.
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
a
s
 
a
 
w
h
o
l
e
 
(
s
t
a
t
e
)
 
-
i
n
 
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
£
 
2
2
.
2
 
2
5
.
9
 
3
0
.
6
 
3
8
.
5
 
4
3
.
8
 
4
1
.
9
 
4
7
.
8
 
5
2
.
0
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
-
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
1
7
 
1
3
8
 
1
7
3
 
1
9
7
 
1
8
9
 
2
1
5
 
2
3
4
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
+
2
2
.
0
 
+
1
6
.
7
 
+
1
8
.
1
 
+
2
5
.
8
 
+
1
3
.
8
 
-
4
.
3
 
+
1
4
.
1
 
-
4
-
8
.
8
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
.
A
F
 
2
0
.
5
 
2
0
.
2
 
2
0
.
6
 
2
2
.
1
 
2
2
.
1
 
2
1
.
4
 
2
2
.
2
 
2
0
.
6
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
3
.
1
 
3
.
4
 
3
·
7
 
4
.
1
 
4
·
4
 
4
.
0
 
4
.
2
 
4
.
1
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
 
(
-
1
.
1
)
 
(
·
1
.
1
)
 
(
3
.
6
)
 
(
3
.
1
)
 
(
3
.
6
)
 
(
1
5
.
9
)
 
(
1
7
-
7
)
 
(
1
6
.
0
)
 
o
f
£
 
B
.
 
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
 
G
o
v
t
.
 
-
i
n
 
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
£
 
9
.
1
 
1
1
.
5
 
1
3
.
4
 
1
6
.
1
 
1
7
-
5
 
1
5
·
7
 
1
6
.
2
 
1
8
.
0
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
-
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
2
6
 
1
4
7
 
1
7
7
 
1
9
2
 
1
7
3
 
1
7
8
 
1
9
8
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
+
1
6
.
7
 
+
2
6
.
4
 
+
1
6
.
5
 
+
2
0
.
1
 
+
 
8
.
7
 
-
1
0
.
3
 
+
 
3
.
2
 
+
1
1
.
1
 
-
%
·
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
8
.
4
 
9
.
0
 
9
.
0
 
9
.
2
 
8
.
8
 
8
.
0
 
1
·
5
 
7
-
1
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
1
.
3
 
1
.
5
 
1
.
6
 
1
.
7
 
1
.
7
 
1
.
5
 
1
.
4
 
1
.
4
.
 
-
l
f
.
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
 
(
-
0
.
2
)
 
(
-
o
.
s
)
 
(
3
.
5
)
 
(
5
.
7
)
 
(
4
.
4
)
 
(
1
6
.
3
)
 
(
1
5
.
0
)
 
(
1
7
.
0
)
 
o
f
·
£
 
c
.
 
L
o
c
a
l
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
-
i
n
 
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
£
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
-
1
0
0
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
£
 
D
.
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
-
i
n
 
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
£
 
-
1
9
6
1
-
1
0
0
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
-
N
.
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
£
 
A
D
E
X
 
I
V
-
5
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
1
 
O
E
C
D
 
1
9
6
9
 
1
9
7
0
 I
 
T
 
A
 
L
 
Y
 
G
R
O
S
S
 
F
O
R
M
A
T
I
O
N
 
O
F
 
F
I
X
E
D
 
C
A
P
I
T
A
L
 
A
S
S
E
T
S
 
-
G
F
C
A
F
)
 
1
9
6
1
 
1
9
6
2
 
1
9
6
3
 
1
9
6
4
 
A
.
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
a
s
 
a
 
w
h
o
l
e
 
(
S
t
a
t
e
)
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
9
 
L
i
r
e
s
 
7
0
9
.
9
 
7
5
7
-
3
 
8
3
7
.
6
 
9
7
8
.
3
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
a
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
7
 
1
1
8
 
1
3
8
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
+
4
 
.
1
 
+
 
6
.
7
 
+
 
1
0
.
6
 
+
1
6
.
8
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
1
2
.
9
 
1
2
.
0
 
1
1
.
4
 
1
3
.
2
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
P
§
i
c
e
s
 
2
.
9
 
2
.
8
 
2
.
7
 
2
.
9
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
 
L
i
r
~
 
k
 
9
0
9
·
 
1
 
(
9
7
0
·
5
 
(
9
5
3
·
9
~
 
(
 
1
1
7
8
.
 
1
 
B
.
 
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
 
G
o
v
t
.
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
9
 
L
i
r
e
s
 
2
8
0
 
·
7
 
3
2
7
.
0
 
3
3
4
.
7
 
3
5
5
-
3
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
:
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
1
7
 
1
1
9
 
1
2
7
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
+
 
2
.
5
 
+
1
6
.
5
 
+
 
2
.
4
 
+
 
6
.
2
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
5
.
1
 
5
-
2
 
4
.
5
 
4
.
8
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
0
r
i
c
e
s
 
s
(
~
:
~
)
 
(
7
8
6
:
~
)
 
(
6
1
1
:
6
)
 
(
7
8
~
:
~
)
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
 
9
L
i
r
e
 
c
.
 
L
o
c
a
l
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
9
 
L
i
r
e
s
 
3
3
1
.
1
 
3
5
8
.
4
 
4
1
0
.
 
~
 
4
9
7
-
0
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
8
 
1
2
4
 
1
5
0
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
+
 
3
.
7
 
+
 
8
.
2
 
+
1
4
.
4
 
+
2
1
.
2
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
6
.
0
 
5
-
7
 
5
.
6
 
6
.
7
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
F
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
1
.
4
 
1
.
3
 
1
.
3
 
1
.
5
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
9
L
i
r
e
s
 
<
-
3
5
.
o
:
 
(
-
7
8
.
3
 
(
-
1
5
5
 
.
2
)
 
(
 
-
2
4
8
.
1
 
D
.
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
l
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
9
 
L
i
r
e
s
 
4
0
.
2
 
5
2
.
9
 
6
3
.
0
 
6
6
.
0
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
3
2
 
1
5
7
 
1
6
4
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
-
1
2
.
4
 
1
 
+
3
1
.
6
 
+
1
9
.
1
 
+
 
4
.
8
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
o
.
 
7
 
I
 
o
 
.
8
 
0
.
9
 
0
.
9
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
o
.
2
 
I
 
o
.
2
 
0
.
2
 
0
.
2
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
9
L
i
r
e
F
:
 
2
3
8
.
5
 
>
1
\
2
6
2
 
.
4
'
 
(
4
9
1
.
 
5
)
 
(
6
3
6
.
9
 
I
N
 
T
H
E
 
P
U
B
L
I
C
 
S
E
C
T
O
R
 
1
9
6
5
 
1
9
6
6
 
1
9
6
?
 
1
9
6
8
 
9
3
8
.
5
 
1
0
1
3
.
7
 
9
8
7
.
4
 
1
1
8
9
.
3
 
1
3
2
 
1
4
3
 
1
3
9
 
1
6
8
 
-
4
.
1
 
+
 
8
.
0
 
-
2
.
6
 
+
 
2
0
 
-
~
·
 
1
3
.
6
 
1
3
.
9
 
1
1
.
9
 
1
2
.
8
 
2
.
6
 
2
.
6
 
2
.
3
 
2
.
5
 
(
2
4
4
 
.
I
1
-
(
1
1
7
.
3
)
 
r
-
8
7
7
.
1
;
 
(
6
2
0
.
6
~
 
3
2
5
.
3
 
3
2
8
.
0
 
3
7
1
.
2
 
4
7
5
.
4
 
1
1
6
 
1
1
7
 
1
3
2
 
1
6
9
 
-
8
.
4
 
+
 
0
.
1
 
+
1
3
.
2
 
+
2
8
.
1
 
4
.
7
 
4
.
5
 
4
.
5
 
5
.
1
 
(
1
6
~
:
~
'
 
(
3
6
~
:
~
 
~
o
g
:
4
)
 
(
6
4
1
 
:
8
)
 
5
1
6
.
6
 
5
2
2
.
6
 
5
1
8
.
9
 
5
2
8
.
2
 
1
5
6
 
1
5
8
 
1
5
7
 
1
6
0
 
+
 
3
·
9
 
+
 
1
.
2
 
-
0
 
.
?
 
+
 
1
.
8
 
7
-
5
 
7
.
2
 
6
.
2
 
6
.
7
 
1
.
4
 
1
.
3
 
1
.
 
2
 
1
 
.
1
 
K
-
1
6
7
 
.
6
 
~
2
9
7
.
1
 
'
-
1
8
7
.
 
5
'
 
~
2
2
9
.
1
 
6
2
.
2
 
1
0
1
 
.
1
 
9
8
.
9
 
1
0
4
.
0
 
1
5
5
 
2
5
2
 
2
4
6
 
2
5
9
 
-
5
.
8
 
+
6
2
.
5
 
-
2
.
2
 
+
 
5
-
2
 
0
.
9
 
1
.
4
 
1
.
2
 
1
 
.
1
 
0
.
2
 
0
.
2
 
0
.
2
 
0
.
2
 
(
2
4
8
.
2
'
 
(
5
1
 
.
o
:
 
~
~
4
3
.
8
.
 
(
2
0
8
.
 
7
'
 
A
N
N
E
X
 
I
V
 
-
6
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
:
 
O
S
C
E
 
1
9
6
9
 
1
9
7
0
 
1
2
1
2
.
8
 
1
3
7
3
.
9
 
1
7
1
 
1
9
4
 
+
 
2
.
0
 
+
 
1
3
.
3
 
1
1
.
3
 
1
1
.
 
1
 
2
.
3
 
2
.
4
 
(
3
8
7
.
3
 
(
4
1
6
.
6
:
 
4
6
2
.
0
 
5
5
8
.
7
 
1
6
5
 
1
9
9
 
-
2
.
8
 
+
2
0
.
9
 
4
.
3
 
4
.
5
 
(
4
3
g
:
~
)
 
<
5
7
8
:
~
>
 
5
8
1
.
0
 
5
9
7
-
2
 
1
7
6
 
1
8
0
 
+
1
0
.
0
 
+
 
2
.
8
 
5
.
4
 
4
.
8
 
1
 
.
1
 
1
.
0
 
(
-
3
1
8
 
•
 
6
 
(
-
2
8
4
.
 
5
.
 
1
1
1
.
0
 
1
1
0
.
4
 
2
7
6
 
2
7
5
 
+
 
6
.
7
 
-
0
 
·
5
 
1
.
0
 
0
.
9
 
0
.
2
 
0
.
2
 
(
2
6
7
.
 
6
:
 
(
 
1
2
2
.
8
 
~
 L
U
X
E
M
B
O
U
R
G
 
A
N
N
E
X
 
I
V
 
-
7
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
:
 
O
S
C
E
 
G
R
O
S
S
 
F
O
R
M
A
T
I
O
N
 
O
F
 
F
I
X
E
D
 
C
A
P
I
T
A
L
 
A
S
S
E
T
S
 
(
G
F
C
A
F
)
 
I
N
 
T
H
E
 
P
U
B
L
I
C
 
S
E
C
T
O
R
 
1
9
6
1
 
1
9
6
2
.
 
1
9
6
3
 
1
9
6
4
 
1
9
6
5
 
1
9
6
6
 
1
9
6
7
 
A
.
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
a
s
 
a
 
w
h
o
l
e
 
(
S
t
a
t
e
)
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
6
 
F
l
u
x
.
 
1
1
6
o
 
1
4
6
0
 
1
2
7
1
 
1
4
8
2
 
1
3
0
8
 
1
4
4
5
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
2
6
 
1
1
0
 
1
2
8
 
1
1
3
 
1
2
5
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
-
5
.
6
 
+
2
5
.
9
 
-
1
2
.
9
 
+
1
6
.
€
 
-
1
1
.
?
 
+
1
0
.
5
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
1
8
.
;
 
2
0
 
.
;
 
1
4
.
4
 
1
3
.
~
 
1
3
.
~
 
1
4
.
7
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
4
.
E
 
5
.
(
 
4
.
E
 
4
.
'
;
 
3
.
~
 
4
.
2
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
6
l
l
u
x
.
~
2
1
4
8
)
 
(
1
6
1
5
)
 
(
1
4
0
4
)
 
(
1
7
4
9
)
 
{
1
8
6
4
)
 
{
1
6
3
5
)
 
B
.
 
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
 
G
o
v
t
.
 
6
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
 
F
l
u
x
.
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
.
A
F
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
6
F
l
U
L
 
C
.
 
L
o
c
a
l
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
6
 
F
l
u
x
.
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
6
F
1
U
&
 
D
.
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
6
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
 
F
l
u
x
.
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
6
i
1
u
x
 
1
4
8
9
 
1
2
8
 
+
 
3
-
0
 
1
6
.
8
 
4
.
2
 
{
7
6
5
)
 
1
9
6
8
 
1
9
6
9
 
1
8
1
0
 
1
7
3
3
 
1
5
6
 
1
4
9
 
+
2
1
.
€
 
-
4
.
3
 
2
0
.
2
 
1
6
.
6
 
4
.
7
 
3
-
9
 
(
6
5
8
)
 
{
1
8
o
9
)
 
1
9
7
0
 G
R
O
S
S
 
F
O
R
M
A
T
I
O
N
 
O
F
 
1
9
6
1
 
A
.
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
a
s
 
a
 
w
h
o
l
e
 
(
S
t
a
t
e
)
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
6
 
N
o
r
w
e
g
i
a
n
 
c
r
o
w
n
s
 
1
1
9
2
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
+
 
2
.
5
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
1
1
.
3
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
6
 
3
.
4
 
N
o
r
w
e
g
i
a
n
 
c
r
o
w
n
s
 
(
2
6
9
1
)
 
B
.
 
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
 
G
o
v
t
.
 
.
 
1
0
6
 
N
 
.
 
-
1
n
 
o
r
w
e
g
1
a
n
 
c
r
o
w
n
s
 
4
1
1
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
+
 
2
.
0
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
3
·
9
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
;
i
c
e
e
 
1
.
2
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
 
N
o
r
w
e
g
i
a
n
 
c
r
o
w
n
s
 
(
 
1
7
4
6
)
 
c
.
 
L
o
c
a
l
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
.
 
1
0
6
 
N
 
.
 
-
1
n
 
o
r
w
e
g
1
a
n
 
c
r
o
w
n
s
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
6
i
c
e
e
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
 
N
o
r
w
e
g
i
a
n
 
c
r
o
w
n
s
 
D
.
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
~
 
.
 
1
0
6
 
N
 
·
 
-
1
n
 
o
r
w
e
g
1
a
n
 
c
r
o
w
n
s
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
~
i
c
e
f
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
 
N
o
r
w
e
g
i
a
n
 
c
r
o
w
n
s
 
N
O
R
W
A
Y
 
F
I
X
E
D
 
C
A
P
I
T
A
L
 
A
S
S
E
T
S
 
(
G
F
C
A
F
)
 
I
N
 
1
9
6
2
 
1
9
6
3
 
1
9
6
4
 
1
9
6
5
 
1
4
1
5
 
1
7
0
6
 
1
9
6
0
 
Z
)
6
9
 
1
1
9
 
1
4
3
 
1
6
4
 
1
7
4
 
+
1
8
.
7
 
+
2
0
 
.
6
 
+
1
4
.
9
 
+
 
5
.
6
 
1
2
.
6
 
1
3
.
8
 
1
5
.
3
 
1
4
.
3
 
3
-
7
 
4
.
2
 
4
.
3
 
4
.
1
 
(
2
8
7
1
)
 
(
2
6
2
3
)
 
(
2
7
6
5
)
 
(
2
 
9
6
5
)
 
4
9
3
 
5
6
8
 
6
7
9
 
7
4
2
 
1
2
0
 
1
3
8
 
1
6
5
 
1
8
1
 
+
2
0
.
0
 
+
1
5
.
2
 
+
1
9
-
5
 
+
 
9
·
3
 
4
.
4
 
4
.
6
 
5
-
3
 
5
-
1
 
1
.
 
3
 
1
.
4
 
1
.
 
5
 
1
.
5
 
(
 
1
8
6
9
)
 
(
 
1
6
9
3
)
 
(
 
1
9
2
3
)
 
(
1
9
1
7
)
 
A
N
N
E
X
 
I
V
 
-
8
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
:
 
O
C
D
E
 
T
H
E
 
P
U
B
L
I
C
 
S
E
C
T
O
R
 
1
9
6
6
 
1
9
6
7
 
1
9
6
8
 
1
9
6
9
 
1
9
7
0
 
2
2
7
7
 
2
7
2
7
 
2
8
5
9
 
3
1
0
2
 
1
9
1
 
2
2
9
 
2
4
0
 
2
6
o
 
+
1
0
 
.
1
 
+
1
9
.
8
 
+
 
4
.
8
 
+
 
8
.
s
 
1
4
.
3
 
1
5
.
0
 
1
6
.
4
 
1
7
.
 
E
 
4
.
2
 
4
.
5
 
4
.
4
 
4
.
5
 
(
3
7
1
5
)
 
(
4
4
5
2
)
 
(
4
3
1
5
)
 
(
4
 
3
9
1
)
 
8
1
4
 
9
7
7
 
1
0
0
6
 
1
1
9
3
 
1
9
8
 
2
3
8
 
2
4
5
 
2
9
0
 
+
 
9
-
7
 
+
2
0
.
0
 
+
 
3
.
0
 
+
1
8
.
6
 
5
.
1
 
5
.
4
 
5
.
8
 
6
.
8
 
1
.
5
 
1
.
 
6
 
1
.
 
6
 
1
.
 
7
 
(
2
5
6
7
)
 
(
3
2
6
2
)
 
(
3
0
0
7
)
 
(
3
0
6
7
)
 A
D
'
E
X
E
 
I
V
-
9
 
N
E
T
H
E
R
L
A
N
D
S
 
S
o
u
r
o
e
 
:
 
O
S
C
E
 
G
R
O
S
S
 
O
O
R
M
A
T
I
O
N
 
O
F
 
F
I
X
E
D
 
C
A
P
I
T
A
L
 
A
S
S
E
I
'
S
 
(
G
F
C
A
F
)
 
I
N
 
T
H
E
 
P
U
B
L
I
C
 
S
E
C
T
O
R
 
1
9
6
1
 
1
9
6
2
 
1
9
6
3
 
1
9
6
4
 
1
9
6
5
 
1
9
6
6
 
1
9
6
7
 
1
9
6
8
 
1
9
6
9
 
1
9
7
0
 
A
.
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
a
s
 
a
 
w
h
o
l
e
 
(
S
t
a
t
e
)
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
6
 
F
L
 
1
9
4
7
 
2
1
6
4
 
2
4
8
3
 
2
9
9
3
 
3
2
3
6
 
3
5
6
7
 
4
0
4
7
 
4
8
2
3
 
5
1
8
0
 
5
6
1
0
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
-
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
1
1
 
1
2
8
 
1
5
4
 
1
6
6
 
1
8
3
 
2
0
8
 
2
4
8
 
2
6
6
 
2
8
8
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
+
1
1
 
3
 
+
1
1
.
1
 
+
1
4
·
7
 
+
2
0
.
5
 
+
 
8
.
1
 
+
1
0
.
2
 
+
1
3
.
5
 
+
1
9
.
2
 
+
 
1
·
4
 
+
 
8
.
3
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
1
7
.
8
 
1
8
.
6
 
2
0
.
0
 
1
9
.
3
 
1
9
.
1
 
1
8
.
4
 
1
9
.
0
 
2
0
.
0
 
2
0
.
1
 
1
8
.
9
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
4
-
3
 
4
-
5
 
4
·
1
 
4
.
8
 
4
-
7
 
4
·
7
 
4
-
9
 
5
.
2
 
s
.
o
 
5
.
0
 
-
N
:
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
6
 
F
L
 
(
2
5
5
5
)
 
(
2
0
9
3
)
 
~
1
7
8
1
)
 
(
2
0
7
3
)
 
(
2
6
1
5
)
 
(
2
9
4
0
)
 
(
3
0
6
7
)
 
(
4
2
2
2
)
 
(
4
9
3
0
)
 
(
5
7
2
0
)
 
B
.
 
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
 
G
o
v
t
.
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
6
 
F
L
 
6
4
0
 
6
1
9
 
7
0
5
 
7
9
6
 
9
3
4
 
1
0
4
0
 
1
1
7
8
 
1
4
1
0
 
1
5
6
0
 
1
7
7
0
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
9
1
 
1
1
0
 
1
2
4
 
1
4
6
 
1
6
3
 
1
8
4
 
2
2
0
 
2
4
4
 
2
7
7
 
-
~
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
+
3
1
-
7
 
-
3
.
3
 
+
1
3
.
9
 
+
1
2
.
9
 
+
1
7
.
3
 
+
1
1
.
3
 
+
1
3
.
3
 
+
1
9
.
7
 
+
1
0
.
6
 
+
1
3
.
5
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
5
·
9
 
5
·
3
 
5
·
7
 
5
.
1
 
5
·
5
 
5
·
4
 
5
·
5
 
5
.
8
 
6
.
1
 
6
.
0
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
1
.
4
 
1
.
3
 
1
.
3
 
1
.
3
 
1
.
4
 
1
.
4
 
1
.
4
 
1
.
5
 
1
.
5
 
1
.
6
 
-
N
:
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
6
 
F
L
 
(
2
0
7
7
)
 
(
1
8
8
2
)
 
1
'
1
8
9
5
)
 
(
2
1
8
9
)
 
(
2
3
3
7
)
 
(
2
8
6
9
)
 
(
3
2
4
7
)
 
(
3
4
5
9
)
 
(
4
1
0
0
)
 
(
4
3
2
0
)
 
C
.
 
L
o
c
a
l
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
6
 
F
L
 
1
3
0
7
 
1
5
4
5
 
1
7
7
8
 
2
1
9
7
 
2
3
0
2
 
2
5
2
7
 
2
8
6
9
 
3
4
1
3
 
3
6
2
0
 
3
8
4
0
 
-
1
9
6
1
-
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
1
8
 
1
3
6
 
1
6
8
 
1
7
6
 
1
9
3
 
2
2
0
 
2
6
1
 
2
7
7
 
2
9
4
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
+
 
3
-
4
 
+
1
8
.
2
 
+
1
5
.
1
 
+
2
3
.
6
 
+
 
4
.
8
 
+
 
9
.
8
 
+
1
3
.
5
 
+
1
9
.
0
 
+
 
6
.
1
 
+
 
6
.
1
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
1
2
.
0
 
1
3
.
3
 
1
4
.
3
 
1
4
.
2
 
1
3
.
6
 
1
3
.
0
 
1
3
.
5
 
1
4
.
2
 
1
4
.
0
 
1
2
.
9
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
g
i
c
e
s
 
2
.
9
 
3
.
2
 
3
-
4
 
3
·
5
 
3
.
3
 
3
-
3
 
3
-
5
 
3
-
7
 
3
.
5
 
3
.
4
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
 
F
L
 
(
1
1
2
)
 
(
9
1
)
 
-
1
4
9
)
 
(
-
2
4
6
)
 
(
8
7
)
 
(
-
5
7
)
 
(
-
3
7
2
)
 
(
1
1
)
 
(
7
0
)
 
(
6
9
0
)
 
D
.
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
6
 
F
L
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
9
6
1
 
-
1
0
0
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
5
i
c
e
s
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
N
:
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
 
F
L
 
(
3
6
6
)
 
(
1
2
0
)
 
(
3
5
)
 
(
1
3
0
)
 
(
1
9
1
)
 
(
1
2
8
)
 
(
1
9
2
)
 
(
7
5
2
)
 
(
7
6
0
)
 
(
7
1
0
)
 U
 
N
 
I
 
T
 
E
 
D
 
-
K
 
I
 
N
 
G
 
D
 
0
 
M
 
G
R
O
S
S
 
F
O
R
M
A
T
I
O
N
 
O
F
 
F
I
X
E
D
 
C
A
P
I
T
A
L
 
A
S
S
E
T
S
 
(
G
F
C
A
F
)
 
I
N
 
1
9
6
1
 
1
9
6
2
 
1
9
6
3
 
1
9
6
4
 
1
9
6
5
 
A
.
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
(
S
t
a
t
e
)
 
a
s
 
a
 
w
h
o
l
e
 
-
i
n
 
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
£
 
9
1
9
 
1
0
2
9
 
1
1
0
8
 
1
3
9
3
 
1
4
8
3
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
1
2
 
1
2
1
 
1
5
2
 
1
6
1
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
+
 
6
.
9
 
+
 
1
2
.
0
 
+
 
7
-
7
 
+
 
2
5
.
7
 
+
 
6
.
5
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
1
9
.
9
 
2
J
.
7
 
2
2
.
6
 
2
3
.
8
 
2
3
.
5
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
3
.
4
 
3
.
6
 
3
.
6
 
4
.
1
 
4
.
1
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
2
3
2
 
5
7
0
 
1
7
1
 
4
7
3
 
7
9
8
 
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
£
 
B
.
 
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
 
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
(
1
)
 
-
i
n
 
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
£
 
2
1
7
 
2
1
5
 
2
2
5
 
2
8
1
 
2
9
8
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
9
9
 
1
0
4
 
1
3
0
 
1
3
7
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
-
1
5
.
2
 
-
0
.
9
 
+
 
4
.
7
 
+
 
2
4
.
9
 
+
 
6
.
0
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
4
.
7
 
4
.
5
 
4
.
6
 
4
.
8
 
4
.
7
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
0
.
8
 
o
.
8
 
0
.
7
 
0
.
8
 
o
.
8
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
2
5
1
 
5
4
8
 
1
9
3
 
3
8
6
 
7
5
2
 
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
£
 
c
.
 
L
o
c
a
l
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
-
i
n
 
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
£
 
7
0
2
 
8
1
4
 
8
8
3
 
1
1
1
2
 
1
1
8
5
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
1
6
 
1
2
6
 
1
5
8
 
1
6
9
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
+
1
6
.
2
 
+
 
1
5
.
9
 
+
 
8
.
5
 
+
 
2
5
.
9
 
+
 
6
.
6
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
1
5
.
2
 
1
7
.
2
 
1
8
.
0
 
1
9
.
0
 
1
8
.
8
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
2
.
6
 
2
.
8
 
2
.
9
 
3
·
3
 
3
·
3
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
-
1
9
 
2
2
 
-
2
2
 
8
7
 
4
6
 
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
£
 
D
.
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
l
 
-
i
n
 
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
£
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
-
%
.
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
£
 
,
.
,
.
,
 
.
.
.
.
 
-
"
'
~
-
-
,
.
.
 
_
_
 
~
_
.
,
 
,
.
,
 
_
_
_
_
_
 
.
.
I
.
L
.
-
-
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
O
E
C
D
 
a
n
d
 
N
a
t
:
 
n
i
c
.
 
a
n
d
 
E
x
p
.
 
1
9
7
1
 
T
H
E
 
P
U
B
L
I
C
 
S
E
C
T
O
R
 
1
9
6
6
 
1
9
6
7
 
1
9
6
8
 
1
9
6
9
 
1
9
7
0
 
1
6
7
8
 
1
9
6
0
 
2
1
6
8
 
2
2
1
0
 
2
3
9
3
 
1
8
3
 
2
1
3
 
2
3
6
 
2
4
0
 
2
6
1
 
+
 
1
3
.
1
 
+
 
1
6
.
8
 
+
 
1
0
.
6
 
+
 
1
.
9
 
+
 
8
.
4
 
2
5
.
0
 
2
7
.
0
 
2
7
.
5
 
2
7
.
2
 
2
7
.
0
 
4
.
4
 
4
.
9
 
5
.
0
 
4
.
9
 
4
.
8
 
1
2
2
1
 
1
0
1
0
 
1
7
3
3
 
2
8
4
3
 
3
3
3
 
3
9
2
 
4
5
6
 
4
8
6
 
5
7
6
 
1
5
3
 
1
8
1
 
2
1
0
 
2
2
4
 
2
6
5
 
+
 
1
1
.
7
 
+
 
1
7
.
7
 
+
 
1
6
.
3
 
+
 
6
.
6
 
+
 
1
8
.
5
 
5
.
0
 
5
.
4
 
5
.
8
 
6
.
0
 
6
.
5
 
0
.
9
 
1
.
0
 
1
.
0
 
1
.
1
 
1
.
1
 
1
1
0
9
 
1
0
2
5
 
1
7
1
3
 
2
8
8
2
 
1
3
4
5
 
1
5
6
8
 
1
7
1
2
 
1
7
2
4
 
1
8
1
9
 
1
9
2
 
2
2
3
 
2
4
4
 
2
4
6
 
2
5
9
 
+
 
1
3
-
5
 
+
 
1
6
.
6
 
+
 
9
.
2
 
+
 
0
.
7
 
+
 
5
-
5
 
2
0
.
0
 
2
1
.
6
 
2
1
.
7
 
2
1
.
2
 
2
0
.
5
 
3
-
5
 
3
-
9
 
4
.
0
 
3
.
8
 
3
.
7
 
1
1
2
 
-
1
5
 
2
0
 
-
3
9
 
A
N
N
E
X
 
I
V
-
1
0
 
!
 
i
 
I
 U
.
 
S
.
 
A
.
 
G
R
O
S
S
 
F
O
R
M
A
T
I
O
N
 
O
F
 
F
I
X
E
D
 
C
A
P
I
T
A
L
 
A
S
S
E
T
S
 
1
9
6
1
 
1
9
6
2
 
1
9
6
3
 
1
9
6
4
 
A
.
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
a
s
 
a
 
w
h
o
l
e
 
(
S
t
a
t
e
)
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
9
 
S
 
1
6
.
1
 
1
6
.
9
 
1
8
.
2
 
1
9
.
8
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
5
 
1
1
3
 
1
2
3
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
+
 
9
-
5
 
+
 
5
.
0
 
+
 
7
-
7
 
+
 
8
.
8
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
1
8
.
8
 
1
8
.
0
 
1
8
.
3
 
1
8
.
3
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
3
.
0
 
3
.
0
 
3
-
0
 
3
.
2
 
-
N
B
 
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
9
 
s
 
(
5
.
1
:
 
(
7
.
9
)
 
(
1
3
.
1
)
 
(
 
1
0
 
.
o
)
 
B
.
 
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
 
G
o
v
t
.
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
9
 
S
 
2
.
3
 
2
.
5
 
2
.
4
 
2
.
6
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
0
9
 
1
0
4
 
1
1
3
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
+
1
5
.
0
 
+
 
8
.
7
 
-
4
.
0
 
+
 
8
.
3
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
2
.
7
 
2
.
7
 
2
.
4
 
2
.
4
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
0
.
4
 
0
.
4
 
0
.
4
 
0
.
4
 
-
N
B
:
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
9
 
S
 
(
-
1
.
8
 
(
-
2
.
8
)
 
(
-
0
.
5
'
 
(
-
5
.
1
)
 
c
.
 
L
o
c
a
l
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
-
-
i
n
 
1
0
9
 
I
 
:
.
.
 
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
.
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
-
N
B
:
-
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
9
 
S
 
D
.
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
l
 
-
i
n
 
1
0
9
 
S
 
-
1
9
6
1
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
-
%
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
a
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
E
 
-
N
B
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
9
 
s
 
;
 
A
N
N
E
X
 
I
V
 
-
1
1
 
S
o
u
r
o
e
 
a
 
O
~
l
)
 
-
l
i
•
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
A
c
c
o
U
D
t
a
 
(
G
F
C
A
F
)
 
I
N
 
T
H
E
 
P
U
B
L
I
C
 
S
E
C
T
O
R
 
1
9
6
,
 
1
9
6
6
 
1
9
6
7
 
1
9
6
6
 
1
9
6
9
 
1
9
7
0
 
2
1
.
5
 
2
3
.
7
 
2
5
.
2
 
2
7
.
1
 
2
7
.
4
 
1
3
4
 
1
4
7
 
1
5
7
 
1
6
8
 
1
7
0
 
+
 
8
.
6
 
+
1
0
.
2
 
+
 
6
.
3
 
+
 
7
-
5
 
+
 
1
.
1
 
1
7
.
9
 
1
8
.
2
 
1
8
.
9
 
1
8
.
5
 
1
7
.
3
 
3
.
1
 
3
.
1
 
3
-
1
 
3
.
1
 
i
.
9
 
(
 
1
4
.
4
)
 
(
1
2
.
5
)
 
(
-
0
.
4
)
 
(
 
1
0
 
.
,
3
)
 
(
2
5
.
1
)
 
2
.
7
 
2
.
8
 
2
.
4
 
2
.
1
 
1
.
9
 
1
1
7
 
1
2
2
 
1
0
4
 
9
1
 
8
3
 
+
 
3
.
8
 
+
 
3
·
7
 
-
1
4
.
3
 
-
1
2
.
5
 
-
9
.
5
 
2
.
3
 
2
.
1
 
1
.
8
 
1
.
4
 
1
.
2
 
0
.
4
 
0
.
4
 
0
.
3
 
0
.
2
 
0
.
2
 
(
-
0
 
.
4
)
 
(
-
8
.
6
)
 
(
-
1
7
.
8
)
 
(
-
8
.
5
)
 
(
-
3
.
3
)
 A
N
N
E
X
 
V
 
V
a
r
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
s
 
o
f
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
a
n
d
 
o
f
 
G
N
P
 
(
1
9
6
1
-
7
0
)
 
-
~
 
6
 
X
 
x
 
A
.
 
G
r
o
s
s
 
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
c
a
]
2
i
t
a
l
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
 
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
7
-
7
5
 
7
·
9
 
0
.
9
8
 
F
r
a
n
c
e
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
4
.
5
8
 
1
0
.
5
 
0
.
4
4
 
I
t
a
l
y
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
7
.
1
4
 
4
.
3
 
1
.
6
6
 
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
5
-
3
0
 
6
.
7
 
0
.
7
9
 
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
9
.
6
o
 
9
.
6
 
1
 
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
r
g
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
.
 
.
 
.
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
(
~
~
 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
 
6
.
8
 
1
1
.
7
 
0
.
5
8
 
B
.
 
G
r
o
s
s
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
E
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
2
.
2
9
 
4
.
9
 
0
.
4
7
 
F
r
a
n
c
e
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
0
.
9
4
 
s
.
8
 
0
.
1
9
 
I
t
a
l
y
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
1
.
4
3
 
5
·
7
 
0
.
2
5
 
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
1
.
7
5
 
5
-
2
 
0
.
3
4
 
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
1
.
2
9
 
4
.
9
 
0
.
2
6
 
(
1
)
 
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
r
g
 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
 
2
.
4
 
3
.
4
 
0
.
7
1
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
 
(
1
)
 
1
.
3
2
 
2
.
8
 
0
.
4
7
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
(
1
)
 
1
9
6
1
-
6
9
 
T
h
e
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
c
o
n
c
l
u
s
i
o
n
s
 
m
a
y
 
b
e
 
d
r
a
w
n
.
 
1
.
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
X
 
O
n
 
t
h
e
 
w
h
o
l
e
,
 
t
h
e
 
G
N
P
 
i
s
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
i
n
g
 
i
n
 
q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
 
b
y
 
a
n
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
5
 
p
e
r
 
c
e
n
t
 
p
e
r
 
a
n
n
u
m
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
E
E
C
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
e
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
r
g
,
 
a
n
d
 
b
y
 
3
 
p
e
r
 
c
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
.
 
O
v
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
e
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
,
 
t
h
e
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
d
 
b
y
 
5
-
1
0
 
p
e
r
 
c
e
n
t
,
 
a
n
d
 
e
v
e
n
 
b
y
 
n
e
a
r
l
y
 
1
2
 
p
e
r
 
c
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
.
 
2
 
•
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
g
a
p
 
6
'
 
T
h
e
 
G
N
P
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
g
a
p
 
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
,
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
,
 
o
n
e
-
f
i
f
t
h
t
o
 
o
n
e
-
h
a
l
f
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
,
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
s
h
o
w
s
 
a
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
c
o
n
c
e
n
-
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
t
h
e
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
.
 
O
n
 
t
h
e
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
h
a
n
d
,
 
t
h
e
 
G
F
C
A
F
 
s
h
o
w
s
 
m
u
c
h
 
l
a
r
g
e
r
 
v
a
r
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
g
a
p
 
b
e
i
n
g
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
o
n
e
-
h
a
l
f
 
a
n
d
 
t
w
o
-
t
h
i
r
d
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
,
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
r
e
f
l
e
c
t
s
 
s
o
m
e
 
v
e
r
y
 
w
i
d
e
 
v
a
r
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
 